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 Abstract  
 
The scientific consensus on climate change is strong, and evidence points to 
the need to take action to drastically reduce emissions of greenhouses gases. 
At the Paris summit in 2015, 195 world leaders set a clear goal to limit climate 
change. Yet the means to achieve this goal remain firmly at the level of the 
nation-state, with each country assuming responsibility for its own national 
plan. Thus national administrations, run by elected politicians, have a crucial 
role to play. It is the role of politicians to put in place the strategies, policies 
and incentives necessary to facilitate emissions reductions.  How does this 
commitment at the level of the nation-state fit with a politician’s mandate as a 
democratically elected representative? What role do national politicians think 
they can and should play in responding to climate change?  
 
The study explores these questions empirically, seeking to understand how 
Members of the UK Parliament (MPs) understand climate change and its 
implications for political and social life, and their deliberations about whether 
or how to act on the issue. The work is informed by an interdisciplinary 
literature including science and technology studies, sociology, political science 
and environmental governance. It uses a mixed method approach, comprising 
corpus analysis of political speech, a focus group with climate advocates, and 
two sets of qualitative interviews with MPs. 
 
The study finds that, whilst politicians understand, to varying degrees, the 
need for action on climate change, it is not straightforward for them to make a 
case for action. There are three main reasons for this. First, the literal and 
metaphorical scale of climate change in comparison to the procedures and 
preoccupations of daily politics. Second, politicians consider the climate issue 
in the context of their professional identity and the cultural norms of their 
workplace, and report that climate action does not ‘fit’ with these norms. Third, 
UK politicians feel very little pressure from their electors to act on climate 
change, and have to work to build a democratic case for climate action.  
 
The study offers recommendations for both research and practice. In terms of 
research, there is a need for a more fine-grained, contextual understanding of 
the interplay between global goals and national political systems. In terms of 
practice, politicians, working with other stakeholders, need support in order to 
articulate the scale and significance of the climate challenge, and craft 
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 Guidelines for Alternative Format PhDs 
 
Below are the guidelines issued by Lancaster University Sociology 
Department, for Alternative Format PhDs. 
	
PhD by Publication (Alternative Format) 
 
To be awarded a PhD by Publication (Alternative Format) a candidate must show that his or 
her work makes a significant contribution to knowledge in a particular field. The publications 
(which may be published, in press or submitted for publication in a relevant scholarly journal) 
and the accompanying statement must also provide evidence of the capacity of the candidate 
to pursue further research, representing a coherent contribution to research in a given field 
and demonstrating a depth of scholarship and originality comparable with that normally 
required in a PhD thesis. The material submitted shall be sufficiently extensive as to provide 
convincing evidence that the research constitutes a substantial contribution to knowledge or 




(a) Candidates are encouraged to seek advice within the Sociology Department that the 
Alternative Format is more appropriate for the research project and that s/he can take full 
advantage of the Alternative Format;  
(b) these guidelines shall form the basis of agreement between the student, supervisor and 
head of department (or her/his nominee) on the Alternative Format to be employed in the 
submission;  
(c) supervision shall proceed in the typical manner.  
 
The thesis shall be comprised of two key elements:  
(1) original, researched materials (normally at least 4 pieces of writing); and 
(2) a supporting paper of 10- 20 000 words.  
 
Notes: 
a) The original researched materials submitted may:  
(i) be already published; and/or  
(ii) be accepted for publication; and/or  
(iii) be submitted for publication in externally refereed contexts such as journals, conference 
proceedings and on-line sites, and 
(iv) include materials which are solely and/or partly authored by the candidate.  
 
The pieces may include journal articles and book chapters, but may not include course 
readers, or unpublished seminar/conference papers.  
 
(b)The candidate must also submit a supporting paper of 10-20 000 words that summarises 
each submitted piece, outlines their interrelationship, gives a critical review of the current state 
of knowledge and research in the applicant's field and indicates how his or her work has 
contributed to the field. For published pieces, should also comment on the standing of any 
journals and the reception of the publications as indicated by citations and reviews.  
 
Examination 




Examiners shall satisfy themselves that the thesis as a whole meets the criteria for award of 
the degree, as outlined above. They may wish to pay particular attention to satisfying 
themselves that of any multi-authored materials included, a significant proportion is the work 
principally of the candidate; and are reminded of the freedom to specify additional tests as 
part of the examination. 
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 The structure of this portfolio 
 
The portfolio begins with the first half of the Supporting Paper, Part A. This  
reports on the research process. It includes a review of the existing state of 
knowledge, the methodological stance, and a summary of published papers. It 
describes the collaboration with Green Alliance, as partners in this project, 
and other policy and practitioner interactions. It also suggests avenues for 
future research.  
 
The five journal papers themselves then follow, as Part B. 
 
Part C is the second half of the Supporting Paper, offering some personal 
reflections on the PhD project. I reflect on the research process itself, 
describing challenges including my own positioning in the research, and 
interdisciplinary working. Finally, I offer some reflections, more speculative 
and wide-ranging than is possible in published papers, on the future of politics 
and climate change.  
 
Part D contains a consolidated bibliography, and annexes, including the 
participant information sheet, consent form and interview schedules; and three 
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 1. Introduction: The origins of this project 
 
A few months before the UK’s 2010 general election, I ran a series of 
workshops for prospective Members of Parliament (MPs), run by Green 
Alliance, an environmental think tank. The workshops were designed to 
introduce MPs to the science, policy and politics of climate change. Our 
participants had discussions with eminent scientists, to talk about climate 
science and its implications. They talked to business representatives, civil 
society groups and government advisers, to develop ideas about how the UK 
can reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases. They debated, with senior 
politicians from their own parties, the implications of climate change for the 
political strategies and outlooks of each political tradition.  
 
The workshops were undoubtedly a success. Over 50 politicians attended, we 
received very positive feedback, we built a relationship with the MPs after the 
election, and we repeated the workshops before the 2015 election. But the 
more time I spent on the work, the more I was nagged by a fundamental 
question. We offered the politicians the chance to learn, to think and to debate 
climate change. What happened when they walked out the door? How did 
they take this learning into their work as a politician? To put it another way – 
suppose each politician had left our workshop convinced of the case for action 
on climate change, how would that change the way they approached their 
job? 
 
It has long been understood that people do not respond to scientific evidence 
in a linear way; politicians, or indeed anyone, should not be seen as empty 
vessels waiting to be filled with knowledge, the so-called ‘deficit model’ of 
science communication (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004; Wynne, 2010). Lack of 
action on climate change, for example, cannot simply be explained by lack of 
knowledge about climate science. Conversely, telling people about the 
science of climate change will not automatically lead to a change in outlook or 
behaviour. I knew that I should not expect politicians to change their views or 
actions on climate change just because they knew more about it, following the 
workshops. So how could I find out more about how they might approach the 
issue, and, therefore, how they could be better understood and supported? 
 
I tried to answer this question. I turned to the academic journals, to see what 
research existed. The literature on climate politics and governance was 
extensive – but there was nothing about politicians, as a significant group of 
individuals within these systems and institutions. There was, too, a rich 
literature about public attitudes and motivations on climate change (eg Horton, 
2003; Laidley, 2013; Norgaard, 2006) and the outlook of business leaders (eg 
(Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Wright et al., 2012). There was nothing like this 
for politicians. I decided I would have to find out myself – and that was the 






 2. Report and summary of the project 
2.1 The contribution of this project 
 
The central research question for this project is:  
 
How do MPs understand climate change and its implications for political and 
social life, and how do they decide whether or how to act on the issue? 
 
As the review in section 2.2 below shows, whilst the politics and governance 
of climate change has been much discussed across the social sciences, there 
has been very little research directed at the question of how politicians 
understand and act upon the issue. The gap in the literature is aptly 
summarised by a review conducted by Lauren Rickards and colleagues into 
the role of senior government and business decision makers in climate 
change mitigation: 
 
Despite the important role of SDMs [senior decision-makers], many 
analyses of the climate change problem gloss over them. On the one 
hand, analyses focus on high-level political economy and sectoral 
responses, playing into images of impersonal omnipotent systems, 
outdated faith in nation states and global agreements, and abstract 
references to ‘power relations’. On the other hand, analyses focus on 
homogenized private individuals (‘consumers’), playing into uncritical 
universalized statements about human responsibility, the neoliberal 
privatization of risk, and climate policy techniques reductively focused 
on civic society. While concentrating instead on SDMs within influential 
political economic structures is no panacea, it does begin to address 
these blind spots and expand change options beyond the limited reach 
of international negotiations or public behaviour change. (Rickards et al 
2014:3) 
 
This is the contribution of this project. It focuses on an under-researched area: 
the motivations and outlooks of politicians, as an important group within 
climate change research. It connects and draws together the disparate 
literatures described in section 3 below, and adds empirical data.  
 
The project was developed as a CASE Studentship, a collaborative project 
between Lancaster University and the think-tank Green Alliance, funded by 
the UK Economic and Social Research Council. The role of Green Alliance as 
the CASE partner is discussed in section 2.5 below. 
 
Thus the project contributes to knowledge in the following ways: 
 
• Providing the first detailed, mixed-method study of how politicians 
understand and respond to climate change; 
 
• In doing so, contributing to the limited number of studies which use 
qualitative methods to investigate politicians’ identities and working 
lives;	
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 • Using novel methodologies, particularly the use of corpus analysis to 
supplement qualitative research methods, and the development of 
composite narratives to present interview data. 
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 2.2 The existing state of knowledge  
 
This project draws on an interdisciplinary literature from across the social 
sciences, drawing on sociology, science and technology studies, political 
science, political theory and geography. Research from all of these disciplines 
provides useful insights into the central research question, though none 
addresses the question directly.  
 
The existing state of knowledge is summarised below and explored in more 
detail in the following section. 
• There has been a great deal of interdisciplinary research into 
mechanisms for environmental governance, and more specifically, 
climate governance. Such work tends to focus on governance 
mechanisms and processes, rather than examining political questions, 
or the motivations or outlooks of the people involved. 
• There is a large and growing literature examining climate politics, in 
the fields of political science and theory. A specific question addressed 
is whether and how climate issues can be incorporated into current 
political arrangements, or whether new approaches are needed. Like 
the work on environmental governance, this does not directly address 
the ‘people question’. 
• There are significant and varied literatures in sociology, social 
psychology and business and management studies, investigating 
understandings of climate change, both among publics and within 
specific groups. This includes a vast literature examining the 
relationship between identity, attitudes, values and behaviour in relation 
to environmental issues; research into specific social and professional 
groupings, including business leaders and environmental activists; and 
work which looks at differences between social class and gender. 
However, with the exception of one Australian study, there is no 
research into politicians as a professional group, and none on UK 
Members of Parliament.  
• The question of how people engage with scientific evidence has 
long been examined within science and technology studies (STS), with 
direct relevance to this project. STS approaches can help to explain 
how politicians understand and respond to scientific evidence. 
• There is a tradition of research into the outlook and working life of 
politicians, across the social sciences. This focuses on the working 
practices, behaviours and strategies of politicians, but does not 
specifically address the issue of climate change. Of particular interest is 
the sociological research into politicians’ identity and social 
understandings, and specifically, research into gender and politics. 
Below, each of these areas of literature is summarised in turn.  
Environmental governance 
There is a very large literature on environmental governance, at international, 
national and local levels, from disciplines including economics, political 
science, geography and environmental science, as well as much 
interdisciplinary work (examples which include discussions of climate change 
include Dalby, 2013; Dryzek, 2016; Eckersley, 2004; Johnson et al., 2014; 
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 Latour, 2014; Lövbrand et al., 2009; Underdal, 2017). The literature of most 
relevance to this study, listed below, includes a) recent work developing the 
concepts of ‘earth system governance’ and ‘planetary boundaries’; b) the field 
of transition management; and c) analyses of actually-existing climate 
strategies and plans at national level.  
 
a) ‘Earth System governance’ is defined by one of its architects, Frank 
Biermann, as “the societal steering of human activities with regard to the long-
term stability of geobiophysical systems” (2014:59). Such research has both 
an analytical and normative dimension, analysing current and historical 
attempts to govern earth systems, and, in normative terms, investigating ways 
in which governance processes could be reformed in order to better manage 
earth systems. Much work in this area has been carried out through the Earth 
System governance Project, launched in 2009. A related concept is the call for 
‘planetary stewardship’ which advocates a system of governance “built around 
scientifically developed boundaries for critical Earth System processes” 
(Rockström et.al., 2009:757). This work is useful in that it analyses the link 
between scientific evidence of climate change (in the context of earth 
systems) and the question of governance. However, it largely focuses on 
multilateral institutions, such as the UN system, with less focus on national 
administrations. Whilst, in its normative dimension, it advocates governance 
regimes to move to effective earth system governance, it does not address the 
question of how such a process could be managed within political systems at 
national or local level.  
 
b) The field of ‘socio-technical transitions’ (see Geels et al., 2017 for a 
summary) aims to analyse the way in which a society and economy can be 
governed in order to bring about desired changes, such as a deep reduction in 
carbon emissions. It provides a useful account of how the transition to a low-
carbon economy and society could be brought about. Emerging from the field 
of evolutionary economics, this approach starts from an analysis of past 
transitions, such as the shift from carriages to automobiles, and uses this 
analysis to suggest how such transitions could be brought about or enabled in 
order to meet social or environmental goals (Geels, 2005; Markard et al., 
2012). This approach provides a useful account of the complexities and 
timescales of environmental governance. However, it has been criticised for 
not paying enough attention to power and politics, particularly the tendency of 
incumbent industries and their supporters to resist change (Geels, 2014; 
Phelan et al., 2012; Unruh, 2000). Neither does it provide an account of the 
motivations of individuals involved in promoting or resisting transitions, 
concentrating instead on economic structures and processes. 
 
c) Also of use to this study are empirical analyses of environmental policy 
across different legislative systems, which show the influence of different 
governance arrangements (eg Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013; Schaffer and 
Bernauer, 2014). A recent review of ‘post-carbon pathways’ (Wiseman et al., 
2013) examine eighteen strategies for responding to climate change, nine 
government-led and nine from non-government sources. The study notes that  
the government-led plans are markedly less ambitious and more incremental 
in tone than the non-government plans. It also stresses the lack of attention to 
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 the political effort required to bring such transitions about, noting “a lack of 
detailed game plans within the strategies analysed for mobilising the required 
level of political leadership and public support for rapid transitions. This 
remains the most significant gap in post-carbon economy transition strategies.” 
(2013:91)   
Climate politics 
As described above, much analysis of environmental governance is silent 
about the politics surrounding it, and specifically, the way in which any 
governance changes might be brought about. Such questions are, however, 
addressed within the disciplines of political theory and political science. The 
areas of most relevance to the study are as follows: a) political theory 
investigating the relationship between humans and the natural world; b) 
political theory and commentary addressing the question of whether or how 
climate change can be addressed through current political structures, or 
whether more radical change is needed; c) political science analysing the 
workings of political systems, including how issues are framed and discussed 
(or ignored); and d) theoretical accounts of political representation, which, 
whilst not specifically addressing questions of climate change, proved to be a 
significant theme emerging from the data generated by this study. 
 
a) The question of the place of nature and non-human species in politics has 
been discussed for many centuries (for an overview see Dobson, 2000). 
Recently, this debate has taken a new turn, with commentators from across 
the natural and social sciences arguing that human-induced changes to earth 
systems are now so profound that we have entered a new geological era, the 
Anthropocene (Bai et al., 2016; Biermann, 2014; Clark and Gunaratnam, 
2017; Lövbrand et al., 2015). The relative planetary stability of the Holocene 
era, it is argued, has given way to a new phase of greater instability in earth 
systems, including the climate system, which in turn requires different political 
understandings (Castree et al., 2014; Clark, 2014). These insights are very 
significant for the study described here, because modern democratic politics 
has developed in a time of relative climatic stability. Anthropogenic changes 
threaten this stability, and a full political response to climate change would 
require discussion of the extent to which a stable climate is a prerequisite for 
our political and social systems. 
 
b) A related debate is the question of whether climate change can be 
addressed through existing political and economic systems, or whether more 
radical changes are needed. Some accounts of climate politics, such as 
Anthony Giddens’ (2009), propose an incremental, reformist agenda; most 
politicians would, implicitly or explicitly, hold this view, as evidenced by 
political manifestos, for example. The analysis of Parliament’s independent 
adviser, the Committee on Climate Change, suggests that radical emissions 
reductions, in line with the 2008 Climate Change Act, are possible under 
current models of governance (Committee on Climate Change, 2016). 
However, more radical critics maintain that meaningful action is incompatible 
with the global economic system, and that far-reaching changes to our 
economy and society are necessary. For example, Tim Jackson (2011) states 
that climate change cannot be tackled without addressing the ‘growth 
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 imperative’ of modern societies; Naomi Klein (2015) similarly argues that the 
structures of modern capitalism are incompatible with climate action; and Eric 
Swyngedouw (2010) argues that climate politics has become ‘post-political’, in 
that it is based around a false consensus about the need for technocratic 
solutions rather than radical economic and social action (see also Machin, 
2013). Radical ecologist William Ophuls makes a similar point from a different 
perspective, that modern societies and political systems are made possible by 
abundant natural resources and a stable environment. The implication is that 
scarcity and environmental instability would threaten the viability of liberal 
democracy (Ophuls, 1992). 
 
c) There is a specific literature within political science which discusses the 
place of climate change on the political agenda. UK studies include Neil 
Carter’s (2014) account of the way in which climate became a significant 
political issue leading up to the 2008 introduction of the Climate Change Act. 
Further analyses (Carter and Clements, 2015; Lockwood, 2013) document 
how consensus behind the Act has unravelled in the intervening years, with 
Fay Farstad and colleagues (2018) warning that the Brexit process could put 
the Climate Change Act itself at risk.  
 
A further insight from political science is the literature on ‘framing’ in politics 
(Benford and Snow, 2000; Cobb and Coughlin, 1998; Downs, 1972; Hajer and 
Forester, 1993; Kingdon, 1995). This describes the process by which 
politicians shape an issue to fit with their ideology, the views and opinions of 
voters and other actors, a sense of what is achievable, prevailing norms and 
assumptions, and so on. An example of such framing is the 1997-2010 Labour 
administration’s deliberate use of economic language and policy instruments 
to achieve environmental goals, which Maarten Hajer (2000) has termed 
‘ecological modernisation’. 
 
d) The discussion of representation in political theory became an important 
theoretical insight for this study, once the interview data revealed MPs’ 
understandings of their representative role to be a key factor in their 
consideration of climate change. The meaning of representation has been 
debated for many centuries (Dobson and Hamilton, 2016; Mansbridge, 2003). 
Standard theories of representation are based on territoriality, but such 
descriptions do not account for issues such as religion, ethnicity or gender 
identity; or the role of non-elected actors in politics, such as businesses or civil 
society groups organising around issues rather than places (Urbinati and 
Warren, 2008). Neither do standard accounts solve the issue of whether or 
how nature and non-human species get a hearing in the democratic process 
(Dobson and Hamilton, 2016). As these standard accounts have come under 
increasing pressure, Michael Saward has proposed a shift in how 
representation can be understood. He argues that representation should be 
seen not as a static fact, but as a dynamic exchange between representatives 
and those being represented, in which a politician (or anyone else seeking a 
representative role) can make a claim, which in turn is accepted or rejected by 
others (Saward, 2010). Saward’s articulation of representation seemed to 
match the accounts put forward by politicians in my study, as explored in 
Paper 3.  
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 Understandings of climate change 
Public opinion research reveals conflicting understandings of climate change. 
Government-commissioned polling in the UK reports that 71% of individuals 
said they are very or fairly concerned about climate change, with this figure 
increasing slightly over time (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, 2017). However, there is also evidence to suggest that public 
concern about climate change is low compared to other issues:  
 
Climate change is invariably not the highest or most important priority 
for many people…. Other global/societal issues (e.g. world poverty, 
crime, terrorism, and war), environmental issues (e.g. water pollution), 
or personal issues (e.g. health, finances, and relationships) have a 
higher expressed importance for them. (Pidgeon, 2012:s87) 
 
This complex picture has been analysed in more detail by scholars from a 
range of disciplines investigating how people understand and respond to 
climate change. In common with the field of science and technology studies 
(STS) discussed in the next section, many of these studies stress that the way 
in which people respond to scientific information is socially and culturally 
constituted (Hulme, 2009). For example, a recent review of the psychology 
literature listed 29 ‘barriers to action’ on climate change, including optimism 
bias, and discounting of the future (Gifford, 2011). The sociologist Kari 
Norgaard uses the term ‘socially organised denial’ to describe “not in most 
cases a rejection of information per se, but the failure to integrate this 
knowledge into everyday life or to transform it into social action” (2011:11). 
This may be symptomatic of life in a complex society where social practice is 
predicated on carbon consumption (Shove, 2012; Urry, 2011).  
 
A relatively small number of studies use the approach taken in this project: 
detailed sociological analysis of the attitudes and motivations of a particular 
social group. Such studies include Thomas Laidley’s (2013) study of class 
differences in responding to climate change, Dave Horton’s (2003) account of 
the identity work of environmental activists, Christopher Wright and colleagues’ 
(2012) study of sustainability ‘experts’ within large corporations, and Kari 
Norgaard’s (2006) investigation of climate understandings in a Norwegian 
village. The only study identified which investigates politicians as a specific 
group, is research by Kelly Fielding and colleagues (2012) on Australian 
politicians, though the work employed quantitative survey techniques rather 
than the more detailed, exploratory methods used in this project. More 
generally, a 2014 review found no research into the views, values and 
motivations of practising politicians on these issues (Rickards et al., 2014). 
Engaging with scientific evidence 
The above discussion of understandings of climate change relates to the 
broader question of the ways in which scientific evidence is produced, and 
how people respond to scientific evidence. These issues are addressed within 
science and technology studies (STS), a field which is too broad and 
heterogeneous to explore comprehensively in this review. Relevant work 
includes analysis of the ways in which climate change is constituted and 
discussed as a scientific phenomenon (eg Beck, 1992; Jasanoff, 2010; Lash 
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 et al., 1996; Wynne, 2010), and the ways in which scientific knowledges and 
public understandings interact (McNeil, 2013; Wilsdon and Willis, 2004; 
Wynne, 1996).  
 
STS insights help to explain that when politicians assess climate change, it is 
not simply a case of taking evidence and ‘translating’ it into appropriate 
governance mechanisms. STS dismisses the notion that science can be 
straightforwardly ‘translated’ (Wynne, 2010). Instead, the ways in which 
people and institutions respond to scientific evidence are complex and 
situated, influenced by social and institutional norms and cultures. As 
articulated by Sheila Jasanoff, the challenge is to understand the “complex 
ways in which the construction of stable knowledge interpenetrates with the 
formation of core elements that stabilize society: identities, institutions, 
discourses and representations, among others” (2010:236). 
 
Also from the field of STS comes insights, inspired by Bruno Latour’s early 
work (1987, 1983) into how scientists go about their working life. Latour’s 
analysis demonstrates that everyday practices have a strong influence over 
the definitions of aims or ambitions (Latour, 1987). An influential study for this 
project is Joan Fujimura’s (1987) study of ‘do-able problems’. Fujimura uses 
ethnographic investigation to reveal how scientists in a cancer laboratory 
constantly work to ‘achieve alignment’ between the day-to-day tasks they 
carry out, the wider environment of the laboratory; and the expectations of 
colleagues, sponsors and other actors. Whilst scientists state their aims in 
terms of the scientific breakthrough they are trying to achieve, these aims are 
actually constantly adapted and negotiated in the light of day-to-day pressures 
and constraints. Fujimura argues that, through this process of ‘tinkering’, aims 
and ambitions get crafted into ‘do-able problems’, manageable within the 
confines of laboratory life. Applying this analysis to parliament, the day-to-day 
working life of politicians could be expected to influence their broader aims 
and ambitions. 
The outlook and working life of politicians 
Although there has not been previous detailed research on how politicians 
understand climate change, other studies about how politicians conceive of 
their roles and duties provide useful background for this study. For example, 
Richard Fenno’s (1977) classic account of ‘home style’ describes the political 
strategy of individual US Members of Congress, drawing a distinction between 
the way that they represent issues in Washington and in their own District. In 
the UK, political scientist Philip Norton has documented the changing 
relationship between MPs and their constituents over time (see for example 
Norton, 1997). Ethnographies of parliament and government (eg Crewe, 2015; 
Rhodes, 2011) describe the day-to-day working lives of Members of 
Parliament, and government ministers. These texts, mainly written from the 
perspective of political science, offer useful insights into politicians’ lives and 
outlooks. 
 
An area of focus is gender in the House of Commons, with studies from both 
political science and sociology examining the role of female MPs in what is still 
a male-dominated environment. For example, Joanna McKay (2011) 
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 investigates how female politicians in the UK and Germany navigate the 
conflicting demands of motherhood and political life. Joni Lovenduski (2012), 
Rosa Malley (2012) and Sarah Childs (2013, 2004) examine gendered 
cultures within the Commons. Their work draws on the tradition of ‘new 
institutionalist’ thought, which argues that the norms and rituals of parliament 
condition and constrain action. Institutions like Parliament consist of 
‘collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions…. 
When individuals enter an institution, they try to discover, and are taught, the 
rules’ (Chappell, 2006:161; see also Douglas, 1986; Lewis and Steinmo, 
2012).  
 
One study that has been particularly influential in this project is Nirmal Puwar’s 
(2004, 1997) study of female and ethnic minority parliamentarians in the 
House of Commons. Puwar draws on the work of Bourdieu to argue that there 
are strong, yet implicit, norms governing life in the House of Commons. The 
‘habitus’ or life-world of politicians, she argues, is implicitly gendered and 
racialised, yet white male politicians feel themselves to be neutral or 
unmarked. Puwar writes that ‘there is a behavioural male norm and women 
are under assimilative pressures to conform to that norm’ (1997:100). If 
politicians reject these norms, they risk damaging their social capital. No other 
study provided the level of detail or insight into politicians’ identities and 
worldviews, which came to be of crucial importance to me in my research, 




 2.3 Methodology 
 
This section summarises the methodology of this project. Each published 
paper sets out the methodological approach in more detail. 
 
The project proceeded as follows: 
• Literature review 
• Design of empirical work; ethical review and approval 
• Corpus analysis of Hansard 
• Focus group with practitioners 
• Interviews with current and former Members of Parliament. 
These stages are described in turn below. 
Literature review 
As described in section 2 above, the literature review was interdisciplinary, 
including literature from sociology, science and technology studies, political 
science, political theory and geography. A series of working papers was 
written, which were later incorporated into the published papers, and this 
supporting paper. During the literature review, I also looked at qualitative 
method, including focus group and interview techniques, ‘elite’ interviews, a 
review of other interview-based studies with politicians, and an investigation of 
biographical and narrative approaches. 
Design of empirical work; ethical review and approval 
The aim of this study was to provide a fine-grained, contextual account of the 
ways in which national politicians experience the issue of climate change. To 
do this, the study takes a mixed-method approach, inspired by what Sanford 
Schram (2013) calls “phronetic social science”.  
 
The term ‘phronesis’ refers to an Aristotelian categorisation of knowledge, 
described as “the practical wisdom that emerged from having an intimate 
familiarity of what would work in particular settings and circumstances” 
(Schram 2013:369). As such, it can be distinguished from episteme, or 
universal knowledge; and techné, or practical application of knowledge. 
Following this approach, this study aims to uncover politicians’ phronetic 
knowledge. It scrutinises their innate understandings of the possibilities and 
constraints of their role, or what Sandford Schram and colleagues refer to as 
“the ‘unconsciously competent’ expertise that ought to be part of the scholarly 
endeavour”. (Schram et al., 2013:271; see also Tyfield and Blok, 2016) 
 
Phronetic social science can be seen as an approach rather than a theory, 
and its application is characterised by mixed-method, problem-driven research 
processes. In this case, the problem being addressed is how politicians 
understand and respond to climate change, and, following from this, how to 
develop better climate governance within the context of national political 
cultures and processes. I decided to use a number of contrasting research 
methods to address this core problem: corpus analysis of political speech, a 
focus group with environmental advocates, and narrative interviews with 
current and former Members of Parliament. A mix of methods helps to 
‘triangulate’ research findings (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). It also allows 
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 an iterative process, in that each stage was informed by the previous research, 
and participants were told about, and asked to reflect on, earlier research 
findings. 
 
Ethical approval from Lancaster University’s ethics committee was sought and 
received. The foremost ethical consideration was the need for anonymity for 
the research subjects, discussed below, and in Paper 3. 
Corpus analysis of political speech 
The first piece of empirical work used the technique of corpus analysis, to 
investigate the language that politicians use to talk about climate change in 
public speech, in the House of Commons. Corpus analysis is a method 
developed within linguistics, analysing large volumes of text, known as 
corpora, to identify patterns in language use (Sinclair, 2005; Wynne, 2005). I 
created a corpus consisting of 97000 words of speech from debates about the 
Climate Change Act, an Act of Parliament passed in 2008 which sets the 
framework for the UK’s response to climate change. This corpus was 
compared with a ‘reference corpus’, a representative sample of language. The 
results were published as Paper 1, described in more detail in the next section. 
Focus group with stakeholders 
With the help of Green Alliance, I ran a focus group for representatives from 
non-governmental organisations who work with politicians on climate change. 
Representatives from Christian Aid, Green Alliance, the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds, the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace took part. I first 
asked them to relate their experiences of working with politicians on climate 
change. I then asked for their views on what motivates politicians. Finally, I 
talked through the main findings of the corpus analysis described above, and 
asked for reflections. The discussion was recorded, transcribed and coded 
using nVivo software.  
Interviews with current and former Members of Parliament 
Following the focus group, I began the first set of interviews with MPs and 
former MPs, in early 2016. Twenty-two people were approached, to secure 
the 14 interviews (66% acceptance rate). Participants were selected to 
provide a balance of age, gender, political party, seniority and length of time 
served as an MP. I used Riessman’s (2008) narrative approach, focussing on 
eliciting narrative from interviewees, with the interview conducted as a free-
flowing conversation. I asked participants to reflect on the way they work in 
general, and the influences and pressures upon them, before asking 
questions specifically about climate change, including their views on how it is 
discussed in Parliament, as well as their own viewpoint. Papers 2, 3 and 4 
(summarised below) give more background to the methodology used for 
interviews and analysis. 
 
The first set of interviews were all held in 2016, prior to the EU Referendum. 
The political hiatus following the Referendum provided a natural break point, 
with MPs very preoccupied about this significant change to UK politics. I 
judged that it would not have been worthwhile to contact MPs at this stage, as 
they would have been less likely to accept, and would have been distracted by 
Referendum / EU issues. I therefore waited until early 2017 to begin the 
21
 second set of interviews, conducting three in early 2017 before being stalled 
once more by the sudden election announcement. The six final interviews 
were conducted in late 2017 and early 2018. The acceptance rate for the 
second round was slightly lower, with 17 MPs approached to secure 9 
interviews (53% acceptance rate), probably reflecting the more turbulent 
political circumstances. 
 
In the second set of interviews, I focussed less on MPs’ working practices and 
outlooks, and more on their views on the issue of climate change. This is 
because I felt I had enough data on these issues, and I felt that similar themes 
were recurring – I had reached a ‘saturation point’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2015). However I had less data on interviewees’ understandings of climate 
change. Though I had discussed the issue with all of them, I had not had time 
in most interviews to develop and probe their responses to questions on 
climate change. Most interviews lasted 30-40 minutes, with current MPs in 
particular not willing to offer more time than this. 
 
Thus I decided to approach the second set of interview differently. I started by 
summarising the findings of the first set of interviews, as presented in Paper 2. 
First, I asked interviewees to comment on these findings, before moving on to 
a more detailed set of questions about how they thought climate change could 
be addressed within the UK political setting. I asked each interviewee how 
political systems could acknowledge and face up to the material significance 
of climate change, at planetary scale, in a way that engages and is workable 
within current political systems (if indeed this is possible). I then asked them to 
reflect on what this means for the traditions and assumptions of politics; and 
lastly, how politicians could be supported in tackling these fundamental issues. 
The findings of the second set of interviews are discussed in Paper 5. 
 
Table 1: Interviewees’ background and experience (both interview sets 
combined) 
 
gender 14 male, 9 female (gender balance of current Parliament is 
71% male) 
party affiliation 8 Conservative, 9 Labour, 4 Liberal Democrat, 2 other 
time served as MP Between 1 and 23 years’ work as an MP; mean = 8.6 
years 
current status 12 sitting MPs; 11 former MPs, who left office between 
2010 and 2017 
seniority 9 interviewees had served in government; 4 had served on 
the opposition frontbench. 10 were backbenchers, most 
with experience on Select Committees. 
record on climate 
change issues 
7 with a strong record of activity on climate change issues 
(assessed through speeches in Westminster and 
elsewhere); 11 with some activity; 5 with little or no activity 
participants were not asked for additional demographic data, eg age or ethnicity 
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 2.4 Summary of papers, and linkages between them 
 
Here I summarise each of the five papers comprising this PhD portfolio, and 
then I describe the linkages between them, in the context of the overall project 
and research process. 
 
Table 2 summarises the standing of each journal, and the reception of the 
publications, as indicated by citations, reviews and other feedback.  
 
The papers are as follows: 
 
Paper 1: Taming the Climate? Corpus Analysis of politicians’ 
speech 
Published in Environmental Politics, January 2017 
 
Paper 2: How Members of Parliament Understand and Respond to 
Climate Change 
Published in The Sociological Review, September 2017 
 
Paper 3: The use of composite narratives to present interview 
findings  
Published in Qualitative Research, July 2018 
 
Paper 4: Constructing a ‘representative claim’ for action on 
climate change: Evidence from interviews with politicians 
Published in Political Studies, January 2018 
 
Paper 5: Governing earth systems: The role of national politicians 
Submitted to Global Environmental Change, September 2018 (in 
review); accepted for presentation at the Earth Systems Governance 
conference, November 2018 
 
The papers, as listed above, follow the sequence of the research process. 
Below, I summarise each paper and outline its position within the project as a 
whole.  
Paper 1: Taming the Climate? Corpus Analysis of politicians’ speech 
Paper 1 provides an analysis of politicians’ public speech on climate change. 
The data for the paper consists of 97000 words of spoken debate in the 
Chamber of the House of Commons, during the 2008 Climate Change Act. 
The data is analysed using techniques of corpus analysis, a method first used 
in linguistics but increasingly being applied in the social sciences. Given the 
relative rarity of this method in political research, the paper describes and 
discusses the applicability of corpus analysis in some detail, a point that was 
welcomed by reviewers. The paper concludes that politicians frame climate 
change narrowly, as an economic and technical issue, with very little 
discussion of people or the natural world. It evidences this with data derived 
from corpus analysis, for example, explaining that the language used to 
describe climate change is more technical and less people-focussed than 
discussions about economic policy. It also concludes that politicians shy away 
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 from discussion of the more radical implications of climate change, particularly 
abrupt or irreversible change. I suggest that politicians attempt to ‘tame’ 
climate change, in order to find ways of making it an acceptable issue in 
political terms. However, such an approach, by definition, precludes more 
radical speech or action.  
 
Reviewers of the original version of the paper commented on the novelty of 
the methodology, and therefore appreciated the empirical contribution that the 
paper made. However there was significant criticism of the theoretical stance, 
and a sense from all three reviewers that it was not clear whether or how the 
paper was grounded in a specific theoretical approach. The interplay between 
theory and empirical work, and the need to ground empirical enquiry within a 
theoretical framework, was something that I had to learn (or re-learn) for this 
PhD project. The second draft submitted to reviewers had a much tighter 
theoretical focus, using notions of ‘framing’ as discussed in the political 
science literature, and this was better received and accepted upon 
resubmission. 
 
Paper 1 can be seen as preparatory research, to provide background and 
context to the interviews which form the basis of subsequent papers. The data 
for Paper 1 is drawn from publically available material. It consists of public 
statements made by politicians. By contrast, the data subsequently derived 
from interviews with MPs offers insights into private deliberations. The main 
insight of Paper 1 – that politicians ‘tame’ climate change, trying to frame it as 
a problem that is manageable within current structures and systems of politics 
– provided a foundation for the interview stage that followed. It demonstrated 
that an important aim for the interviews would be to encourage reflection on 
this very issue - to ask why it is that they might adopt the strategy of ‘taming’ 
the climate; and to ask how or under what circumstances individual politicians 
might feel able to consider and discuss the far-reaching implications of climate 
change. Although I had this aim from the beginning of the interview process, it 
still proved a very difficult question to address, as I discuss in section 5 above. 
 
Paper 2: How Members of Parliament Understand and Respond to 
Climate Change 
Paper 2 presents and analyses the results of the first set of interviews. It 
begins with a discussion of the role of national politicians in climate change 
policy and action. In this paper, I used a deliberately broad theoretical base, 
drawing from an interdisciplinary literature including sociology, political theory 
and science and technology studies, to investigate how politicians might 
navigate their working life. The paper outlines the methodological stance of 
the research, specifically the use of narrative interview techniques, and the 
presentation of data through ‘composite narratives’, combining data from 
several interviews to tell a single story. It presents four such narratives, and 
then draws out three more general conclusions. First, drawing on sociological 
analysis of identity, it concludes that politicians see climate change within the 
context of their professional identity and aspirations, and particularly, that 
many see climate as an ‘outsider’ issue. Second, drawing on theories of 
political representation, it discusses how politicians speak and act on climate 
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 change depends on their understanding of their role as elected 
representatives. Third, it uses insights from science and technology studies to 
discuss how the day-to-day working practices of politicians affect the way in 
which they shape their aims and ambitions.  
 
The main challenge of Paper 2 was the breadth of scope. I felt that each of the 
three themes merited more detailed discussion than was possible in a single 
paper, yet it was important to present the complete picture. I therefore 
persevered, and whilst there are areas that could have been further developed, 
I felt that the paper was a good reflection and analysis of the issues raised in 
the interview set. Though I had expected peer reviewers to make criticisms 
about the breadth of the paper, this did concern them; in fact, reviewers 
praised its “broad theoretical approach”. As one wrote, “The author does a 
very good job at summarising three distinct sets of literature (sociology, 
political science and STS) and relating the conclusions back to these 
literatures. The resulting broad theoretical framework makes a lot of sense to 
me, and places this paper in line with the journal’s manifesto for 
interdisciplinarity.” 
 
In writing up the interview data for Paper 2, I wanted to convey a rounded 
account of the politicians, as individuals. It did not seem appropriate to 
‘disembody’ each interviewee, by categorising them in groups according to 
pre-defined criteria such as political party, gender, or seniority. To do so would 
not have been in keeping with my methodological approach. I wanted to 
present them as people, not categories. However, I also needed to ensure 
anonymity. Even if names are changed, politicians can be easily identified, by 
a combination of characteristics such as their constituency or party; length of 
time served; age; gender and so forth. I therefore presented the data as 
‘composite narratives’, in which data from several interviews are combined to 
form a single narrative. Having had the idea to present the data in this way, I 
trawled the literature on social science methods, thinking that it might be a 
common or recognised approach. I was surprised to find that it was not widely 
used. I found some accounts of similar approaches in the literature on 
psychoanalysis, and educational research, but found no codified methods for 
composite narratives. This is why I decided to write Paper 3, which sets out 
my approach to composite narratives, in more detail than was possible in 
Paper 2.  
Paper 3: The use of composite narratives to present interview findings  
Paper 3 was published in the journal Qualitative Research as a ‘research note’, 
a short paper describing a methodological approach or challenge. The paper 
reviews the use of techniques similar to my approach, drawn from research in 
the fields of psychoanalysis, education and health. It describes how I, and the 
reviewers of my previous paper, wanted a more structured, transparent 
approach to the development of narratives than previous applications had 
shown. It then charts the process I developed to present data as composite 
narratives. The paper discusses the benefits of presenting research as 
composite narratives. The technique conveys the complexity of individual 
accounts, without compromising anonymity. It can also provide insights which 
can be used to guide action, in this case, helping those who work with 
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 politicians to understand their position and motivations. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the limitations of the approach, particularly the need for 
the researcher to convey faithful, yet anonymised portrayals of individuals. 
 
Paper 3 was written after Paper 2, and was greatly helped by the review 
comments on Paper 2. In the first draft of Paper 2, I had presented four 
composite narratives, but did not take the time to describe the way in which I 
had developed the narratives. Reviewers wanted more detail and justification 
for the method. I therefore developed a more formalised description of the 
method I had used, which I outlined briefly in the revised manuscript. It was 
this that formed the basis of Paper 3.  
 
Paper 3 was favourably received by the journal and by reviewers. The main 
revisions requested were to add a more explicit discussion of the way in which 
the composite narrative technique is one possible solution to a more general 
issue of how to present qualitative data. As a reviewer wrote,  
 
I would suggest that the use of composite narratives emphasises the 
nature of all qualitative research and writing…. We use our 
comprehension of the research setting and our sociological/qualitative 
research expertise to create, cut up and recombine our data in order to 
tell a ‘sociological truth’. 
 
The final version of Paper 3 thus included a more explicit discussion of the 
role of the researcher’s judgement and understanding in presenting qualitative 
data. 
Paper 4: Constructing a ‘representative claim’ for action on climate 
change: Evidence from interviews with politicians 
As described above, Paper 2 summarised three themes that emerged from 
the interview set. One of these, the issue of representation, seemed to me to 
merit further analysis, because representation, however conceived, is central 
to the role of an elected politician. In writing Paper 2, I had explored the 
literature on political representation, and particularly, a new approach to the 
theory of representation, Michael Saward’s idea of ‘the representative claim’. I 
decided to develop this analysis further, through a separate paper, Paper 4.  
 
Paper 4 discusses how politicians understand their representative role, and 
the implications of this for political action on climate change. It analyses the 
interviews through the lens of the theory of the ‘representative claim’ 
developed by Michael Saward. This approach sees representation as a 
dynamic process of claims-making, as an interaction between the 
representative and those they claim to represent. After a brief discussion of 
the methodology behind the research, the paper identifies four different types 
of ‘representative claim’ made by the politicians in the study. A ‘cosmopolitan’ 
claim stresses that it is in the interests of all humans to act on climate change, 
and therefore the duty of politicians to act. A ‘local prevention’ claim, by 
contrast, asserts that action is required in order to prevent climate change 
impacts on the local area, such as flooding or other extreme weather events. 
Through a ‘co-benefits’ claim, politicians assert that taking action on climate 
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 change has other benefits, such as reduced fuel bills from energy efficiency 
measures, or jobs in new industries, and therefore has a double dividend. Last, 
some politicians choose not to speak out on climate change even though they 
might privately believe that action is necessary. Instead, they justify any 
proposals in other ways, for example, arguing for better transport measures to 
improve congestion, whilst deliberately avoiding discussion of potential 
benefits to climate change through reducing carbon emissions. I call this a 
‘surrogate claim’. The paper concludes with a discussion of ways in which 
politicians could be better supported to speak out and act on climate change. 
 
Paper 4 offered me an opportunity to apply a single theoretical approach, that 
of the ‘representative claim’, to my research question and data, in contrast to 
the wider, more interdisciplinary scope of Paper 2. It was rewarding to dive 
deep into one specfic theory, and to test this with my data. This application of 
a new theory was noted by a reviewer of the paper, who wrote that it 
“genuinely does bring current theory and empirical work together”. This paper 
was well received by reviewers, with relatively minor amendments required. 
Paper 5: The role of national politicians in Earth System governance 
In the final paper, my aim was to draw together the findings of the research 
project as a whole, and write them up for a different audience. Whereas 
previous papers were written for social science journals, the final paper is 
aimed at the interdisciplinary Global Environmental Change. This journal is 
read widely by those in the climate science and policy community.  The aim of 
this paper, then, is to bring the research to the attention of a more general 
climate policy readership. The paper enters into dialogue with those 
researchers pursuing the concept of ‘Earth System Governance’. The paper 
will also be presented at the Earth System Governance Conference in Utrecht, 
in November 2018.  
 
The paper begins with a description and critique of Earth System Governance, 
and its application to climate change policy and politics in the UK. It argues 
that much of the Earth System Governance literature has focussed on 
analysing what governance structures are needed, in abstract terms; and that 
closer attention must be paid to questions of how such governance can be 
developed, and steered through political systems. It then presents a summary 
of the data from this project, incorporating the corpus analysis, focus group 
and interview findings.  
 
The paper argues that few politicians have yet been able to operationalise 
their understanding of climate change into meaningful responses at the 
national level. There are three main reasons for this. First, the literal and 
metaphorical scale of challenges at the earth system level conflict with the 
procedures and preoccupations of daily politics. Second, politicians consider 
the climate issue in the context of their professional identity and the cultural 
norms of their workplace, and report that climate action does not ‘fit’ with 
these norms. Third, UK politicians feel very little pressure from their electors to 
act on climate change, and have to work to build a democratic case for climate 
action. The paper concludes with recommendations for research and practice. 
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 Paper 5 can be seen as a summary paper, in that it uses all the data 
generated from the study (in comparison with Paper 1, which reports on 
corpus analysis alone, and Papers 2 and 4, which just use interview data). 
This proved to be the main challenge of the paper – to provide a broad 
overview of methodology and results, and to use that to develop an overall 
argument, in the limited space offered by a journal paper. A related challenge 
was presenting my work for a journal with a different readership. Readers of 
Global Environmental Change are more likely to be researchers with 
backgrounds in environmental science and technical governance domains, 
rather than sociology or political science or theory, and may not use qualitative 
research methodologies. As many scholars have noted, the challenge of 
speaking across disciplines can be considerable (Barry, 2012; Castree, 2017).  
 
Taken together, the four substantive papers, together with Paper 3, the 
methodological ‘research note’, provide four linked answers to the central 
research question, how politicians understand and respond to climate change.  
Possible further papers 
These papers did not exhaust the data. I would like to use the data to write the 
following papers: 
• The question of politicians’ identity, and the way in which it frames their 
approach to climate change, which I referred to in Paper 2, could be 
developed in more detail for a sociology journal.  
• The issue of politicians’ working practices, and how they mould climate 
change into a ‘do-able problem’, was discussed in Paper 2 but could be 
further developed, using relevant literature from science and 
technology studies, for a journal addressing these issues.  
• A theme common to many reviews of these papers was the issue of 
time horizons, and the interplay between the short- and long-term in 
politics. I could write a further paper on this issue, drawing on 
sociological accounts of time, and political science analysis of time 
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 2.5 Implications for practice  
 
As this research project was designed as a collaborative project, working with 
Green Alliance, there has been interaction with practitioners throughout. 
Some of this was planned into the research process, and some was more 
opportunistic, emerging during the course of the research. Below I set out how 
this work helped Green Alliance and other practitioners.  
Working with Green Alliance 
As I describe in the introduction, this project emerged out of Green Alliance’s 
Climate Leadership Programme. The Programme provides workshops and 
other support to MPs to encourage them to consider the implications of 
climate change for their work as a politician. Green Alliance agreed to be a 
partner in the research, which was established as a CASE Studentship 
between Lancaster University and Green Alliance, funded by the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council.  
 
Green Alliance provided both practical and intellectual input into the project. 
Green Alliance’s director (until 2017) Matthew Spencer, and deputy director 
Tamsin Cooper, advised on the design and scope of the project. Green 
Alliance hosted the focus group of practitioners from non-governmental 
organisations who work with politicians on climate change (see section 4). 
The politics team, who work closely with parliamentarians, advised on 
potential interviewees, and offered guidance on interview questions. 
Recruitment for the focus group and interviews was helped by explaining that 
it was a collaborative project. Green Alliance is known and respected amongst 
MPs and others. The high acceptance rate for interviews (66% in the first 
round, 53% in the second round) can be explained in part by Green Alliance’s 
involvement.  
 
Green Alliance has helped to disseminate research findings, primarily through 
publishing articles on their Inside Track blog (see annex), and through social 
media. Each time an academic paper was published, I wrote a short blog for 
the site, summarising the findings and linking to the paper, which was 
published Open Access to enable access from those from outside the 
academic sector. Publicised on Twitter, the blogs were widely read and 
discussed, as can be seen from the ‘altmetric’ scores (see table above). I 
have also written a short policy briefing summarising research findings from 
the project as a whole, which will be published in the Autumn.  
 
When the blogs were published, I wondered if some of my findings might 
seem obvious or self-evident to practitioners. However, the feedback I 
received indicated that the research was useful even to those who work with 
politicians on a daily basis. It provided them with an opportunity to step back 
and reflect on their practices and working relationships.  
 
Findings from the project are now being used to inform work planning and 
funding bids for a new programme of work on Climate Leadership, as well as 
wider strategy discussions. Green Alliance have recently been successful in 
winning funding for a further package of work with MPs, including the 
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 establishment of a Citizens’ Assembly on Climate Change, which was a direct 
recommendation of this research. The work will begin in 2019. 
 
A further unexpected impact has been to increase Green Alliance’s 
engagement with the university sector. I have been able to advise them on 
developing collaborative research bids on other topics, such as a successful 
bid led by Cardiff University on materials and resources issues.  
Other interactions  
The research has also been used by a range of organisations outside 
academia, who are interested in the way in which climate science and policy 
proposals are understood by MPs. Following an introduction by Green 
Alliance, I advised The Climate Coalition, a partnership of civil society 
organisations who encourage individuals to take action on climate change, 
including contacting MPs. I contributed to the evaluation of their ‘Share The 
Love’ campaign aimed at politicians. The campaign asked supporters of the 
Climate Coalition’s member organisations to contact their MP to show their 
support for climate action (The Climate Coalition, 2018). I also advised Hope 
For The Future, a specialist charity providing support for people who want to 
contact their MP to discuss climate change. They have used research findings 
to inform the briefings and training that they provide. I worked with a Scottish 
organisation, the 2050 Climate Group, to provide training for young Climate 
Leaders in Scotland on how to engage MPs, again based directly on the 
research findings. Further sessions will be offered by Green Alliance to NGO 
practitioners later in 2018. 
 
During the course of my research, I have presented findings to a range of 
audiences, including the following: 
• Invited plenary speaker at the Royal Society Science Plus meeting, 
Decarbonising UK energy: effective technology and policy options for 
achieving a zero-carbon future (2017) 
• Invited speaker at British Academy / DECC / Royal Society / 
Government Office for Science private roundtable Language, 
Communication, Energy and Climate Change (2016) 
• Seminars at the Universities of Lund and Linköping, and the Stockholm 
Environment Institute during a Visiting Fellowship at the Centre for 
Environmental and Climate Research, Lund University, Sweden in 
2016 
• Invited participant at Lorentz Centre workshop, Decarbonising Futures: 
Narrating Low-carbon Societies, Leiden University, Netherlands (2016) 
• Seminars at the Universities of Leeds, Sussex and Cambridge. 
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 2.6 Limitations of this research, and future research  
 
This project has focussed on one influential group in climate politics: Members 
of the UK Parliament. The main limitation of the study was that it was 
restricted to a small group of politicians in one legislature. However, the 
method of inquiry used in this study could be applied more widely. During the 
course of my research I have identified a number of different areas for further 
research, which I outline below. 
 
Politicians at other levels of governance, such as cities, municipalities and 
local authorities, as well as the UK’s devolved nations, could be studied in the 
same way. Many cities, in particular, now have their own climate change 
strategies and targets. How do local politicians understand climate change, 
and how does this shape local strategy? Interviews with local politicians would 
provide useful evidence to investigate the potential for more localised 
responses to climate change. If a larger study of politicians were undertaken, 
it might be possible to test whether politicians from different parties, or 
ideological outlooks, understand or respond to climate change in different 
ways. 
 
Similarly, politicians in other legislatures could be interviewed. A comparative 
approach across different legislative systems would reveal whether different 
political systems result in different strategies. For example, my research has 
shown the dilemmas faced by MPs in the UK, who are elected to represent a 
geographical constituency, and the strategies they use to link the global issue 
of climate change to the needs of their local area. This evidence would 
suggest that strategies would be different in a different political system, such 
as proportional representation based on a national list, as used in 
Scandinavia, for example; or in federal political systems like Germany or the 
US. An even more intriguing question is how politicians in countries without 
elections think about these issues, particularly in China, given its geopolitical 
importance and its new-found role as a climate leader (Tyfield, 2018).  
 
The reliance on interviews in this study is a limitation, in that it focuses on 
what politicians say rather than what they do. This could have been 
addressed through additional ethnographic observation of MPs at work, both 
in public settings and in private meetings, if consent could be obtained. 
 
The methods used to study politicians in this research could also be used to 
study other actors in the policy and political process, including for example 
civil servants, business groups and advocacy organisations. How do 
individuals from these groups ‘frame’ the issue of climate change? Are they, 
like the politicians studied here, worried about being seen as outsiders if they 
present too radical an account of climate problems or solutions? What 
assumptions do they make about how other actors are seeing the issue? 
These questions could be addressed through ethnographic observation of 
policy discussions, for example at policy seminars, conferences or informal 
meetings of stakeholders involved in the climate debate, combined with 
anonymous interviews. I have already applied the learning from my doctoral 
research in a project that I am contributing to, Assessing the Mitigation 
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 Deterrence Effects of Greenhouse Gas Removals. This project looks into the 
risks of greenhouse gas removal technologies delaying or deterring mitigation. 
Like my doctoral study, this project uses a phronetic social science approach, 
investigating the motivations and outlooks of individuals involved in 
greenhouse gas removal technologies and strategies.  
 
Last, as discussed in Paper 4, the MPs in this study did not feel any pressure 
from those they saw themselves as representing, to act on climate change. 
However, the study only looked at one side of this: the representative, not the 
represented. To examine the issue of representation and climate change 
more comprehensively, MPs could be brought together with groups of 
constituents. Together, the politicians and those they represent could discuss 
how they see the climate problem and possible solutions. Advocates of 
deliberative democracy argue that such processes would help politicians to 
develop their mandate on climate change (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). 
Members of Parliament, together with local politicians and other stakeholders, 
could use deliberative processes to discuss climate strategies which would 
benefit local areas. This could follow the model of participatory budgeting, for 
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ABSTRACT
The politics of climate change is much discussed, but there has been little
investigation into how politicians themselves understand or articulate the
issue. Corpus analysis, a method developed within linguistics, is used to
investigate how UK politicians talk about climate change, using the example
of the 2008 Climate Change Bill. Corpus techniques, including keyword analy-
sis, collocation and semantic tagging, are used, alongside critical reading of
the text. The analysis shows that politicians frame climate change as an
economic and technical issue, and neglect discussion of the human and social
dimensions. They are selective in their use of scientiﬁc evidence, with little
mention of abrupt or irreversible change. In doing so, they attempt to ‘tame’
climate change, rather than confronting diﬃcult realities. While this strategy
has the beneﬁt of political acceptability, it does not allow for discussion of the
full political and social implications of climate change, and precludes more
radical responses.
KEYWORDS climate change; politicians; speech; discourse; Hansard; corpus analysis; the UK
Introduction
It is diﬃcult to overstate the challenge that climate change poses for
politics. As evidenced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), climate change is likely to cause instability and uncertainty in both
natural and human systems (IPCC 2014). This instability, together with the
challenge of achieving signiﬁcant emissions reductions, has far-reaching
implications for the way in which politics is done. The politics and govern-
ance of climate change have been much discussed (e.g. Giddens 2009,
Swyngedouw 2010, Steﬀen et al. 2011, Urry 2011, Biermann et al. 2012,
Dalby 2013, Dryzek 2014, Johnson et al. 2014, Latour 2014). Yet, there has
been very little attention paid to a crucial group of individuals at the centre
of this challenge: the politicians themselves, who, working through
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institutions at the global, national and local levels, have the task of mediat-
ing responses to complex climate-related problems.
How do politicians understand and articulate an issue as complex as
climate change? A recent comprehensive literature review found very little
research into this issue (Rickards et al. 2014), a useful exception is Fielding’s
et al. (2012) survey of Australian politicians). In the research presented here
I begin to address this gap, using corpus analysis of speech by Members of
Parliament (MPs) in the UK to analyse how politicians conceptualise and
present climate change as a political issue in their discussion of the 2008
Climate Change Bill. The research is part of a collaborative project between
Lancaster University and the think tank Green Alliance, who since 2009
have run the Climate Leadership Programme, which introduces MPs in the
UK to the science, policy and politics of climate change.
I begin with a discussion of the way in which politicians, rather than
responding in a straightforward or linear way to climate science, actively
craft and shape the issue to ﬁt with their outlook, and those of their supporters
and other actors. I draw on the literature on ‘framing’ in politics (Downs 1972,
Hajer and Forester 1993, Kingdon 1995, Cobb and Coughlin 1998, Benford
and Snow 2000) to discuss how issues come to be seen and described in
particular ways; and examines the central role of language in deﬁning political
positions and issues (Fairclough 2000). Two aspects of ‘framing’ are consid-
ered: ﬁrst, how climate change is discussed – what type of language is used;
and second, what aspects of climate change are excluded from debate.
I then introduce corpus analysis, a method developed within linguistics,
to discuss how the technique can provide empirical evidence for such
framing processes. The critical advantage of corpus analysis is the ability
to handle large quantities of text, thereby spotting patterns and styles of
speech that may not otherwise be evident. For this research, a corpus of
97,000 words was created from Hansard, the online record of parliamentary
speech. The corpus was analysed using three techniques: keyword analysis,
examining the frequency of signiﬁcant words in comparison to other
corpora; collocation analysis, investigating which words are used together
and oﬀering insights into the meanings given to key terms; and semantic
tagging, which compares the relative frequency of use of groups of words
which share similar meanings.
Corpus analysis demonstrates that MPs used a scientiﬁc and economic
framing to discuss the Climate Change Bill. In doing so, they exclude discus-
sion of the environment or non-human species. There is also very little
discussion of people or social factors. Further, their use of science is selective,
with risks of abrupt or irreversible climate change downplayed or ignored.
I conclude with a discussion of the reasons for, and implications of, such
discourse. I suggest that politicians are attempting to ‘tame’ the climate by
framing a diﬃcult, complex issue in a less threatening way, and suggesting
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technical and economic solutions, but this means that they do not discuss the
far-reaching implications of climate change for political and social life. I suggest
ways of bringing about a more comprehensive treatment of climate change in
politics, and also oﬀer reﬂections on the use of corpus analysis in the study of
politics.
Understanding political speech on climate change
While politicians are not the only actors in climate politics, their role is
crucial. Many, if not most, proposed responses to climate change require
legislative action. This in turn requires politicians to advocate, act and
monitor. Yet politicians’ reasons for acting, or indeed not acting, on climate
change are not well understood. Consumer behaviour is put under intense
scrutiny (Jackson 2005) and the strategies of corporate leaders are analysed
(Wright et al. 2012, Rickards et al. 2014), but much less has been said about
political decision makers. Discussions of politics and governance tend not
to examine the motivations or outlooks of the people who do the politics,
but use the terms ‘governance’ and ‘politics’ in the abstract (see, e.g. Dalby
2013, Dryzek 2014; Lövbrand et al., 2009).
It is clear that politicians do not respond to scientiﬁc evidence on climate
change in a simple or linear way, and neither should we expect them to.
Indeed, the way in which all people understand and interact with scientiﬁc
evidence is complex (Wynne 1996, Demeritt 2001, Hulme 2009, McNeil
2013). Yet an assumption persists, particularly among the scientiﬁc and
policymaking communities, that scientiﬁc evidence will translate straightfor-
wardly into political action (Hajer et al. 2015). Hajer et al. coin the phrase
‘cockpitism’ to describe the illusion of a simple and smooth progression from
scientiﬁcally deﬁned issue, to international agreement, implemented by
national governments acting in the best interests of the planet as a whole.
In reality, it has long been understood that politicians do not passively
translate evidence into appropriate action, but instead, whether consciously
or not, shape an issue to ﬁt with their ideology, the views and opinions of
voters and other actors, a sense of what is achievable, prevailing norms and
assumptions and so on (Downs 1972, Hajer and Forester 1993, Kingdon
1995, Cobb and Coughlin 1998, Benford and Snow 2000). This ‘framing’
process inﬂuences both how issues are discussed, including what type of
language is used; and whether certain aspects of the issue are discussed at
all, or if they are instead ignored. These are discussed in turn below.
Framing: how issues are discussed
As noted above, the way in which climate change is discussed in Parliament
and elsewhere is framed by politicians and other actors. Framing can be
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understood as ‘signifying work or meaning construction . . . an active,
processual phenomenon’ (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614), an ongoing
process of describing and deﬁning an issue to ﬁt with the aims of a
particular group or movement. Such framing happens with all issues, but
is particularly apparent with complex risk issues like climate, which are
both caused by, and understood through, the interplay of technology and
society. As Ulrich Beck argues, such risks are mediated: ‘Without techni-
ques of visualisation, without symbolic forms, without mass media, etc.,
risks are nothing at all’ (Beck 2006, p. 332). So the question of who
visualises or gives form to risk is all important.
One of the most crucial ways in which such framing takes place is
through language. Norman Fairclough writes that ‘political diﬀerences
have always been constituted as diﬀerences in language, political struggles
have always been partly struggles over the dominant language’ (2000, p. 3).
This is not to say that political struggles can be reduced to linguistic
struggles; rather that language is a crucial way in which diﬀerent political
groupings assert their positions and generate alliances. In Hajer’s concep-
tion of ‘discourse coalitions’, argumentation is ‘the medium through which
actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain social
positions and practices, and criticise alternative social arrangements’ (Hajer
and Forester 1993, p. 47). Thus discourse helps to frame and direct political
outcomes. It is ‘socially constitutive as well as socially shaped’ (Wodak and
Fairclough 1997, p. 258).
In the late 2000s, the UK Labour Government made a conscious choice
to frame climate change as a discussion about economics, with the pub-
lication of the government-commissioned Stern Report in 2007. Stern, an
academic economist and government adviser, presented climate change as a
‘market failure’, and estimated the monetary costs and beneﬁts of climate
action (Stern 2007). Though controversial, this approach won the support
of business groupings and helped to build the cross-party support which
contributed to the successful passage of the Climate Change Act (Carter
and Jacobs 2014). The Labour administration’s strategy can be seen as part
of a wider trend towards using economic language and policy instruments
to achieve environmental goals, termed ‘ecological modernisation’ (Hajer
2000).
Framing: whether an issue is discussed at all
It is also important to consider which issues, or aspects of an issue, are not
discussed at all. As noted above, strong scientiﬁc evidence does not automa-
tically lead to a response commensurate with the problem. The complex way
in which an issue ﬁnds a place on the formal political agenda has been
discussed at length in the political science literature (Bachrach and Baratz
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1962, Kingdon 1995, Solecki and Shelley 1996, Cobb and Coughlin 1998).
Kingdon’s (1995) conception of ‘policy windows’, for example, maintains that
an issue reaches the political agenda when three ‘streams’ converge: a well-
deﬁned problem; proposed solutions such as policy mechanisms; and political
support for the issue. Carter and Jacobs (2014) use this model to explain the
cross-party support for climate change in the UK Parliament in the late 2000s.
Some issues, however, are not taken up by the formal political process.
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) noted the need to study ‘non-decision-making’,
or the ways in which dominant inﬂuences and assumptions prevent dis-
cussion of some issues. Similarly Crenson (1971), in his empirical study of
the politics of air pollution, showed that where particular interests dom-
inate (in this case a steel company) politicians are inhibited, and do not
speak out. What follows is not argument, but silence; hence the title of
Crenson’s book, The Un-politics of Air Pollution.
An example of the ‘un-politics’ of climate change is the lack of discussion,
within the formal political sphere, of society’s dependence on fossil fuels.
Phelan et al., writing from a neo-Gramscian perspective, describe the hege-
mony of the ‘fossil fuel historical bloc’ Phelan et al. 2012. Mitchell (2011), goes
a step further in claiming that modern democratic systems themselves are a
product of fossil-fuel exploitation. Radical ecologist William Ophuls (1992)
argues that modern societies and political systems are made possible by
abundant natural resources and a stable environment, and that scarcity and
environmental instability would threaten the viability of liberal democracy. If
climate change alters the operating conditions for politics, that undoubtedly
makes it a diﬃcult issue to address within a formal parliamentary setting.
Using corpus analysis to understand political treatment of
climate change
Here, I use corpus analysis to evidence UK politicians’ approach to climate
change, with reference to these two aspects of framing: ﬁrst, how the issue is
discussed; and second, whether certain aspects are discussed at all: what gets
left out? As I set out below, corpus analysis provides strong evidence that MPs
talk about climate change using an economic and technical discourse. There
are signiﬁcant gaps in the discourse too, particularly an absence of discussion
of people, the environment or other species; the social impacts of climate
change and policies to address it; and a reluctance to discuss the possibility of
abrupt or irreversible climate change.
Why corpus analysis?
Corpus analysis is an approach developed within linguistics, analysing large
volumes of text, known as corpora, composed of speech or written language
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(Sinclair 2005, Wynne 2005). Software packages are used to identify pat-
terns in language use, including the relative frequency of diﬀerent words,
and collocation, words which frequently occur together. Speciﬁc corpora
can be compared with a ‘reference corpus’, a representative sample of
language, such as the British National Corpus (BNC).
Such analyses originally informed the study of language, and linguists
noted a crucial advantage of corpus methods: they uncover patterns or
styles of speech that may not otherwise be seen by researchers. As John
Sinclair, one of the founders of corpus linguistics, wryly observed,
‘Language users cannot accurately report language usage, even their own’
(Sinclair 1994, p. 7). Thus the statistical techniques of corpus analysis allow
researchers to uncover patterns and traits of language use which are not
immediately apparent to the users, teachers or analysts of that language.
This characteristic of corpus analysis – the ability to ‘start with the text’,
using statistical techniques to uncover patterns in language that might not
be apparent to a reader – makes it a useful technique for social science
research too. As Partington (2012, p. 12) writes,
At the simplest level, corpus technology helps ﬁnd other examples of a
phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals patterns
of use previously unthought of. In between, it can reinforce, refute or revise a
researcher’s intuition and show them why and how much their suspicions
were grounded.
The potential of corpus analysis for social sciences has been recognised in
recent years, with use of the method increasing (e.g. Baker et al. 2008,
Caldas-Coulthard and Moon 2010) and some work looking speciﬁcally at
language and climate change (Fløttum et al. 2014, Dayrell and Urry 2015).
Although corpus analysis uses statistical techniques, as with all such
techniques its ﬁndings are not generated automatically but rely on the
judgement of the researcher, who decides which texts to input, what
analysis to undertake, what cut-oﬀ points to apply and so on (Baker et al.
2008). As such, it is an addition to, rather than a replacement for, a more
qualitative discourse analysis, through detailed reading with consideration
of the social, cultural and political context (Weiss and Wodak 2002).
Combining corpus analysis and discourse analysis in an iterative process
ensures that the right texts are used, and that insights gleaned from
statistical analysis can be contextualised and explained (Baker et al. 2008,
Wild et al. 2013, Baker and Levon 2015). This is the approach I take here.
Previous corpus analyses of Hansard oﬀer useful insights into politicians’
motivations and strategy (Baker 2004, Perren and Dannreuther 2013). For
example, Baker’s (2004) study of discourses of homosexuality within the
House of Lords reveals a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the discourse used
by those for and against reform of the age of consent for gay men. The
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methodological norm, however, is for corpus linguists to extend their
analysis into social science, rather than social scientists using tools of
corpus analysis (Partington 2012), which makes the study described here
atypical.
Method
I use corpus methods and critical discourse analysis (CDA) to investigate
a key moment in UK climate politics: the discussion of the Climate
Change Bill, which became an Act of Parliament in 2008. This Act set
a framework for action on climate change, including statutory targets for
carbon reduction, and established the independent Committee on
Climate Change to advise and monitor progress. The Act had strong
cross-party support, with all major parties on side and only ﬁve MPs
voting against. This represented a signiﬁcant breakthrough in UK climate
politics, with high levels of party political consensus, though these were
somewhat undermined the following year by controversy surrounding
leaked climate emails and the failed Copenhagen negotiations, as Carter
(2014) documents.
Preparation of corpora
I prepared two new corpora for this research: the Climate Change Bill
(CCB) Corpus, and the Budget Corpus. I also used an already existing
reference corpus, the BNC Sampler Spoken.
The CCB Corpus consisted of MPs’ speech from the two main oppor-
tunities to debate the Bill on the ﬂoor of the House, in June and October
2008. As described above, the debates took place at a time of relative
consensus in climate politics, and before the full eﬀects of the economic
downturn had been felt (Carter 2014). In June, in the so-called ‘Second
Reading’, traditionally the stage at which the purpose and content of a Bill
is debated, there was a 6-hour discussion. In October, MPs returned to the
Bill for a shorter discussion of draft amendments. Speech from these two
debates was combined to create the CCB Corpus, consisting of all 97,000
words from the two debates, downloaded from Hansard online. Combining
the two debates provided a comprehensive corpus of political speech on the
Climate Change Bill.
As described above, corpus analysis relies on comparison of the corpus
under consideration with reference corpora. It is through comparison with
other texts that signiﬁcant patterns emerge. For example, examining word
frequency without a reference corpus tells you that words such as ‘and’, ‘to’
and ‘the’ are frequent, but this does not shed light on the particularities of
the speech under consideration. Examining word frequency in comparison
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with a reference corpus reveals the way in which the speech in question is
distinctive or diﬀerent (Wynne 2005).
For this research, I used two reference corpora. First, I used a standard
reference corpus, the BNC Sampler Spoken, which is a representative
sample of spoken English, comprising approximately one million words
of spoken English derived from public and professional settings (British
National Corpus 2008). Comparing the Climate Change Bill speech with
this standard reference corpus shows the diﬀerences between standard
speech and the debate in question, revealing signiﬁcant patterns.
The research also aimed to examine how MPs’ speech on climate change
diﬀers from other speech in Parliament. For this reason, a second reference
corpus was used, derived from another parliamentary debate of the same
year – the 2008 Budget Debate. Comparing a budget debate with a climate
debate reveals the particularities of how MPs talk about climate change.
This corpus consisted of the full 50,000 word debate on the March 2008
Budget, and was named the ‘Budget Corpus’.
The CCB Corpus and the Budget Corpus were prepared through down-
loading the debates from the Hansard website. Hansard is not strictly
verbatim, as speech is lightly edited, which can pose a problem for some
corpus studies (Molin 2007); however, this did not matter in this research,
which focuses on the context and style of speech, rather than linguistic
detail.
Analysing the corpora
In analysing the corpora, I made use of three corpus analysis techniques:
keyword analysis; collocation analysis and semantic tagging.
Keyword analysis: Keyword analysis reveals which words occur fre-
quently in the text under study, compared to a reference corpus. I
analysed the CCB corpus using the Wmatrix programme, which allows
the corpus to be compared to other corpora (Rayson 2008). The CCB
corpus was compared with both the BNC Sampler Spoken Reference
Corpus and the Budget corpus. Tables of words that were comparatively
over- and under-used were compiled, and patterns were identiﬁed, as
described in the results section below.
Collocation: I analysed keywords further through looking at their col-
locates, or words which frequently occur together with the keyword. This
was done with a diﬀerent software package, AntConc. Collocation shows
which words frequently occur within a set span of text either side
(usually the ﬁve words before or after the keyword, or ‘node’) and allows
analysis of the way that the keyword is used, thus providing the ‘atmo-
sphere’ of a word (Baker et al.2008).
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Semantic tagging: Wmatrix software enables the text to be tagged, with
words grouped into categories of meaning, or semantic ﬁelds, to look at
which semantic groupings are used more or less frequently in compar-
ison to another corpus. This allows trends and patterns to be identiﬁed
which may not be observable at the level of individual words. For
example, the semantic category ‘work and employment’ contains words
such as work(ing), staﬀ, (un)employment, jobs and employees. These
individual words may not register as keywords on their own, but
together they could form a key semantic group (Rayson 2008). As with
keyword analysis, I compared semantic groupings in the CCB corpus
with the two reference corpora. Lists of under- and over-used semantic
groupings were scrutinised.
Combining corpus analysis with critical discourse analysis
As described above, when used in social science research, corpus analysis is
best combined with CDA. CDA can be seen not as a speciﬁc, prescribed
method but as a broad theoretical orientation, which combines close read-
ing of the text with consideration of the social, political and cultural context
of the text (Weiss and Wodak 2002, Baker et al. 2008). In this research,
CDA was used both to situate the corpora – for example, incorporating an
understanding of the signiﬁcance of the Climate Change Act in UK climate
politics; and to explain ﬁndings from corpus analysis through qualitative
interpretation of MPs’ speech.
Findings from corpus analysis of the 2008 Climate Change Bill
The techniques described above reveal clear patterns of discourse in the
discussion of the CCB, pointing to particular framings of climate change as
an issue. Below, I discuss two aspects of this framing: ﬁrst, the way in which
climate change is discussed; and second, what is not discussed at all.
How is climate change discussed?
The language used by politicians to discuss the Climate Change Bill is
strongly scientiﬁc and economic in nature. Turning ﬁrst to scientiﬁc evi-
dence, in the debate on the Climate Change Bill, the words science, scientiﬁc
and scientist(s) occur very regularly (128 occurrences), as shown in Table 1.
Many speakers open their statements with reference to the science. This is
true for those who support the scientiﬁc consensus, as represented by the




However, in using this language, politicians are not merely reﬂecting the
scientiﬁc consensus. They are using scientiﬁc language selectively, to build
their case. This can be seen through analysis of semantic groupings. Table 2
shows that a very signiﬁcant semantic grouping, compared to standard
speech in the BNC Corpus, is ‘cause and eﬀect/connection’, including
words such as produce/impact/responsible/cause/eﬀect, suggesting that
speakers are trying to build a case for action on climate change.
These patterns of speech suggest that when politicians are talking about
climate change, they have to work hard to justify climate action. Detailed
reading of the text shows that speakers tend to open with a statement on the
science, and an explanation of causes and eﬀects, before proceeding to
discuss solutions. Although, in the debate under analysis, climate sceptic
views were a small minority, all speakers had to justify their positions
through recourse to the science. Even those who strongly support action
on climate change feel the need constantly to explain why, suggesting that
they see the case for action as fragile. This is not helped by the complex and
indirect impacts of climate change, which means that politicians not only
have to state the science but they also have to explain the links and
connections of both climate impacts and climate solutions. It is also striking
that, while ‘science’ is quoted often, there is very little discussion of
potential non-linear changes in the climate system, an issue to which I
return below.
Table 1. Typical use of words ‘science’, ‘scientist(s)’ and ‘scientiﬁc’ (CCB Corpus).
Typical use of words ‘science’, ‘scientist(s)’ and ‘scientiﬁc’ (CCB Corpus)
implying scientiﬁc consensus (90 occurrences)
within the overall 2 C increase limit, which scientists say should not be exceeded
if the worst-case scenarios of the scientists are realised we will be in deep trouble
that can support human life can work. The scientiﬁc consensus is that there tends to be
governments must follow the latest science that clearly shows the need for the UK to
important Bill because, as is clear from the Science and the IPCC, these matters are
implying lack of scientiﬁc consensus (38 occurrences)
A bit like medicine in the 1850s. The scientists are scratching the surface of
The most recent survey of climate scientists indicates that 46% of them disagree
If it is not, there is a danger that it is not a scientiﬁc report, but more of a political one
down to the activities of man. There is no scientiﬁc consensus on this, and there have been
discussion in the debates as though all the science was settled, but my reading of it is that
Table 2. Typical use of words within semantic grouping ‘cause and eﬀect/connection’.
Typical use of words within semantic grouping ‘cause and eﬀect/connection’
human activity is by far the principle cause, and that with global action to reduce
from consumer activity in this country, is responsible for about 15 per cent of global emissions
rainfall and increased ﬂooding are a direct result of the climate change that we are already
rises in fuel and food prices are of course related The prospect of an economic downturn
scientiﬁc knowledge: economic and social implications will also need to be taken into account
carbon pollution completely overnight, the eﬀects of existing levels of CO2 in the
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Second, corpus analysis provides strong evidence that the dominant
framing used to discuss climate change is economic and technical. When
compared with the BNC Spoken reference corpus, three main groups of
words stood out as keywords, used signiﬁcantly more frequently in the CCB
Corpus. First, words directly related to the subject of the debate (climate
change, bill, target . . .), which is not surprising. Second, words usually used
in parliamentary debate (member, gentleman, amendment . . .), which again
is to be expected. Third, economic or technical phrases, referring to climate
impacts or mitigation measures: economy, capture [relating to carbon cap-
ture], eﬃciency, low-carbon, reduction/reduce, trading, costs, CCS [carbon
capture and storage], fuel, power stations, measures. Looking in terms of
semantic groupings, the groupings ‘science and technology in general’ and
‘money: cost and price’ are over-represented.
The dominance of economic and technical language is notable in com-
parison with other parliamentary speech, as is demonstrated by a compar-
ison with the Budget Corpus. While parliamentary speech about the budget
obviously contains a large number of economic words and phrases, so too
does speech about the CCB. In particular, Table 3 shows that the words
costs and beneﬁts are actually used more than twice as often in the CCB
Corpus than in the Budget Corpus, to describe the impacts of climate
change or policies to mitigate climate change.
This evidence shows that politicians use scientiﬁc, economic and tech-
nical language in order to construct a credible case for action on climate
change.
What is not discussed?
Politicians’ tendency to use scientiﬁc and technical language to discuss
climate change is further emphasised by an examination of what is left
out. I show below that some signiﬁcant categories of speech are underused
in discussion of the CCB: environment and non-human species; and people
and social groupings. There is also little discussion of potentially far-reach-
ing or catastrophic climate events.
Table 3. Typical use of costs and beneﬁts in CCB Corpus.
Typical use of costs and beneﬁts in CCB Corpus
early action considerably outweigh the costs and that if the investments are made
produce lower-bound estimates of the costs of carbon abatement in 2050
they say: Both short and long run costs could be unevenly distributed, with
what we propose to do, who will bear the costs and who will get the beneﬁts
and to reap the potential economic beneﬁts that are on oﬀer
possible to calculate precisely the economic beneﬁts or disbeneﬁts of speciﬁc actions
the thing is that it puts the maximum beneﬁts of the actions proposed in the Bill
couple of years, but then the technological beneﬁts should kick in, albeit before the
222 R. WILLIS
46
Environment and non-human species: Politicians barely mention the
environment, and rarely stress their commitment to environmental protec-
tion, in discussions on climate change. The words environment and envir-
onmental, although used more than in the BNC Spoken reference corpus,
did not occur frequently, and when they did, their meaning was nuanced.
Environmental is used only 53 times (compared with economy, used 97
times, or trading, used 72 times). But nearly half of these relate to the names
of organisations, such as the Environmental Audit Committee, leaving only
29 true uses of the word. Of these, only 14 can be identiﬁed as seeing
environmental protection as a necessary or desirable thing – examples are
set out in Table 4.
There are a further ﬁve uses of the term environmental which carry a
negative or uncertain connotation, such as: ‘green taxes serve only to give
the whole environmental agenda a bad name’ (Hansard 9 June 2008 col
121) or ‘must be supported by evidence of the environmental beneﬁt’
(Hansard 28 October 2008 col 815).
Neither is there much mention of non-human species. The semantic
category ‘living creatures: animals, birds, etc.’ actually occurs less frequently
in the CCB Corpus than in everyday speech (the BNC Spoken reference
corpus).
People and social groupings: It is striking that politicians do not talk
about people when discussing climate change. Ten out of the top 60 words
that are underused in the CCB Corpus (i.e. used more often in standard
spoken English than in the CCB Corpus) are words directly connected with
people: you; I; she; they; he; them; me; her; him; people. When analysing
semantic groupings rather than words, the same pattern emerges: signiﬁ-
cantly underused semantic groupings include ‘pronouns’ and ‘kin’.
Parliamentary speech is, of course, diﬀerent from standard informal
speech, and this could account for the above ﬁndings. To investigate this,
the CCB Corpus was compared with the Budget Corpus. A similar pattern
emerged. Words that were signiﬁcantly underused in the CCB Corpus
compared to the Budget Corpus include: families, child, children, pensioners,
parents. The semantic grouping ‘kin’ was used six times more frequently in
the Budget speech. As shown in Table 5, ‘kin’ words in the Budget speech
are used to talk about how the budget may aﬀect diﬀerent groupings, with a
Table 4. Typical use of ‘environmental’.
Typical use of ‘environmental’ (14 occurrences)
not address climate change: the massive environmental migration, the ﬂooding in some areas
Darfur, reiterating the linkages between the environmental degradation caused by global warming
there tends to be a 30-year delay in the environmental impact of the damage that we do now
I accept that climate change is a serious environmental threat that requires action. We have to
budget is met, along with the 2050 target. In environmental terms, it does not matter where in the
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particular focus on families. Speakers use ‘kin’ words to stress how they
want to help people. However, in the CCB Corpus, usage is more abstract:
the most common term is household/s rather than family/ies and the focus
is on the household as a unit for policy, such as ‘reducing emissions . . . at
household level’ (Hansard 28 October 2008 col 749).
Detailed reading of the text reveals that a notable exception to this is the
rhetorical appeal to consider the future world which grandchildren will
inhabit, as a way of talking about potential climate impacts: ‘I am con-
cerned about . . . my grandchildren and the world they live in’ (Hansard 9
June 2008 col 105). While this is unequivocally a personal appeal, it still
diﬀers from the Budget speech, which is concerned with immediate impacts
on people.
Economic and technical language also dominates the debate about
responses to climate change. Signiﬁcant collocates of the word carbon
(words occurring together with the keyword carbon) include: storage, cap-
ture, low, budget(s), credits, price, reduc(e)/ing/ion, economy. If, as Baker
et al. (2008) suggest, collocates provide the ‘atmosphere’ of the word, it is
clear that carbon is discussed as a technical issue, not a social one. This
reduces the range of potential responses under consideration, and leaves no
room for discussion of the embedded, socially bound nature of climate
change and the ‘locked-in high carbon legacy’ (Urry 2011, p. 65) of social
practices.
In short, it appears from this analysis that politicians do not discuss the
human element of the climate problem, or solution, perhaps feeling that a
more emotional, people-based narrative would be discredited – despite the
widespread tendency of politicians to appeal to personal narratives and
‘human interest’.
Abrupt or irreversible impacts: Lastly, there is very little discussion about
abrupt or irreversible impacts of climate change, sometimes called ‘tipping
Table 5. Typical use of words within semantic grouping ‘kin’ in CCB Corpus and Budget
Corpus.
Typical use of words within semantic grouping ‘kin’ in CCB Corpus and Budget Corpus
CCB Corpus (28 occurrences in 97k words)
incentive schemes, designed to encourage households to minimise and recycle their waste
impact of this Bill on the costs of ordinary households to play their part
the world that they live in, and about my grandchildren and the world they live in
billion would equal over 10,000 from every family in every constituency
balance of reducing emissions, not only at household level but between diﬀerent sectors
Budget Corpus (85 occurrences in 50k words)
economy now and help businesses and families I will postpone that increase
many lives. Central to that is helping more parents into work. We want to demonstrate
for ﬁrst-time buyers and lower-income families and this will help more people
one such constituent is 106 and her husband died 40 years ago
about charging 30,000 per member of a household . I am pretty sure concerns
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points’ or ‘threshold events’. Although the possibility of such impacts was
discussed in the previous year’s IPCC (2007) and the Stern Review listed
‘abrupt and large-scale impacts’ (Stern 2007, p. 66), these are barely men-
tioned by politicians.
In the Parliamentary debate, there are only three mentions of these
words or phrases (tipping point/threshold (event)/abrupt/irreversible). In
presenting the Bill, the Environment Minister Phil Woolas speaks of ‘a
real risk of reaching the point at which abrupt or irreversible climate
change happens’ (Hansard 9 June 2008 col 37). Tipping point is used
twice, but one of these uses is sceptical that tipping points are likely, despite
the scientiﬁc consensus to the contrary. The MP in question states that ‘the
only argument for acting radically now is if there is a tipping point – a
point of no return. None of the scientists whom I have read predicts that’
(Hansard 9 June 2008 col 105). The word threshold is not used at all in this
context.
Conclusion: taming the climate?
Corpus analysis of politicians’ discussion of the 2008 Climate Change Act
reveals a clear tendency on the part of politicians to ‘tame’ climate
change, presenting it as a technical issue, amenable to straightforward
policy action. This is evident both in how climate change is presented,
and in what is left out. Climate change is presented through strongly
scientiﬁc, technical and economic language. There is little or no discus-
sion of people, other species or the environment; neither are climate
issues seen as social issues. Politicians’ use of science is also highly
selective, with little discussion of abrupt or irreversible impacts, in con-
trast to both the scientiﬁc consensus and the Stern Review (IPCC 2007,
Stern 2007).
Below I evaluate the use of corpus analysis as a methodological
approach, before discussing the wider implications of the ﬁndings.
Evaluating corpus analysis for the study of politics
This study, as well as previous studies of diﬀerent issues (Baker 2004,
Perren and Dannreuther 2013), has shown the value of corpus analysis
in providing empirical evidence of patterns of political discourse.
Corpus techniques complement standard textual analysis, allowing
researchers to identify particularities of language use. The main limita-
tion of corpus analysis of Hansard is that it investigates how politicians
present climate change in the public domain. Anonymised interviews
with politicians would help to uncover the thinking behind the words,
and examine the extent to which framings are conscious choices.
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There are number of ways in which the method could be extended. It
could be used to compare diﬀerent discourses between political parties, or
to examine how the language used to discuss an issue like climate alters
over time, or between parliamentary settings: Is the language used by Select
Committees, for example, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent? Comparison could also be
made with policy proposals, such as White Papers or Reviews, to investigate
how political framing of an issue inﬂuences subsequent discussions of
policy.
This study examines a particular, and consensual, moment of climate
politics in the UK; a comparison with, say, 2015 would be instructive,
given threats to this consensus following the economic downturn
(Skovgaard 2014, Carter and Clements 2015). The discourse of politicians
could also be compared with language used by other groups, such as
campaign groups or business groupings, to evidence diﬀerent framings of
an issue.
Taming the climate? Implications for policy and practice
This study shows that, rather than adjusting their worldview to accommo-
date the far-reaching implications of climate change, politicians instead
attempt to adjust or tame climate change to ﬁt into existing worldviews.
This may be a well-meaning attempt to frame a diﬃcult, complex issue into
something amenable to the political agenda. Thus politicians who want to
make progress on the issue present it as a relatively unthreatening, manage-
able problem. It may be that they face a tactical choice: to do this or not to
discuss the issue at all. The only way that politicians can create a ‘policy
window’, to use Kingdon’s (1995) phrase, is to deﬁne the problem relatively
narrowly, and present solutions that they believe will attract a viable level of
support and maintain a consensus.
If, as this research suggests, politicians do indeed deﬁne climate change
in a relatively narrow way, it would explain why, following Latour (2007)
and Marres (2005), the issue called ‘climate change’ discussed outside
Parliament is diﬀerently constituted from the one discussed inside
Parliament. Outside Parliament, amongst activist groups, for example, or
at international climate negotiations, the issue can be given free rein and
the full political implications discussed; within the Palace of Westminster it
is constrained into ‘un-politics’ (Crenson 1971) in order to be discussed
at all.
There may also be a more profound reason for politicians’ reluctance to
discuss the more far-reaching implications of climate change. Politics, and
indeed human society, has developed during a time of remarkable planetary
stability. Anthropogenic changes threaten this stability, and call into ques-
tion the continuation of the benign climatic conditions that have
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underpinned our social life on this planet (Clark 2011). A full response to
climate change would require discussion of this very fact, that a stable
climate is a prerequisite for our political and social systems – what
Donna Haraway calls ‘a denormalisation of that which is normally held
still’ (Haraway 2014), or what Sarah Whatmore calls the ontological politics
of ‘posthumanism’, a project ‘that insists on the co-evolutionary embodi-
ment and embeddedness of the human animal within the world’
(Whatmore 2013, p. 34).
When confronted with an existential challenge on this scale, it is not
surprising that politicians craft a more manageable conception of the
problem. Yet the obvious caveat is that wishing climate change to be
more manageable will not make it so. Framing climate change in this way
may make it possible to address in Parliament, but it means that the full
implications are ignored.
The evidence of this study suggests that it is very diﬃcult for politicians to
address climate change comprehensively within a formal Parliamentary setting,
however necessary it may be to do so. Opening up debate within Parliament
could be achieved through using diﬀerent discussion spaces or types of debate,
such as a ‘national convention’ on climate, and by encouraging robust engage-
ment between politicians and climate advocates outside Parliament. A more
explicit articulation of power relations and vested interests, which inﬂuence
political framings of the issue (Oreskes and Conway 2012, Phelan et al. 2012,
Geels 2014), could also help. The fossil-fuel divestment movement, now gain-
ing considerable traction, is one example of this. Such initiatives could allow
politicians to debate fully the implications of climate change, and build support
for a more comprehensive political and social response.
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Action on climate change, to meet the targets set in the 2015 Paris Agreement, requires strong 
political support at the national level. Whilst the political and governance challenges of climate 
change have been discussed at length, there is little understanding of how politicians, as influential 
individuals within the political system, understand or respond to climate change. This article 
presents findings from 14 qualitative interviews with Members of the UK Parliament, to discuss 
how politicians conceptualise climate change, and their deliberations on whether or how to act 
on the issue. First, it reviews an interdisciplinary literature from sociology, political theory and 
science and technology studies, to investigate how politicians navigate their work and life. Second, 
it presents ‘composite narratives’ to provide four different MPs’ stories. Last, it draws conclusions 
and implications for practice. It highlights three crucial factors: identity, or how politicians consider 
the climate issue in the context of their professional identity and the cultural norms of their 
workplace; representation, how politicians assess their role as a representative, and whether 
proposed political action on climate is seen as compatible with this representative function; and 
working practices, how day-to-day work rituals and pressures influence the aims, ambitions and 
engagement of politicians with climate change.
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climate change, composite narratives, identity, interviews, Parliament, politicians, representation, 
UK
Introduction
In a recent media interview, the British artist Antony Gormley said that he despaired of 
politicians’ inability to act on climate change. ‘They are just not capable of long-term 
thinking’, he said. ‘We are sleepwalking into a massive human disaster’ (quoted in Brown, 
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2015). Gormley is not alone in expressing these frustrations. Groups as diverse as Friends 
of the Earth, the OECD and the World Economic Forum have been critical of legislators’ 
timidity on climate change (Bawden, 2015; Brown, 2015; Camberlain, 2013; Gurría, 
2008). Are they right to lay the blame at the door of Parliament, and specifically, on the 
action, or inaction, of politicians?
Whilst the politics and governance of climate change have been much discussed 
across both sociology and political science (e.g. Biermann et al., 2012; Eckersley, 2004; 
Giddens, 2009; Johnson et al., 2014; Latour, 2014; Urry, 2011), there has been very little 
research directed at understanding how politicians understand and act upon the issue. A 
recent comprehensive review found no research into the views, values and motivations 
of practising politicians on these issues (Rickards, Wiseman, & Kashima, 2014). Yet 
elected politicians have crucial powers and responsibilities. Action by governments and 
parliaments is dependent upon politicians (amongst others) articulating a case, navigat-
ing conflicting interests and proposing responses.
This article presents research exploring how politicians understand their role, and 
how they deliberate on an issue as complex as climate change. It starts from the assump-
tion that climate change is a social and political issue, ‘something that cannot be solved 
through a reliance on science and technology alone’ (Carter & Charles, 2009, p. 15). 
Thus sociological analysis is, as Urry writes, ‘central to examining high carbon societies 
and climate change’ (2009, p. 84).
The research takes a similar approach to studies investigating public attitudes and moti-
vations, such as Laidley’s (2013) study of class differences in responding to climate change, 
Horton’s (2003) account of the identity work of environmental activists, and Norgaard’s 
(2006) investigation of climate understandings in a Norwegian village. The aim is not to 
supplant the more macro, structural accounts of climate governance and politics, but to 
enrich them through enhanced understanding of the motivations and outlooks of politicians 
– as crucial agents within this structure. In doing so, the research can improve practice, 
through helping scientists, policymakers and third-sector advocates understand the politi-
cal domain, and collaborate with politicians to develop workable strategies.
The article begins with a discussion of the role played by national parliaments in cli-
mate action, following the 2015 Paris Agreement. Previous work from sociology, politi-
cal theory and science and technology studies, which helps to explain politicians’ 
motivations and outlooks, is then reviewed. The methodological approach is set out, and 
in particular, the use of narrative interviews. Findings are presented through four ‘com-
posite narratives’, blended from 14 interviews, telling four stories about how politicians 
navigate their working life in general, and climate issues in particular. Finally, conclu-
sions and implications for practice are drawn.
Governing the climate: From a global agreement to 
individual politicians
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change of December 2015 was unprecedented. A 
record 195 countries agreed that ‘climate change represents an urgent and potentially 
irreversible threat to human societies and the planet … deep reductions in global emis-
sions will be required’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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[UNFCCC], 2015, p. 1). Whilst providing a framework for international cooperation, 
under the Agreement, each state is responsible for developing its own plan, called a 
‘nationally determined contribution’, to contribute to the overall goal of limiting climate 
change to between 1.5°C and 2°C rise in global average temperature. Following Paris, 
therefore, attention has shifted to the level of the nation-state, and the process of drawing 
up strategies compatible with the Paris Agreement.
The UK already has statutory targets on carbon reduction, enshrined in the 2008 
Climate Change Act. This Act sets five-yearly carbon budgets, leading to an 80% 
reduction in emissions from 1997 levels by 2050, overseen by the independent 
Committee on Climate Change. However, the means by which this goal will be reached 
are not clear. Targets need to be met through policies and action to reduce emissions in 
energy, transport, buildings and land use, for example. The Committee recently criti-
cised government for a so-called ‘policy gap’ (Committee on Climate Change, 2016, 
p. 3), saying that further policies are required if the targets are to be met. Responsibility 
for meeting the targets lies with Parliament, an institution consisting of 650 individual 
MPs, working within a context of established and evolving norms, procedures and ritu-
als (Lovenduski, 2012).
The life and work of a parliamentarian
Though there is little research into the specific question of politicians’ treatment of cli-
mate change, previous work offers insights into how politicians and others understand 
their role and navigate their working life. Below, three different approaches to this ques-
tion are briefly reviewed: first, sociological investigations of Parliament, looking at 
questions of identity in particular; second, research from political theory examining the 
representative role of politicians; and third, work from science and technology studies on 
the day-to-day working practices of individuals within institutions.
Identity: The social world of politicians
The ways in which individual outlooks and actions are conditioned by social and cultural 
contexts have long been studied by sociologists of identity (for a review see Lawler, 
2014). Studies on gender in the House of Commons (Lovenduski, 2012; Malley, 2012; 
McKay, 2011; Puwar, 2004) demonstrate that the norms and rituals of Parliament condi-
tion and constrain action. New institutionalist thinkers refer to this as a ‘logic of appro-
priateness’ (Chappell, 2006, p. 223). Institutions like Parliament should be seen, they 
argue, as ‘collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions. … 
When individuals enter an institution, they try to discover, and are taught, the rules’ 
(Chappell, 2006, p. 161; see also Douglas, 1986; Lewis & Steinmo, 2012).
In a similar vein, Puwar (2004) draws on the work of Bourdieu in a study of female 
and ethnic minority politicians. Puwar argues that there are strong, yet implicit, norms 
governing life in the House of Commons. The ‘habitus’ or life-world of politicians, she 
argues, is implicitly gendered and racialised, yet white male politicians feel themselves 
to be neutral or unmarked. Puwar writes that ‘there is a behavioural male norm and 
women are under assimilative pressures to conform to that norm’ (1997, p. 100).
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If politicians reject these norms, they risk damaging their social capital. Puwar stresses 
the importance of social capital – forging links with others who provide support and 
endorsement. She describes ‘circles, competing and overlapping, of mutual admiration. 
… The higher you rise, the more you are party to the mechanisms of affirmation’ (1997, 
p. 120). Caroline Lucas’s (2015) account of entering Parliament as the sole Green Party 
MP is striking, in that the isolation Lucas feels is not just political, but personal and 
social too.
From this research, it is clear that, to investigate how politicians understand climate 
change, it is necessary to study individuals’ implicit or explicit ‘identity work’, and the 
dynamics between individuals and organisations.
Representation
For politicians, however, it is not just the relationship between the individual and the 
organisation that matters. Politicians are also representatives, with relationships and 
responsibilities that go beyond the immediate confines of their institution. The relation-
ship between the representative and those they represent is complex, and the subject of 
much debate in political theory, from the Ancient Greeks through to Rousseau and 
beyond (Dobson & Hamilton, 2016; Mansbridge, 2003; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). 
Recent work by Michael Saward conceptualises representation not as a static fact, but as 
a dynamic relationship between representatives and represented. Under this formulation, 
the representative makes a claim to representation, which can be accepted or rejected by 
constituents. Saward writes that representatives:
… make claims about themselves and their constituents and the links between the two; they 
argue or imply that they are the best representatives of the constituency. … They may well be 
‘agents’, as representatives are conventionally understood, but equally or more importantly 
they are ‘actors’, makers of claims. (Saward, 2006, p. 302)
The conception of representation as a negotiated claim links back to the first factor dis-
cussed above: that of identity. In this light, a crucial part of a politician’s identity is the 
constant affirming and reaffirming of a representative claim, in order to show colleagues 
and publics alike that they are carrying out their role appropriately. Thus politicians 
speaking and acting on climate change must construct a ‘representative claim’ to justify 
their proposed actions, and to show why and how they are in the interests of the 
represented.
Working practices
It is not just abstract concepts of identity and representation which govern the working 
life of politicians. A third factor is the constraint placed upon them by the day-to-day 
practice of politics.
Ethnographies of Parliament and government (Crewe, 2015; Rhodes, 2011) show that 
politicians spend their days in a fast-paced blur of meetings, actions and reactions. Work 
in science and technology studies demonstrates that everyday practices, whether in a 
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laboratory or in Parliament, have a strong influence over the definitions of aims or ambi-
tions (Latour, 1987). Fujimura’s (1987) ethnography of scientists in a cancer laboratory 
reveals that scientists must constantly work to ‘achieve alignment’ between the day-to-
day tasks they carry out, the wider environment of the laboratory, and the expectations of 
colleagues, sponsors and other actors. Whilst scientists state their aims in terms of the 
scientific breakthrough they are trying to achieve, these aims are constantly adapted and 
negotiated in the light of day-to-day pressures and constraints. Fujimura argues that, 
through this process of ‘tinkering’, aims and ambitions get remoulded into ‘do-able prob-
lems’, manageable within the confines of their institutional setting.
Applying this analysis to Parliament, the day-to-day working life of politicians should 
be expected to influence their broader aims and ambitions. Analysis of political speech 
on climate change (Willis, 2017) demonstrates that politicians attempt to ‘tame’ climate 
change, presenting it as a more manageable issue than may be the case. It is thus essential 
to develop an understanding of what politicians regard as ‘realistic’. Do politicians craft 
‘do-able problems’ for themselves, and by doing so, effectively rule out ‘un-do-able 
problems’, which are too big, too complex or too different?
Developing an understanding of politicians’ deliberations on climate
These insights suggest that the ways in which politicians respond to climate change are 
complex and situated, influenced by social norms and political understandings. When 
politicians assess climate change, it is not simply a case of taking evidence and ‘translat-
ing’ it into appropriate governance mechanisms. Scholars of science and technology 
studies have long criticised the notion that science can be straightforwardly ‘translated’ 
(Wynne, 2010). Instead, the challenge is to understand the ‘complex ways in which the 
construction of stable knowledge interpenetrates with the formation of core elements that 
stabilize society: identities, institutions, discourses and representations, among others’ 
(Jasanoff, 2010, p. 236). The aim of the research presented here, then, is to examine how 
politicians understand ‘climate change’, as a scientific, social and political phenomenon; 
and how this influences the way in which policies are developed and implemented.
Methodology
The aim of this study, as described above, is to supplement accounts of climate politics 
and governance with a deeper understanding of a crucial set of people in this debate: 
politicians. Thus the interviews were designed to elicit personal stories, drawing on 
Riessman’s (2008) narrative method, in which participants are encouraged to tell the 
story of their work and life. The narratives that interviewees choose, the language and 
style they use, and the way that they conduct themselves are all significant. As Riessman 
writes in describing narrative research, ‘narratives do not mirror, they refract the past … 
narratives are useful in research precisely because storytellers interpret the past rather 
than reproduce it as it was’ (2005, p. 6).
The interviews were explicitly presented as collaborative, a joint investigation by the 
researcher and the researched (Morris, 2009; Oakley, 1988). As the interviewer, I was 
already known to most of the interviewees, having worked with the think tank Green 
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Alliance, running workshops for MPs to discuss issues of environmental strategy. I did 
not present myself as an impartial academic, but as an enquirer and collaborator. 
Interviewees understood that one of the purposes of the study is to find ways to better 
support politicians in their work on climate change.
Research process
MPs from three political parties in the UK House of Commons, Labour, Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat, were interviewed between February and June 2016. The inter-
views took place just after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change; 
this was mentioned by some interviewees. All interviews took place before the EU 
Referendum on 23 June, though the referendum campaign provided a backdrop for dis-
cussions. MPs were recruited through an invitation setting out the collaborative nature of 
the project, as a joint initiative between Lancaster University and Green Alliance. 
Twenty-two MPs were approached, to secure the 14 interviews. Participants were 
selected to provide a balance of age, gender, political party, seniority and length of time 
served as an MP (see Table 1).
Participants’ previous involvement in the issue of climate change was investigated. 
There was a wide spectrum of involvement, as evidenced by participation in events or 
speeches. Known ‘climate sceptic’ MPs (defined as those who publicly state that they do 
not accept the scientific consensus, as represented by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [IPCC, 2014]) were not approached. This is because the research ques-
tion focuses on how MPs try to understand and act on climate change, rather than exam-
ining the reasons for rejecting the issue altogether. Although this is an interesting and 
important question, a different research strategy would be needed for this group. Though 
climate sceptics are influential, they are small in number, with only five MPs out of 650 
voting against the Climate Change Act in 2008.
Interviews were semi-structured, and designed to be informal, with a focus on elicit-
ing narrative from the participant. In the first part of the interview, I asked participants to 
reflect on the way that they work, including what issues they work on and why; and the 
influences and pressures upon them. I then asked questions specifically on climate 
Table 1. Interviewees’ background and experience.
Gender 9 male, 5 female (reflecting gender balance of Parliament as a whole)
Party affiliation 6 Conservative, 6 Labour, 2 Liberal Democrat
Time served as MP Between 1 and 19 years’ work as an MP; mean = 6.4 years
Current status 8 sitting MPs; 6 former MPs, who left office in 2010 or 2015
Seniority 4 interviewees had served in government; 2 had served on the 
opposition frontbench; 8 were backbenchers, most with experience 
on Select Committees
Record on climate 
change issues
7 with some record of activity on climate change issues (judged 
through speeches in Westminster and elsewhere); 7 with little or no 
activity
Note: Participants were not asked for additional demographic data, e.g. age or ethnicity.
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change: the extent to which the issue is discussed in Parliament and how it is discussed; 
and whether and how they work on the issue. This basic framework was used for all 
interviews, though, in the spirit of narrative research (Riessman, 2008), the interview 
was conducted as a conversation, and emphasis varied. Whilst the interviews were cer-
tainly collaborative, I challenged interviewees when I felt that this would aid reflection. 
Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Ethical protocols, ano-
nymity and consent were discussed with each participant.
Analysis and presentation of data: The use of composite narratives
Interview data were transcribed and analysed through coding using NVivo software, and 
through critical reading of the scripts. The overall picture thrown out by the interview 
data was both more tangled and richer than anticipated. ‘Standard’ categories, such as 
party affiliation, social background, gender, age and previous experience all played a 
part, as expected from previous research (see, for example, Carter [2013] on party strate-
gies, and research described earlier [e.g. McKay, 2011; Puwar, 2004] on gender). 
However, the picture that emerged did not show clear-cut distinctions along these lines, 
but a complex web of influences, moralities, strategies, assumptions and practicalities. 
Each individual could be seen to navigate their working life within this web, and, whereas 
each web was unique, some considerations were common to all – such as the issue of 
how each politician understands their role as a representative, as discussed below.
Thus the interviews presented a methodological challenge: how to do justice to the 
complexities of individual motivations and outlooks, whilst drawing out more general-
ised learning and understanding; or, in the words of STS scholar John Law, how to deal 
with ‘mess’, and finding ways ‘to keep the metaphors of reality-making open, rather than 
allowing a small subset of them to neutralise themselves and die in a closed, singular, and 
passive version of out-thereness’ (Law, 2004, p. 139).
Above all, the data asked for a form of presentation that conveyed the richness of 
each individual interviewee’s account. Yet this posed a further challenge: that of ano-
nymity. All participants spoke anonymously, and this was crucial in building a clear 
picture of their private deliberations. In this context, assuring anonymity requires a 
more robust approach than just changing names (Saunders, Kitzinger, & Kitzinger, 
2015; Tolich, 2004). Politicians, as public figures, are identifiable through a combina-
tion of factors such as age, time in office, constituency, party affiliation, professional 
or family background and so on.
These two considerations: first, the need to convey the richness and complexity of 
individual accounts; and second, the need to ensure anonymity, led to the decision to 
present the data as a series of ‘composite narratives’. Using this approach, several indi-
vidual interviews are combined to tell a single story. This approach, though rare, has 
been used when researching complex issues when anonymity is crucial, such as Piper 
and Sikes’s (2010) study of teacher–pupil relationships.
Four composites were created from the data: ‘David’, a relatively new MP, who 
speaks regularly on the need to address climate change; ‘Jonathan’, also new to 
Parliament, who is less confident about speaking out; ‘Paul’, a more experienced politi-
cian with a frontbench role, who tries to find strategies to work on climate issues that 
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resonate with his colleagues and constituents; and ‘Stephanie’, a veteran ex-minister, 
who is concerned with the practicalities of achieving political and legislative change.
These accounts are stories, not fictions (Smart, 2010), in that each description is based 
solely on interview data, and all quotations come directly from interviews. The only 
modification is to present data from several interviews as if it were from a single indi-
vidual. The stories mix interviewees from both genders, though in order to tell the story 
straightforwardly, a gender has been assigned to each narrative – one female, three male, 
roughly representing the gender split of the Commons (71% male). Party affiliations 
have not been ascribed to each story. As discussed above, political outlook is crucial to 
each politician’s strategy and motivation, but the data did not reveal clear-cut distinctions 
along party lines. At the beginning of each narrative is a short description of the inter-
views that the composite is based on.
The interview data could, of course, have been combined in different ways, to create 
different composites. Indeed, different combinations were considered and explored. The 
final composites were chosen as they were felt to convey the range of views and posi-
tions revealed by the data, and to provide contrasting accounts of outlook and strategy. 
To borrow from John Law again, the aim is a ‘complex and performative sense of social 
inquiry’ in which ‘methods are never innocent … they enact whatever it is they describe 
into reality’ (Law & Urry, 2004: 403).
Deliberating on climate change: Four stories
David
‘David’ is a composite of three interviewees, one Labour, one Conservative and one 
Liberal Democrat, with a mean of 3.7 years in office. One interviewee had recently taken 
a role as a spokesperson for their party, the other two were backbenchers.
David has been in Parliament six years. He is a backbencher, and sits on a Select 
Committee. He is forthright, and a champion of climate issues. He points out to me that 
where we’re sitting, in the House of Commons beside the River Thames, may well be 
under water in a few decades’ time. He calls climate change ‘catastrophic’, and thinks 
that might be why some of his colleagues don’t want to talk about it:
I think the majority of MPs recognise that climate change is manmade, is happening and is 
going to have catastrophic consequences, but it’s so scary in some ways, maybe they don’t want 
to think about it. It’s just such a big issue.
David tries to speak about climate change at every opportunity, both in Parliament and in 
his constituency. He asks questions about climate issues in debates; he puts forward 
amendments which alter legislation in support of climate action; and he goes to meetings 
hosted by environmental groups.
David feels that his commitment has come at a price. Like every MP I speak to, he says 
that climate change is not discussed much in the Commons. He thinks his colleagues see 
him as a ‘freak’, and that speaking out on climate is a ‘career-limiting move’. Though he 
doesn’t set out to be difficult, and would like to be promoted, it is important to him to 
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speak up for what he believes in. However, he thinks about how to present issues in ways 
that might appeal: ‘I’m happy to use an economic argument if that means that more people 
will come on side. … I change the language to be much, much less extreme.’
As a relatively new MP, David says he needs to focus a lot of his attention on his 
constituency. He feels a responsibility to the people he represents, and wants to stand 
up for his local area. This takes up a lot of his time. Like nearly all the MPs I interview, 
he says that people don’t ask him about climate change. ‘I’ve knocked on thousands of 
doors, and had thousands of conversations with voters, and I just don’t have conversa-
tions on climate change.’ Nevertheless, he says, ‘I do feel I have a mandate to act on 
it’, and finds ways to talk about it. He uses speeches in his constituency to ‘highlight 
the things that I care about’, including climate change. He works with local environ-
ment groups, like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, though he is critical about how 
strident they are. They are like the Englishman abroad, he says; ‘If you don’t under-
stand me, I’ll shout louder.’
He thinks much discussion of climate change is too abstract and distant from voters: 
‘They’ve never been to Bangladesh, they’ve never met a polar bear … they’re like, 
“yeah, ok, whatever”.’ Instead, he tries to make a case for low-carbon jobs, preventing 
floods and so on, building climate change into the discussions as he goes.
Despite his commitment to the issue, David says it is important to be realistic about 
what can be achieved:
Politicians like to have campaigns that they can win. Then they can do that press release: ‘I 
campaigned for x, and I got x, and I’ve delivered for you.’ And you can’t say ‘I’ve campaigned 
to stop climate change. And now climate change is fixed, and I’ve delivered for you.’ It’s never 
going to be a press release that anyone’s going to put out.
Jonathan
‘Jonathan’ is a composite of three interviewees, one Labour, two Conservative. Two had 
served one year as an MP; one had six years’ experience. One had a role as a spokesper-
son for their party; the other two were backbenchers.
Jonathan is new to Parliament. Elected a year ago in a marginal seat, he feels that his 
position is precarious. He is just starting to find his way around the Commons, saying 
that ‘there isn’t really any training in being an MP’. He comments that the working ethos 
is ‘totally individualistic, not collegiate’, with each MP having to steer their own way 
through their working life. Knowing I have worked with politicians, he asks me for my 
opinion: ‘Everyone appears to do it differently depending on their circumstances, so 
there’s no model, I wouldn’t say. Who do you think’s doing it well? What do you see?’
Jonathan is cautious about being ‘pigeonholed’. For example, he has spoken several 
times in Parliament about a particular health condition, but worries that colleagues will 
see him as the person who ‘keeps banging on about [the condition]. Whereas you want 
people to think of you as, oh you can go to him with anything.’ He is critical of strategies 
used by MPs like David, who speak stridently about the causes they believe in. ‘You 
can’t just go steamrollering in, although some people have done that, and they’ve made 
themselves very unpopular. … So you have to tread really carefully.’
65
484 The Sociological Review 66(3)
Jonathan has not spoken much about climate change, in Parliament or in his constitu-
ency. He says ‘my priority is to stand up for my constituency’. Jonathan sees climate 
change as an abstract, long-term issue, which makes it hard to talk about. ‘Telling people 
about the long term is a hard sell, you know it’s not going to get in the local paper above 
[a story about how] one village has broadband and the other doesn’t.’ Every decision he 
makes, his constituency comes first. He tells me this is because of the UK’s electoral 
system. Jonathan compares his marginal constituency with colleagues who have safe 
seats:
There’s a sort of a luxury that comes with a safer seat, you can say ‘Well ok well I care about, 
whatever issue,’ and make that your mission in life to change the world on one particular issue. 
Whereas when you’re in a more marginal seat … you feel like you have to be doing a little bit 
of everything.
Jonathan describes a particular group within his constituency as ‘retired, intelligent and 
affluent’. Such people like to make their views known to their local MP, he says, yet there 
is a danger in just listening to the loudest voices. He tries to make contact with people 
who would not think of approaching him. Of course, he wants their votes; but he also 
wants to make sure he is representing the interests of all his constituents, not just the 
campaigners and letter-writers.
Paul
‘Paul’ is a composite of four interviewees, three Conservative and one Liberal Democrat. 
All had served either five or six years; three were backbenchers and one had a role as a 
Parliamentary Private Secretary.
Paul has served two terms as an MP. When I ask him why he ran for Parliament, he 
says, ‘it sounds rather trite, but coming into politics was an exercise in wanting to make 
a difference. My previous work [in the public sector] had taught me that there was plenty 
wrong in society.’
Paul says that he sees climate change as a ‘gut’ issue. He has thought a lot about it, but 
worries that it does not motivate his colleagues. He says they are generally ‘not naturally 
inclined to be so interested in this policy area’ and that there is no pressure from party 
leaders to get involved. He sees limited value in trying to persuade colleagues, and tries 
to find other ways to make progress. He gives me his ideas for reforming transport and 
energy policy, but is adamant that such policies should be justified solely on economic 
and social grounds, and that reducing carbon emissions, or tackling climate change, 
should not be given as a reason for action. In short, he advocates climate policy by 
stealth. ‘I don’t use climate change as the word because I think it’s just toxic now in poli-
tics’, he tells me. ‘As is the way in these issues which are contentious, you won’t take 
people with you politically.’
Paul worries that too much focus on climate change will alienate people – both local 
people in the constituency, and fellow MPs. He says, ‘I think it is important not to be 
a climate change zealot.’ He recently argued for better public transport in his local 
area, alongside a proposed road scheme. When I ask him whether he had talked about 
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the carbon emissions from transport, he says, ‘I think if I had mentioned carbon emis-
sions, there would have been a rolling of eyes and saying, “Oh here he goes again”.’ So 
he made his case in other ways. He is very deliberate in his choice of strategy, and in 
the words he uses.
He is pessimistic about the ability of parliamentary processes and mechanisms to 
bring about change. He tells me that he worried about this before he was elected, but ‘I 
underestimated. There’s no question I underestimated. The frustrations are much greater 
… it’s a bunfight, nothing ever changes, you can become deeply cynical.’ He says that 
how policy is designed ‘ends up really mattering’ and is more important than bold public 
statements. He mentions Bismarck’s phrase: ‘politics is the art of the possible’.
Paul has a different attitude to his constituents than David or Jonathan. He is not so 
strongly motivated by constituency work, he tells me. ‘I enjoy the constituency stuff; it 
gives me a hell of a lot of information and knowledge which is of benefit to me here for 
the national stage. But ultimately, my job is here [in Parliament], it isn’t there.’ Though 
this attitude gives him more freedom to focus on the things that he sees as important, he 
is keen to point out that he is not dismissive of local views. He sees his constituency as a 
barometer of public opinion.
Paul talks about the possibility of profound change over time, using the example of 
equal marriage legislation to argue that change is possible through a combination of 
opinion shifts and careful policy. He worries, though, about moving too far, too fast. He 
says, ‘however much it might look like the leaders are making decisions, in a democracy 
they are polling public opinion, they are asking people about their priorities, they’re 
experiencing, just in the course of doing their job, where public opinion is.’ This complex 
balancing act, he says, is the core of democratic process. So no matter how urgent the 
issue, ‘the idea that you can somehow ignore the electoral result when setting your 
expectations of what government might do is, I think, profoundly undemocratic’.
Stephanie
‘Stephanie’ is a composite of four interviewees, all from the Labour Party, with a mean 
of 12 years’ experience in Parliament. Two had been junior ministers, and two had 
served in the Cabinet.
Stephanie has been in the Commons for three terms, and has served as a minister. She 
expresses her views readily, and speaks with the relaxed confidence of someone who has 
proven their worth. Though she talks about her constituency, it is clear that it doesn’t 
have the same pervasive influence on her as for younger or less experienced MPs. Neither 
is she as worried about what people think of her. When I tell her that other MPs are wor-
ried about being seen as outsiders if they make the case for action on climate change, she 
is surprised and even dismissive: ‘There’s no argument for staying quiet on any of this. 
You’ve got to speak out.’
Stephanie sees herself as a pragmatist, and says that others’ expectations are unrealis-
tic. ‘The punters, the populace think that the politician, the prime minister for example, 
is all-powerful. Actually, they absolutely are not. I’m not saying they have no power, but 
they can’t just do it.’ This isn’t an excuse for doing nothing, she says, but is instead a plea 
to focus on the practical steps necessary to achieve change.
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This view is central to her argument about how to tackle climate change. It’s not 
enough, she says, for politicians to be convinced of the science: ‘Even if all the Cabinet 
today were completely persuaded, the question then of what you do about it, becomes a 
difficult and problematic issue.’ She was in Parliament when the 2008 Climate Change 
Act was passed, and like the vast majority of MPs, voted for the legislation. She doesn’t 
remember it being discussed much, though: ‘The big issues were more around terrorism, 
anti-terrorism legislation, tax rates, and smoking in public places … I remember it going 
on in the background.’ She thinks that the fact that there was a strong consensus might 
have meant that it was discussed less, saying that if ‘you take it out of the day-to-day of 
political conflict, you shouldn’t be surprised that people aren’t talking about it’. Stephanie 
describes the group of politicians working directly on the Bill as ‘the obsessives … I 
know it’s offensive to use the term obsessives’. For her, she says, climate change ‘prob-
ably falls into the basket of general progressive issues that sound good to ensure’.
I ask Stephanie more about this, talking about the likely impacts of climate change. 
She tells me that I’m missing the point. Just stating the problem, without regard to practi-
cal steps that can be taken, is counter-productive. ‘The argument you’ve just made, that 
we’re in a qualitatively different situation than we’ve ever been in history, in my opinion 
doesn’t help the argument at all.’ For the same reason, she criticises environmental 
organisations: ‘motivation isn’t about just a set of beliefs, it’s about an ability to imple-
ment … this is a criticism I’d make of many of the green organisations, you just say it’s 
all very worthy but what the fuck can you do?’ Instead, she wants to focus on tangible 
objectives, promoting measures that improve local areas, like encouraging walking and 
cycling, creating jobs in the renewables industry, and so on.
Though Stephanie is less focussed than other interviewees on the views of her con-
stituents and public opinion, she does also ask how realistic it is to expect significant 
change on an issue that barely features in public or media debate. Following the reces-
sion, she says, it has ‘died’ as an issue. Neither is it discussed much within her party: ‘If 
either your party membership or the public are not flagging it up consistently as one of 
their top concerns or priorities, that is the issue.’ She is keen to explore changes to the 
practice of politics that could enable a more constructive debate between parties on cli-
mate change. ‘It’s the ultimate challenge to politics, isn’t it?’ she says.
Conclusions and implications for practice
As the narratives show, the ways in which the politicians in this study approach climate 
change is influenced by their understanding of the scientific evidence, but also by their 
professional identity, their conception of their role as a representative, and the way they 
navigate the day-to-day realities of life as an MP. Each of these are discussed in turn, 
below. Based on this analysis, some implications for practice are drawn.
Climate change and identity
David’s characterisation of himself as a ‘freak’, Jonathan’s criticism of colleagues who 
become identified by a single issue and Paul’s careful strategies to avoid being labelled a 
‘climate change zealot’ all point to a strong awareness of social and cultural norms within 
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Parliament, which individuals compare themselves against. This confirms results of pre-
vious studies (e.g. Puwar, 2004). The pressures are particularly acute for new MPs. Whilst 
Stephanie, given her seniority and experience, says that she does not feel the need to 
conform, her description of the ‘obsessives’ advocating for climate change contributes to 
the sense that it is an outsider’s issue. Taking an active role on climate does not fit current 
institutional norms. Thus politicians must choose to either keep quiet, like Jonathan, or 
develop strategies that they feel will not negatively affect their reputation or legitimacy. 
They may even, like Paul, do this by deliberately not mentioning climate change whilst 
championing policies which they feel to be appropriate solutions to the problem. The 
alternative is David’s strategy of saying exactly what he thinks, even though he feels that 
it casts him as an outsider and could limit his career. This matters not just because it might 
affect David’s career prospects, but also because, if climate advocates are less influential 
within the mainstream of each party, the issue will receive less attention.
This and other evidence (e.g. Hulme, 2009) shows that, for climate, the messenger is 
as important as the message. Politicians will feel more comfortable speaking out on cli-
mate change if they hear others do the same. More vocal support from party leaders and 
elders would help, as would advocacy from outside Parliament – for example, from busi-
ness, civil society organisations and the scientific community.
Making a representative claim on climate change
To what extent can politicians reconcile action on climate change with their ‘representa-
tive claim’, as discussed above? Each politician sees their representative role differently, 
and constructs their claims differently. Some, like Paul, see themselves as primarily a 
representative at the national level, with their constituents informing, but not prescribing, 
their stance in Parliament. Others, like Jonathan, see their job as representing their local 
area as faithfully as possible. Within the group of interviewees, newer MPs were more 
likely to forge an account of their legitimacy based on their ability to respond to the 
demands of the people they represent.
This set of interviews suggests that politicians feel little pressure from those they 
represent to act on climate change. Nevertheless, some politicians, like Paul and 
Stephanie, find ways to connect climate change to issues of importance to those they 
represent – through making the link to job creation, better transport systems and so on. 
This can be seen as constructing a ‘representative claim’. However, for such a claim to 
work, it must be accepted by those being represented. Hence the warnings of some MPs 
that their mandate for action on climate change is limited, and Paul’s explicit warning 
that to ignore the electoral result is ‘profoundly undemocratic’.
Thus the mandate for action on climate is not straightforward. Politicians need to play a 
mediating role between the scientific consensus embodied in the Paris Agreement, on the one 
hand, and current public views and demands, on the other, by building a ‘representative 
claim’ that action on climate is in the democratic interest. One possibility would be through 
the use of deliberative or collaborative approaches to politics at a local level (Dryzek, 2002), 
whereby Members of Parliament, together with local politicians and other stakeholders, use 
deliberative processes to discuss climate strategies which would benefit local areas. This 
could follow the model of participatory budgeting, for example (Davidson & Elstub, 2014).
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It may be that the UK’s constituency-based electoral system acts as a block to action 
on climate change; comparative research with politicians in other legislatures with con-
trasting electoral systems would help to identify whether this is the case. More funda-
mentally, the interviews highlight tensions between different time horizons, with 
politicians elected for five years or fewer, whilst being asked to take responsibility for 
issues playing out over decades. Sociological accounts of futures (Adam & Groves, 
2007; Urry, 2016) stress that contestation over the future affects and is affected by cur-
rent concerns. Some legislatures, including Hungary, Finland and Wales, have made this 
link explicit, by creating institutions such as an ‘ombudsperson’ or ‘commissioner’ 
tasked with representing future generations.
Is climate change a ‘do-able problem’?
With her long experience of politics, Stephanie puts a particular emphasis on the need to 
focus on practicalities, and is critical about politicians and others who take a moral stand 
on an issue without offering actionable solutions. David, too, reminds us that politicians 
need to show results; Paul calls for realism about how difficult genuine reform is. 
Coupled with the pressures of day-to-day life in the Commons, it is clear that politicians 
feel that they need to craft ‘do-able problems’, to borrow Fujimura’s (1987) phrase, out 
of the climate agenda. They seek ways of working on climate change which fit the work-
ing practices of Parliament and the institutions of policymaking. Interviewees gave 
examples of possible approaches, including reducing emissions from the transport sector 
through promoting public transport, incentivising renewable energy, policies to improve 
the energy efficiency of housing, and using industrial policy to promote low-carbon 
innovation strategies. These all provide a way for politicians to support bounded and 
achievable action on climate change, measures which fit within the established culture of 
politics and policymaking.
The question is whether action on climate change can indeed be crafted as a series of 
‘do-able problems’. Is it possible to envisage a set of responses which are politically and 
practically feasible, whilst significant enough to meet the statutory carbon targets laid 
down in the UK’s Climate Change Act? The analysis of Parliament’s independent adviser, 
the Committee on Climate Change, suggests that it may be (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2016). However, more radical critics maintain that meaningful action is incom-
patible with the global economic system, and that far-reaching changes to our economy 
and society are necessary (Jackson, 2011; Klein, 2015). Whilst this is not a view that 
politicians in this study held, four out of the 14 interviewees did single out climate 
change as an issue different to others, in that it threatens the benign environmental condi-
tions that have underpinned our society for many thousands of years (Clark, 2011). 
David’s comment that the House of Commons may one day be under water is a stark 
illustration of this.
Politicians need to perform a difficult juggling act: articulating the scale and signifi-
cance of climate change, whilst also crafting and building support for tangible, achievable 
projects and initiatives to address it. Recent evidence from city-scale action on climate 
may point the way (Bulkeley, Broto, & Maassen, 2014). In recent years, however, the 
UK’s climate strategy has been national in focus, with no targets or responsibilities being 
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given to local areas. A reinvigoration of local action on climate change may help to make 
the issue seem more tangible and ‘do-able’.
The research presented here indicates that action on climate change poses considera-
ble challenges for politicians. In short, even if they are convinced of the case for action, 
they find it difficult to craft responses that are credible, manageable and popular, within 
current institutions and systems of governance. However, there is much that could be 
done to support politicians in their crucial role on this issue.
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Abstract
This research note describes the use of composite narratives to present interview data. A 
composite narrative uses data from several individual interviews to tell a single story. In the 
research discussed here, investigating how politicians consider climate change, four composites 
were created from fourteen interviews with Members of the UK Parliament. A method for 
creating composite narratives is described. Three, linked, benefits of the technique are discussed. 
First, they allow researchers to present complex, situated accounts from individuals, rather than 
breaking data down into categories. Second, they confer anonymity, vital when reporting on 
private deliberations, particularly if interviewees are public figures. Third, they can contribute to 
‘future-forming’ research, by presenting findings in ways that are useful and accessible to those 
outside academia. The main limitation of composite narratives is the burden of responsibility 
upon the researcher, to convey accurate, yet anonymized, portrayals of the accounts of a group 
of individuals.
Keywords
anonymity, climate change, composite narratives, elite interviews, interviews, narrative methods, 
politicians, UK
Introduction
Although a great deal has been written about the politics of climate change (Giddens, 
2009; Urry, 2011) there has been little research aimed at understanding how politicians 
themselves understand or respond to the issue (Rickards et al., 2014). In contrast, there 
are studies exploring the environmental views and behaviours of individuals (Laidley, 
2013; Norgaard, 2006) and the outlook of business leaders (Wright et al., 2012). The 
research described here aimed, therefore, to take a similar, explicitly qualitative and 
sociological approach to examine how politicians understand their role.
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A major part of the study was a set of fourteen interviews with current and former 
Members of the UK Parliament in 2016, drawing on Riessman’s (2008) narrative method, 
and conducted under conditions of anonymity. In the first half of the interview, partici-
pants were encouraged to reflect on their working life, including their ambitions, and the 
influences and pressures upon them. They were then asked to consider how they 
approached the issue of climate change. As the interviewer, I was impressed and some-
what surprised by my subjects’ reflectiveness, with many showing a disarming frankness 
about their professional and personal struggles. I was left with a set of complex and 
personal interview accounts, and the tricky question of how to do justice to this richness, 
whilst maintaining the anonymity which, as many of my subjects told me, was crucial to 
them speaking out.
The results of the study are published in an article in the Sociological Review (Willis, 
2017a). This research note discusses one aspect of data analysis and presentation: the use 
of what I term ‘composite narratives’, in which a number of interviews are combined and 
presented as a story from a single individual. Though this approach is rarely used, it 
seemed to me to be a good response to the tricky question described above: how to pre-
sent an authentic yet anonymous story.
Below, I firstly describe how I arrived at the decision to develop composite narratives, 
and the process I engaged in to draw up the composites. I then discuss the advantages of 
this approach, and the potential drawbacks. The note ends by suggesting that being trans-
parent about the way in which composite narratives are developed might help to over-
come these issues.
Using fictions to convey ‘emotional truth’
Glossy hair, shiny shoes, white teeth . . . This woman is beautiful, mid-twenties, successful. She 
delivers her material as though saying: ‘Pretty gripping stuff, eh? What do you make of that, oh 
therapist?’ (Blundy, 2017)
Psychotherapist Anna Blundy writes a monthly column for Prospect Magazine, offering 
intimate accounts of her conversations with patients, to inform and to entertain her read-
ers. But none of these characters actually exist. At the end of every column, there is a 
small disclaimer: ‘the situation described above is composite, and confidentiality has not 
been breached’ (Blundy, 2017). The therapist Susie Orbach takes a similar approach. In 
her book The Impossibility of Sex (2000), she draws on her vast clinical experience to 
invent seven fictional characters, describing the complexities of the patient-therapist 
relationship.
Both Blundy and Orbach state that they use composite accounts to prevent breaches 
of patient confidentiality. Orbach also alludes to a further advantage of composites: 
she can use a single story to tell a more generally representative account of the experi-
ence of her patients. Thus she is not just talking about one individual; she is instead 
using her judgement to create stories which capture the essence of her patients’ lives, 
experience and perspectives. Orbach calls this ‘emotional truth’ (2000: 196), defined 
as ‘an authentic representation of feeling states rather than a strict adherence to narra-
tive truth’ (2000: 197).
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In taking this approach, Orbach has much in common with qualitative sociological 
researchers. With qualitative methods, researchers use their experience and judgement to 
make sense of large quantities of data, from interviews or ethnographic observations, for 
example. Researchers select, interpret, order and arrange data, in order to analyse and 
present research findings (Law, 2004). Creating stories or narratives based on a range of 
individual accounts is one way to do this.
Like Orbach and Blundy, I was drawn to storytelling by the data I had in front of me. 
I had conducted fourteen interviews with politicians, and they had talked to me about 
their life and work, their aspirations and concerns, and the nitty-gritty of how they got 
through their working day. The picture thrown out by the data was richer, more tangled 
and more personal than I had expected. It did not seem to me to be appropriate to ana-
lyze the data through ‘standard’ categorization, such as party affiliation, social back-
ground, gender, age or previous experience. Of course, all these factors are significant, 
as evidenced by previous research (see, for example, Carter (2013) on the differences 
between political parties; and the work of McKay (2011) and Puwar (2004) on gender 
in politics). Yet my aim was not to distinguish between politicians, through comparisons 
and categorizations. Instead, it was to investigate how politicians, as (a group of) peo-
ple, navigate their life and work.
An obvious solution would have been to focus on particular individuals, as case stud-
ies. I could have picked, say, four individual politicians, and given a full account of each. 
However, I was prevented from doing this by the need to preserve anonymity. Each 
subject had agreed to the study under condition of anonymity. As public figures, politi-
cians can be identified easily, even if personal details are disguised. Thus I had the idea 
of combining individual accounts, to form a composite. As with Orbach’s work, this 
would also have the advantage of writing narratives which, together, give a picture of the 
group as a whole.
With this in mind, I undertook a search of literature on qualitative research, assuming 
that presenting interview data in this way would be commonplace. To my surprise, it 
appeared to be a technique rarely used. In addition to the psychotherapy examples 
described above, a small number of other studies emerged. Wertz et al. (2011) describe 
the use of ‘composite first person narratives’. For example, a story of an obese adoles-
cent girl, told from her point of view, illustrates the ‘body shaming’ that such individuals 
may feel. As Wertz et al explain,
The individual narratives of each study participant are unified with the reflexive understandings 
of the researcher . . . [which] affords the reader the ability to explore the ‘felt-sense’ of the 
informants’ experiences. (2011: 8)
Similarly, a study by Piper and Sikes (2010) of sexual relationships between teachers and 
pupils uses fictionalized stories, based on ethnographic and interview data. Though dia-
logue and contextual details are fabricated, the researchers did not make up ‘anything 
that directly related to people’s experiences and perceptions of allegations of abuse as 
told to us’ (Sikes and Piper, 2010: 43). Their prime reason for using this approach was 
protection of anonymity, particularly given the risk of media intrusion. Annette Markham 
(2012) also describes how she creates composite accounts to present data gathered from 
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online sources, which could otherwise, if quoted directly, be traced easily through search 
engines. Markham deliberately and provocatively uses the term ‘fabrication’ to ‘inter-
rogate and destabilize the mistaken and often unspoken assumption that invention neces-
sarily represents a lack of integrity’. (2012: 336).
Inspired by these examples, I began to experiment with creating composites from my 
interview data, that would convey ‘emotional truth’, to use Orbach’s phrase (2000: 196). 
In doing so, I began to formalize a more rigorous method, in order to give a clear account 
of how the composites were derived. This is described below.
Developing a methodology for composite narratives
Whilst the use of composites discussed above (Orbach, 2000; Piper and Sikes, 2010; 
Wertz et al., 2011) are a compelling way of presenting research, the link between the 
original data and the final story is not clear. The process by which the original speech 
becomes a written narrative is opaque. Readers are asked to simply put their faith in 
the researcher’s judgement. To a certain extent, all qualitative research faces this issue; 
researchers must use their judgement to analyse and present unwieldy amounts of 
‘raw’ data in the form of interview data or ethnographic fieldnotes. By documenting 
the way in which the data has been analysed and presented (describing, for example, 
the process of coding; decisions about what extracts to include; decisions about any 
categorization, and so on) the researcher can build trust in the research process and the 
subsequent findings.
I started to consider ways in which I could do this. I wanted to demonstrate that the 
narratives were derived directly from the original data. I decided that all the quotations I 
used would be verbatim quotations from the original interviews, and likewise, all the 
details from the narratives would be taken from one or more of the original interviews. 
When I submitted the article for peer review, however, the reviewers were broadly sup-
portive of the composite narrative approach, but all asked for more clarity about how 
they were derived. One wrote
The idea of composite narratives is interesting, partly as a way of dealing with the difficulties 
of anonymising politicians’ statements. However, you would need to tackle some serious 
questions about precisely how you compiled the composites and what we can deduce from 
them.1
As a result, in a subsequent draft, I developed a much more detailed and transparent 
account of the process of deriving composite narratives. I devised four practices to gov-
ern the process of composing the narratives, as follows:
1. Each composite is based on transcripts from interviews. 3–5 transcripts are con-
densed into one composite narrative. For example, ‘Jonathan’ is a composite of 
three interviewees from different parties, all relatively new to their roles as MPs 
and sharing similar concerns about speaking out on the issue. In contrast, another 




2. All quotations come directly from these interview transcripts.
3. Other details, such as where the interview took place; how the conversation 
evolved; and any paraphrasing of discussions, are taken directly from one of the 
source interviews.
4. In the narrative itself, I avoid imposing any judgement on the interviewees’ expe-
riences and opinions, and do not assume motivations or feelings. Any comments 
of this nature in the narrative are taken directly from the interviewees. For exam-
ple, in the composite narrative ‘David’, concerns are raised that if politicians are 
vocal about ‘controversial’ issues like climate change, this might affect their 
opportunities for promotion. In the narrative, this is reported as follows: ‘David 
feels that his commitment has come at a price’, showing that this is his reading of 
events, not the researcher’s interpretation.
Taken together, these practices ensure that there is a clear link between the original inter-
view transcripts and the final narratives. The only modification is to present data from 
several interviewees as if it were from a single individual. I use the term ‘narrative’, not 
‘fiction’, to emphasize the fact that they are derived solely from the data.
The resulting composite narratives
Following this approach, I created four composite narratives from fourteen interview 
transcripts. Several different groupings of composites were considered, and of course, 
the stories could have been combined in any number of different ways. I chose the final 
groupings as they seemed to me to best convey the range of positions and views that the 
data revealed. A full description of the method, and the final composite narratives, each 
of a length of around 500–600 words, is presented elsewhere (Willis, 2017a) and sum-
marized below. The composites mix interviewees of both genders, but in order to tell the 
story in a readable way, a gender is assigned to each, roughly representing the gender 
balance of the House of Commons as a whole (71 percent male in the 2015–2017 
administration).
‘David’ is formed from a composite of three interviewees, all relatively new to parlia-
ment. David speaks out about the need to act on climate change, even though this means 
that his colleagues see him as a ‘freak’.
‘Jonathan’ is a composite of three MPs, one Labour, two Conservative. In contrast to 
David, Jonathan worries about being too vocal on issues that he sees as controversial. His 
primary concern is to support his constituents.
‘Paul’ is formed from four interviewees. He has more experience than David or 
Jonathan. He wants to tackle climate change, and focuses on the tactics by which action 
can be achieved.
‘Stephanie’ is a composite of four interviewees, all of whom have served in govern-
ment. Stephanie’s overriding concern is the slow pace of change, and the need to focus 
on practical, achievable steps.
Following the presentation of the four narratives, the article (Willis, 2017a) examines 
three themes common to each: questions of identity, or how politicians understand their 
own role and life; the question of how politicians interpret and execute their role as 
79
6 Qualitative Research 00(0)
representatives; and the issue of how each MP manages the pressure and complexity of 
everyday life.
Why use composite narratives?
This research highlights three potential benefits of using composite narratives, discussed 
below.
Complex, situated accounts
Given that the aim of this project was to examine the outlooks and motivations of politi-
cians, as individuals within a wider system of democratic governance, there was a need 
for a method that allows the complexities of an individual’s position to be presented and 
explored.
The urge to resist typologies and categorizations, and instead to find ways to convey 
the richness and complexity of an individual’s perspective, is common to much qualita-
tive research. Examples include the body of work on illness narratives which moves 
beyond medical categorizations to focus on the lifeworld of the patient (for a dicussion 
see Atkinson, 2010); the studies described by Wertz et al. (2011) discussed above; and 
feminist research such as Puwar’s (2004) study of female and ethnic minority MPs.
In his review of ‘narrative ethics’, Tony Adams asserts that, in any such research which 
focuses on eliciting narrative, it would be wrong to categorize or de-personalize accounts 
in presenting the data: ‘we must not approach stories with a prescription or typology for 
analysis; an evaluation of narrative must remain contingent on the stories, authors, and 
audiences as they interact’ (Adams, 2008: 179). Instead, as John Law writes in describing 
‘messy’ methods, the challenge is ‘to keep the metaphors of reality-making open, rather 
than allowing a small subset of them to neutralize themselves and die in a closed, singular, 
and passive version of out-thereness’ (2004: 139). In keeping with this orientation, narra-
tives aim to embrace the account provided by the individual, rather than searching within 
it for an objective ‘truth’ (Adams, 2008; Riessman, 2008; Thomas, 2010). As Riessman 
writes, ‘narratives are useful in research precisely because storytellers interpret the past 
rather than reproduce it as it was’ (2005: 6). Narratives allow research to be presented in 
a way which acknowledges the complexities of individual motivations and outlooks, 
whilst drawing out more generalized learning and understanding.
Anonymity
The more context and detail offered in a narrative account, however, the greater the 
chance of compromising anonymity. An important advantage of composite narratives is 
that they allow the presentation of contextualized stories, without resorting to fiction, 
and whilst offering a significant degree of anonymity.
Members of Parliament are public figures, with a great deal of information about 
them in the public domain, particularly given the ease of online data gathering. Ensuring 
anonymity is, therefore, much more complex than changing names and withholding 
basic personal data (Saunders et al., 2015; Tolich, 2004). MPs can be identified by their 
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political party, constituency represented, stated views on a particular issue, voting record, 
or, most likely, some combination of these. To ensure anonymity, details must therefore 
be removed or altered. However, doing so removes vital context, and works against the 
aims of providing a situated account, described above. Composite narratives protect ano-
nymity through mixing accounts, thereby preventing the possibility of identifying a 
research subject through a combination of details.
Much discussion of anonymity has focused on the need to protect vulnerable research 
subjects, such as Piper and Sikes’ (2010) teachers and pupils involved in accusations of 
abuse, and Saunders et al.’s (2015) family members of people in minimally conscious 
states. Politicians may not be seen as ‘vulnerable’ in this sense. Yet their status as public 
figures confers a different type of risk or vulnerability. In her discussion of elite inter-
viewing, Morris (2009) reports that whereas elite interviewing is typically held to be 
problematic because the interviewees are powerful figures, she instead argues that 
researchers ‘have power over the respondent through the process of research . . . control 
of what is published and control of meaning’. (Morris, 2009: 213) In this sense, elite 
interviewees are particularly vulnerable to breaches of anonymity.
In my case, politicians spoke openly to me about the dilemmas they faced in deciding 
whether to speak out on issues that they saw as controversial or difficult. For example, 
one admitted to feeling lost and unsupported as a new MP. Many were critical of the 
stances taken by their colleagues. These interviewees would have been embarrassed at 
best, and possibly severely compromized, if their identity was revealed.
Future-forming research
Last, a crucial additional advantage of composite narratives is that, by providing con-
texualized and personalized accounts, they can help to build understanding of particular 
people and groups, in ways that are accessible to non-academic audiences.
For example, my work has proven useful for people who want to work with politi-
cians to build political responses to climate change, including scientists and advocates 
from pressure groups. Because composite narratives are based on anonymized conversa-
tions, they provide insights that might not be forthcoming if MPs were speaking in the 
public domain. I have presented this research to audiences of scientists and practitioners, 
who commented that it gave them an insight into how MPs think through their working 
life and strategy. The work is now being used by a coalition of advocacy organizations, 
to evaluate their parliamentary campaigns. Similarly, many illness narratives aim to pro-
vide healthcare practitioners with an understanding of patients’ lived experience, thereby 
improving care practices (see Mishler, 2005 for a discussion).
Such research can be seen as part of a wider project of what Gergen (2015) terms 
‘future-forming’ research. Gergen distinguishes between, on the one hand, social sci-
ences which take from the natural science tradition an aim of mirroring reality; and on 
the other hand, a ‘reflexive pragmatism’ (2015: 287) which sees research as situated 
within the social world, with an explicit ethical stance and aim for intervention, rather 
than just description or analysis. The research described in this article, a collaborative 
project between a university and an environmental advocacy organization, was designed 
to do precisely this: using academic methods to improve outcomes for climate policy and 
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politics. Whilst not all research using composite narratives is necessarily ‘future-form-
ing’, this project, as well as examples from the field of healthcare, demonstrates that 
composite narratives lend themselves well to this sort of applied research.
Evaluating the use of composite narratives
My approach to composite narratives, and particularly the development of a transparent 
route from the data to the narrative, as described above, helps to build confidence that the 
composites are a meaningful representation of the original data.
Yet even with this more formalized approach to composite narratives, there is a dan-
ger that in merging accounts from different individuals and presenting them as one, the 
narratives becomes simplistic or caricatured. For example, I could have combined inter-
views in a different way, to create a narrative about a timid, newly-elected MP who feels 
completely overwhelmed by their role. Many interviewees did express feelings of doubt 
or worry to me, and I could have combined these to create one composite of a nervous, 
overwhelmed politician. However, this would not have been true to the data, as everyone 
I interviewed had a certain degree of self-assurance and confidence, unsurprisingly given 
the job they were doing.
As this example illustrates, when creating composite narratives, there is a considerable 
burden on the researcher to develop composites that ‘fit’ the underlying data. In common with 
much qualitative research, including narrative techniques and ethnography, the reader relies 
on the researcher’s interpretation and presentation of data. The researcher needs a level of 
understanding and familiarity with the context of the study, in order to judge what makes a 
meaningful composite. In my case, I had worked with politicians for many years, and under-
stood the world of parliament in general and the politics of climate change in particular; this 
meant that I had a depth of understanding which enabled me to write up data in this way.
There may also be a danger of privileging narrative, relying too much on accounts pro-
vided by individuals, and not seeing the wider context or structure within which the narra-
tive is set. For example, one of my interviewees told me that he had not been promoted 
within his party, because of his outspokenness. As a peer reviewer of my article commented 
rather archly, he could have been overlooked for promotion simply because he is not very 
talented. This difficulty can be overcome not by trying to get to the ‘truth’ buried in each 
account, which is an impossible task, as discussed above; but by using a range of different 
methods to triangulate and situate narrative accounts. In this instance, there is other evidence 
(see for example Rickards et al., 2014; Willis, 2017b) that politicians and other leaders do 
indeed feel the need to modify their views in order to progress in their careers.
In summary, this research illustrates that composite narratives provide an effective 
means of presenting anonymized interview data, while maintaining the richness and 
complexity of personal stories. Researchers can demonstrate the validity of the narra-
tives through following a transparent process in drawing the interviews together to form 
composites.
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At the 2015 Paris Summit, global leaders agreed a strategy to tackle climate change. Under 
the agreement, each country must prepare a national plan. What challenges does this pose for 
politicians? How do they reconcile their representative role with understandings of climate change 
and measures required to address it? This article analyses interviews with UK politicians, through 
the framework of the ‘representative claim’ developed by Michael Saward, seeing representation 
as a dynamic interaction between politicians and those they claim to represent. Thus, politicians 
need to construct a ‘representative claim’ to justify action on climate. Four different types of 
claims are identified: a ‘cosmopolitan’ claim, a ‘local prevention’ claim, a ‘co-benefits’ claim and a 
‘surrogate’ claim. The analysis shows that it is not straightforward for a politician to argue that 
action is in the interests of their electorate and that climate advocates need to support efforts to 
construct and defend claims.
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Introduction
The scientific consensus on climate change is strong, and evidence points to the need to 
take action to drastically reduce emissions of greenhouses gases (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014). At the Paris summit in 2015, 195 world leaders 
agreed to act, with each country committing to a national plan for emission reduction. 
National politicians, therefore, have responsibility for developing their country’s plan, 
putting in place the strategies, policies and incentives necessary to facilitate emission 
reductions.
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But how does this political commitment to act on climate change link to democratic 
representation at the national or local level? The scientific case may be made, but ques-
tions remain as to how (or indeed whether) this fits with a politician’s mandate as an 
elected representative, given that public concern about climate change is low compared 
to other political issues (Pidgeon, 2012). This article considers action on climate change 
through the lens of political representation and presents evidence from a set of interviews 
with Members of the UK Parliament (MPs).
The article begins with a discussion of political representation, particularly the theory 
of the ‘representative claim’ developed by Michael Saward (2010). Saward sees represen-
tation not as a static fact but as a dynamic relationship between a representative and the 
represented. The politician must put forward a claim, which may be accepted, rejected or 
ignored by those that he or she represents.
This theoretical lens is used to analyse the way in which politicians reconcile their 
representative role with their understanding of the need for political action on climate 
change. Data are taken from 14 interviews carried out in 2016. The interviews show that 
climate change poses a representation dilemma for politicians. While they acknowledge 
that action on climate change is necessary, they report little or no pressure from their 
electorate to speak or act on the issue. Politicians shape the way that they talk about and 
act on climate, crafting the issue in a way that they feel will be meaningful to those they 
see themselves as representing, in order to justify their actions and garner support. In 
other words, they make a ‘representative claim’. Doing this is not straightforward, given 
the complex nature of the problem and the low levels of public concern.
Among the politicians interviewed, four different types of representative claim were 
identified. First, some MPs make a cosmopolitan claim, saying that it is in the interests of 
the human species as a whole to act, and therefore, it should be a concern for all politi-
cians. Second, some frame the issue as a local prevention claim, in which they assert that 
action is necessary to prevent impacts such as flooding in their local area. Third, some 
point to the economic or social benefits arising from taking action on climate change, 
such as jobs created in renewable energy industries. This can be called a co-benefits 
claim, as politicians are claiming that such action helps towards tackling climate change, 
as well as bringing other specific local benefits. Last, some politicians judge that they 
cannot speak out on climate change because a direct claim would be opposed or ignored. 
Instead, they make what might be called a surrogate claim, in which climate change is not 
explicitly mentioned. Instead, other reasons are given for measures which the politician 
privately believes will help to tackle climate change.
The interviews show that politicians feel constrained in acting on climate change, but 
some nonetheless find ways of building a representative claim. The article concludes with 
a discussion of the implications of this analysis for the theory of representative claims and 
suggests ways in which politicians could be better supported to act on climate change.
Although the politics and governance of climate change has been discussed exten-
sively, across the fields of political studies and international relations (see, for example, 
Giddens, 2009; Underdal, 2017), there has been relatively little attention to the ways in 
which politicians, as crucial actors within political systems, understand or respond to the 
issue (Rickards et al., 2014). This article contributes to a greater understanding of the 
specific role of politicians, supplementing the accounts of governance and political sys-
tems described above. In doing so, it tests empirically a contemporary theory of represen-




Theorising Representation: The Representative Claim
How should an MP, elected by the voters of a geographical constituency, approach their 
representative role? The meaning of representation has been debated for many centuries 
(Dobson and Hamilton, 2016; Mansbridge, 2003). Summarising a complex picture, 
Urbinati and Warren (2008: 388) identify what they term ‘standard accounts of demo-
cratic representation, focused primarily on territorially based electoral representation’. 
However, this ‘standard account’ is under increasing pressure:
… territoriality, though historically essential to the evolution of democratic representation, 
identifies only one set of ways in which individuals are involved in, or affected by, collective 
structures and decisions. Issues such as migration, global trade, and environment, for example, 
are extraterritorial; they are not contained by any existing territorially organised polity (Urbinati 
and Warren, 2008: 389–390).
Neither does territoriality account for issues such as religion, ethnicity or gender iden-
tity, or the role of non-elected actors in politics, such as businesses or civil society groups 
organising around issues rather than places. Meanwhile, the vexed question of whether or 
how nature and non-human species get a hearing in the democratic process is not solved 
by standard accounts of representation (Dobson and Hamilton, 2016).
As these standard accounts have come under increasing pressure, Michael Saward has 
proposed a shift in how representation can be understood. He argues that representation 
should be seen not as a static fact but as a dynamic exchange between representatives and 
those being represented, in which a politician (or anyone else seeking a representative 
role) can make a claim, which in turn is accepted or rejected by others:
Political representation is not simply a fact of political life, or an achieved state of affairs, 
resulting from elections. Rather, at a deeper level, representation is a dynamic process of claim-
making and the reception of claims (Saward, 2010: 8).
Thus, the job of the politician is to demonstrate, through words and action, the ways in 
which they represent: ‘representation is an ongoing process of making and receiving, 
accepting and rejecting claims – in, between, and outside electoral cycles’ (Saward, 2010: 
36). Politicians make and modify their claims, in a dialogue with those they seek to rep-
resent, to demonstrate that they are carrying out their role appropriately and effectively.
Saward sets out schematically how a representative claim is constructed. Each claim 
has a ‘maker’, who sets out the claim; a subject, put forward as the representative; an 
‘object’, the group to be represented; a ‘referent’ (the wider pool from which the object is 
drawn); and an ‘audience’, who, crucially, can accept, reject or ignore the claim. A claim 
therefore follows this pattern:
A maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a subject (‘S’) which stands for an object (‘O’) 
that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered to an audience (‘A’) (Saward, 2010: 37).
Using this formulation, Saward describes how an MP might make a representative 
claim:
The MP (maker) offers himself or herself (subject) as the embodiment of constituency interests 
(object) to that constituency (audience). The referent is the actual, flesh-and-blood people of 
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the constituency. The object involves a selective portrayal of constituency interests (Saward, 
2010: 37).
The formal electoral process – the winning of an election – is the legal and procedural 
basis for the MP’s claim to representation, but this only tells part of the story. During the 
election campaign, and while in office, politicians make claims setting out who they 
represent and how. The acceptance of these claims is an agreement by the represented 
that their politician does indeed represent them. The question of what is, or is not, in the 
interests of those represented is explored and refined through the making and accepting 
(or rejection, or ignoring) of claims. There is no pre-determined spatial, temporal or 
other boundary to the claim. Politicians can claim that it is in the interests of the people 
they represent, to consider the needs of future generations, citizens of distant countries 
or, indeed, other species. Neither is representation limited to the formal political sphere. 
Any individual or group can make a claim to representation. Saward gives the example 
of the singer Bono claiming to represent people in Africa who, Bono asserts, ‘have no 
voice at all’ (quoted in Saward, 2010: 83; see Montanaro, 2012, for a discussion). These 
claims to representation interact with, shape and are shaped by the claims made by 
elected representatives.
Saward’s theory has been used in particular to analyse representation in the European 
Union, whose institutions work alongside, but do not replace, national legislatures, 
thereby raising problems of complexity and legitimacy (see, for example, de Wilde, 
2013). The UK’s referendum decision to leave the European Union could, at its sim-
plest level, be seen as UK citizens rejecting representative claims made by European 
institutions.
The theory of the representative claim has much in common with the concept of ‘fram-
ing’ discussed in political science, the process by which politicians shape an issue to fit 
with political ideology, the positions held by voters and other actors and prevailing politi-
cal norms (Benford and Snow, 2000; Lockwood, 2011). This is discussed further in the 
conclusion.
Representation and Climate Change
As discussed above, the concept of the representative claim is a useful way of thinking 
about action on climate change. Climate change is certainly a challenge in representa-
tional terms: it is something that affects all humans, and all species, but to differing 
degrees and over different timescales. Climate change is not immediately ‘knowable’ but 
is mediated through scientific evidence and modelling and is understood in different ways 
by different groups (Hulme, 2009). Given the ubiquity of fossil fuel use, agricultural 
practices and other land use which results in emissions of greenhouse gases, nearly all 
humans contribute to the issue and will also be affected by any attempts to curb emissions 
(although causes and effects of climate change are distributed very unevenly in global 
terms). Climate change is both local and global, both immediate and long-term, both 
personal and systemic. In representational terms, there is no simple answer to questions 
about who should represent or act on behalf of whom.
The scientific community stresses that reductions in greenhouse gases are urgently 
needed to avert the worst effects of climate change (IPCC, 2014). As a result, a high-pro-
file group of scientists is making the case for a new approach to governance, termed ‘plan-
etary stewardship’ (Steffen et al., 2011). They argue that human interference in crucial 
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earth systems, including the climate system, must not go beyond certain boundaries, and 
advocate for a system of governance which enables humanity to keep within these limits: 
‘the need to achieve effective planetary stewardship is urgent’ (Steffen et al., 2011: 739) 
and ‘can be built around scientifically developed boundaries for critical Earth System pro-
cesses’ (Steffen et al., 2011: 757).
In advocating this approach to governance, scientists are, in effect, making a repre-
sentative claim. While they do not explicitly argue against democracy, they contend that 
‘planetary stewardship’ is a precondition of human society (and, within that, the political 
system); thus, it is something that must be done. The question of how it is done is left 
unspecified, save for generalised references to governance. Andrew Dobson (2010: 765) 
describes this approach as playing ‘a card that will trump political debate and discussion’. 
Yet, to the extent that action relies on legislation or policy change, scientists remain 
dependent on formal political processes to achieve their aims. Scientists can make a claim 
that they represent humanity’s future, but their claim needs to be accepted, by national 
legislatures and publics alike, if it is to be successful.
Meanwhile, public concern about climate change has low salience compared to other 
issues. A recent review of evidence states that:
… climate change is invariably not the highest or most important priority for many people … 
Other global/societal issues (e.g. world poverty, crime, terrorism, and war), environmental 
issues (e.g. water pollution), or personal issues (e.g. health, finances, and relationships) have a 
higher expressed importance for them (Pidgeon, 2012: s87).
There is some evidence to suggest that climate change is a ‘valence’ issue, one which 
voters expect politicians to act on, even though they do not identify it as a priority 
(Lockwood, 2013). Thus, politicians are faced with generalised concern about climate, 
but little guidance as to what action voters would like to see. How should a politician 
respond if scientists call for urgent action, but publics, including those whose votes they 
depend upon, do not prioritise climate action? How can they develop a strategy that 
achieves the necessary emission reductions while resonating with publics and building 
support for further action? In other words, the task is to develop representative claims on 
climate change. What might such claims look like? This question is examined empiri-
cally, below, through analysis of interviews with UK politicians.
Method
The interviews used a narrative approach (Riessman, 2005), aiming to elicit description 
and storytelling – the politician telling their own story of their work and life. Participants 
were informed that one of the purposes of the study is to find ways to better support politi-
cians in their work on climate change. Thus, the interviews were presented as a collabora-
tive discussion (Morris, 2009; Oakley, 1988), a joint investigation by the researcher and 
the researched.
MPs were recruited through an email invitation from the researcher, setting out the 
collaborative nature of the project, as a joint initiative between Green Alliance and 
Lancaster University. Basic information was provided about the research question and the 
interview itself. A total of 22 MPs were approached, to secure the 14 interviews. Given 
the methodological stance, the number of interviews was limited, to allow detailed quali-
tative analysis (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2015). Within these constraints, participants were 
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selected to provide a balance of age, gender, political party, and length of time served as 
an MP (see Table 1). Both current and former MPs took part; some differences were noted 
between these two groups, with former MPs tending to be more reflective and less focused 
on the practical difficulties of working life.
Participants’ previous involvement in the issue of climate change was investigated. 
There was a wide spectrum of involvement, as evidenced by participation in events or 
speeches. Known ‘climate sceptic’ MPs (defined as those who publicly state that they do 
not accept the scientific consensus, as represented by the IPCC (2014)) were not 
approached. This is because the research question focuses on how MPs try to understand 
and act on climate change, rather than the reasons for rejecting the issue altogether. A dif-
ferent research strategy would be needed for this group. These ‘climate sceptics’ are influ-
ential, although they are small in number. Only five MPs out of 659 voted against the 
Climate Change Act in 2008, although opposition to climate action has increased in sub-
sequent years (Carter, 2014).
The interviews began with a short description of the study, and discussion of ethical 
issues including consent and anonymity. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed 
by the researcher. Interviews were semi-structured and designed to be informal and con-
versational. First, participants were asked to reflect on the way that they work and the 
influences and pressures upon them. Questions were then asked specifically about cli-
mate change: the extent to which the issue is discussed in Parliament and how it is dis-
cussed, and whether or how they work on the issue. The term ‘climate change’ was 
deliberately not defined by the interviewer, with interviewees free to interpret it as they 
wanted, with some talking more about climate science and international co-operation and 
others discussing action at local level. This basic framework was used for all interviews, 
although emphasis varied. Most interviews were 30–40 minutes long, but a number were 
considerably longer, and one lasted only 20 minutes.
Interview data were transcribed and analysed through coding using NVivo software 
and through critical reading of the scripts. The data showed differences between inter-
viewees, with party affiliation, social background, gender, age and previous experience 
all playing a part, as can be expected from previous research (see, for example, Carter 
(2013) on party strategies and research described earlier (McKay, 2011; Puwar, 2004) on 
gender). Younger MPs, for example, were more likely to be influenced by the positions 
taken by their seniors (this is discussed further in Willis, 2017a). However, these differ-
ences were not clear-cut, and there were many commonalities. The analysis presented 
Table 1. Interviewees’ Background and Experience.
Gender 9 males, 5 females
Party affiliation 6 Conservative, 6 Labour, 2 Liberal Democrat
Time served as MP Between 1 and 19 years’ work as an MP; mean = 6.4 years
Current status 8 sitting MPs; 6 former MPs, who left office in 2010 or 2015
Seniority 4 interviewees had served in government; 2 had served on 
the opposition frontbench; 8 were backbenchers, most with 
experience on Select Committees
Record on climate 
change issues
7 with some record of activity on climate change issues (judged 
through speeches in Westminster and elsewhere); 7 with little 
or no activity
Participants were not asked for additional demographic data, for example, age or ethnicity
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below does not categorise according to party, age, gender or other ‘standard’ category, but 
discusses the different sorts of claims made by the group of MPs as a whole. In the con-
clusion, some differences based on political ideology are discussed.
The interviews were designed to investigate how MPs address climate change, in gen-
eral terms. The issue of representation was a subject that was raised by each interviewee, 
in different ways, as discussed below. Other themes to emerge were questions of identity 
– how politicians see themselves and their role, and discussion of the pressures of work-
ing life. These findings are published elsewhere (Willis, 2017a).
While this study investigates the positions of individual MPs, it is important to note 
that the stance of a particular government, or political party, is not simply the sum of 
individual MPs’ stances. In the UK system in particular, the executive has far-reaching 
powers and influence, memorably dubbed an ‘elective dictatorship’ by Lord Hailsham 
(Byrne and Weir, 2004), with backbenchers having a limited role in national policy for-
mulation (Norris, 1997). Thus, this study cannot claim to offer a full explanation for the 
stance of government or particular parties. Studying elected MPs can, however, offer 
insights into the dilemmas of representation and how this can be reconciled with action 
on climate change or indeed other issues.
Interviews were held anonymously, and this was crucial in building a picture of their 
private deliberations. In this context, assuring anonymity for public figures requires a 
more robust approach than just changing names (Saunders et al., 2015). Therefore, the 
amount of context given to the data in this article is limited.
MPs’ Representative Claims on Climate Change
This set of interviews shows that climate change poses a dilemma for politicians trying 
to carry out their representative function. Interviewees acknowledged that action on 
climate change is necessary (though their understanding of, and commitment to, the 
issue varies). Yet, they report consistently that they feel little or no pressure from the 
people they see themselves as representing, to work on climate issues. Thus, if they are 
to speak or act on the issue, they must work to construct a ‘representative claim’, dem-
onstrating how their work on climate change can be justified in terms of their role as 
an elected politician.
Below, politicians’ deliberations on climate change and representation are presented in 
three steps. First, their understandings of the need for political action on climate change 
are discussed. Second, their attitudes towards their representative role in general are con-
sidered. Third, these two elements are joined, to discuss how politicians reconcile repre-
sentation and climate action and to discuss how they make representative claims on the 
issue. Four types of claim are identified, each of which portrays climate change, and the 
responses needed, in a different way.
Understanding the Need for Political Action on Climate Change
All the interviewees in this study stated that action by politicians on climate change is 
needed, although there were a wide range of views on the importance and urgency of the 
issue. (Note that, as described above, known ‘climate sceptic’ MPs were not interviewed.) 
When asked about their awareness of the issue, responses included:
It’s just been [there] … I don’t remember not caring about [it].
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The first big memory I obviously have of it is Kyoto [the first international climate treaty, signed 
in 1997] … and then it became an increasing issue rising up the agenda.
Some distanced themselves, saying that they did not understand the issue enough:
I’m not an expert on it, it’s still a very complicated subject.
The majority, however, showed what might be termed passive or conditional support. 
For example, one interviewee explained that she knew it was important, and part of the 
wider agenda of her party and political outlook, but that it was not something that moti-
vated her:
It probably falls into the basket of general progressive issues that sound good to ensure … It’s 
not why I went into politics.
A minority of interviewees saw climate change as a crucial issue to address, one 
describing its potential impact graphically as we sat in the House of Commons:
Where we’re sat right now might well be underwater, right next to the Thames. I wouldn’t fancy 
our chances.
Whatever their own views, all interviewees agreed that the issue was not much dis-
cussed in parliament. Comments included:
It’s not the number one issue that’s talked about here.
I don’t really recall it coming up a lot.
It’s just not part of the daily discourse, it’s too far away.
Two interviewees made the distinction that it had been talked about more in previous 
administrations, particularly around the time of the Climate Change Act, passed in 2008:
There was a lot of passion, a lot of commitment, a lot of concern … and I feel it has completely 
disappeared.
As a mainstream political issue, your top five, I think it’s died. Which is bizarre given that it’s 
the greatest challenge facing the planet.
All interviewees reported that the issue was seldom or never raised by the constituents they 
meet in their surgeries, on the doorstep when campaigning or in day-to-day encounters:
I’ve knocked hundreds, literally thousands of doors, and had tens of thousands of conversations 
with voters … and I just don’t have conversations about climate change.
I can’t remember the last time I was asked about climate change. It’s very rare to be asked about it.
Some reported a minority within their constituency who raised climate change, nor-
mally as part of a broader set of issues concerning environment and social justice. This 
was particularly the case for those who represented wealthier constituencies, with a core 
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of what one MP described as ‘articulate, affluent people who have perhaps a particular 
type of worldview’. Another described this group as a vocal minority:
It’s an unusual city, it’s got its Guardian-reading intelligentsia, who are engaged … And yes, we 
know from the emails they send that climate change is one of the issues of concern, but to be 
honest, I’m quite interested in the other eighty-seven thousand people, and particularly working 
class people, who are not going to be engaged in the issues, but are concerned about whether 
their kids can get to school or whether the hospital is operating.
Politicians are adept at understanding different segments of opinion and social posi-
tion within their local area, as one explained:
I’ve begun to think too much like a market researcher, you know, there’s the segment of the 
population for whom it [climate change] matters more than others.
Thus, while some MPs felt pressure from a minority of their electorate to act on cli-
mate change, none reported a significant mandate from their constituency.
Demonstrating Representativeness
All the interviewees in this study stressed the need to consider their constituency and 
relate their work to local people. In keeping with Saward’s theory, politicians rely to a 
certain extent on the formal system of constituency representation to justify their posi-
tion, but this does not mean that they take their ‘representativeness’ for granted; they 
feel the need to demonstrate it through words and action. This is in part due to the UK 
electoral system, in which each politician represents a specific geographical area. 
Previous research suggests that this constituency role has become more important over 
time. In the 1950s, MPs rarely visited their constituency (Norton, 1994), whereas all 
interviewees in this study highlighted their local links. One described ‘the incredibly 
real emotional pressure you feel from your constituency’. She used metaphors of fam-
ily to explain this:
It is really unbelievably strong. It’s almost like being a parent. It’s got the sort of joys and terror 
associated with that type of emotional connection. And so you see everything through the prism 
of how it will go down locally, and if you’re properly connected you will in a sense become your 
constituency, and you will walk in time to it.
While all felt the need to demonstrate that they were working on behalf of their con-
stituents, they differed in the degree to which this dominated their working life. Newly 
elected MPs felt a strong need to prove their connection, as one explained: ‘I say my 
priority is to stand up for my constituency, putting forward things in my constituency, to 
make it better, to attract funds, to improve productivity’. Those who represented marginal 
seats, too, felt under a greater degree of pressure. One contrasted the ‘luxury’ of a safe 
seat with the perils of representing a marginal:
[there is] a sort of a luxury that comes with a safer seat … you can say well ok I care about, 
whatever, and make that your mission in life to change the world on one particular issue. 
Whereas when you’re in a more marginal seat you don’t feel like that. You feel like you have 
to be doing a little bit of everything, to prove to everybody that you’re a generalist, not a 
specialist.
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Previous research has suggested differences between parties in the degree to which 
MPs are led by the electorate’s views. For example, Philip Norton argues that Conservatives 
are more likely to characterise their role as ‘acting in the best interests of the people’ 
(Norton, 2012), which, they argue (following Edmund Burke (1774)), requires a degree of 
autonomy; Labour and the Liberal Democrats are more likely to respond directly to con-
cerns of current voters. This did not hold true for the limited sample of MPs interviewed in 
this study, with all MPs claiming to represent their constituency in a direct sense, although 
how they did this differed across parties and is discussed in the conclusion.
While the needs of their constituency influenced all the interviewees, other factors 
were influential too: their own background, views and values; the priorities of their party, 
which they must be seen to address; parliamentary business, such as the legislative 
agenda, and any specific role as a minister, spokesperson or committee member.
A ‘License to Talk’: Building a Representative Claim on Climate Change
As the discussion above shows, if politicians are to address climate change, they must 
find a strategy which appeals to, or at the very least does not conflict with, the people who 
they see themselves as representing. In Saward’s language, they must construct a ‘repre-
sentative claim’.
MPs’ reflections in interviews support Saward’s (2010: 8) description of representa-
tion as ‘a dynamic process of claim-making and the reception of claims’. Interviewees 
spoke explicitly about their efforts to present issues in ways that would appeal to their 
electorate and serve their interests. One, for example, representing an affluent rural con-
stituency, described how she married her own environmental interests with her constitu-
ents’ concerns about planning issues. She said that these concerns ‘gave me a bit of a 
license to talk about environmental issues’.
On climate change, interviewees discussed the ways in which it was possible to address 
the issue, despite reporting low levels of interest or awareness: through building a repre-
sentative claim on climate change and developing an account of how a certain course of 
action would serve the interests of those they claim to represent. Below, four such claims 
are analysed. They are presented as separate, static claims, but in practice, as discussed in 
the conclusion, politicians may use different claims in different circumstances, as part of 
a dynamic exchange between representative and represented.
A Cosmopolitan Claim. As a global issue, it can be argued that climate change requires a 
global response; this is the approach taken in the cosmopolitan claim. These MPs argue 
that it is in the interests of the global community (including, of course, their own country 
and constituency) to take action. Thus, their representative claim reaches far beyond their 
local area; they see themselves, alongside others, as representing the global community. 
In the words of one interviewee, a former MP:
I often started off with that sort of fairly internationalist viewpoint … a lot of the impacts of 
climate change are going to hit other places before they hit here. [My constituency] is not likely 
to be one of the first places to be hit particularly badly. So what? I just happen to be here.
This is a cosmopolitan claim because it explicitly states that a global viewpoint is 
needed. In putting forward such a claim, this politician is positioning himself within a 
wider group of climate advocates, including, for example, politicians in other countries, 
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civil society leaders, and climate scientists. Thus, this claim extends beyond representing 
the interests of one particular constituency and assumes a more global significance.
While a cosmopolitan claim has the advantage of reflecting the global nature of the 
issue, if it is to be successful, any claim must be accepted, rather than being rejected or 
ignored, by its intended audience. The same politician described the limitations of his 
claim: the audience is limited because in his view, few people think in such abstract, 
global terms. Such a claim will not appeal to:
… people who fundamentally care about themselves, their environment, their friends, their local 
space. They’ve never been to Bangladesh, they’ve never met a polar bear … We have these sort 
of massive big things about what will happen in other parts of the world about bits of Africa 
drying, about these species, and they’re like, ‘yeah, ok, whatever’.
Another interviewee also pointed out the limited appeal of a cosmopolitan claim, con-
trasting it with an appeal to local interests. In conversation with the interviewer, he 
stressed the impact that a visit to Bangladesh, to view climate impacts first-hand, had had 
on him. Yet, he hesitated to use this to make a case with constituents:
We’ve got to be able to take people to Birmingham, not just Bangladesh … Bangladesh is going 
to motivate some people, I actually did go to Bangladesh as well, and it did have an impact on 
me, but you know, it just feels, it’s just not going to be enough.
As this shows, even those interviewees who put forward a cosmopolitan claim acknowl-
edged its limitations. A further difficulty with this claim is that it is not directly linked to 
particular strategies or actions. It is difficult to relate a generalised claim of this sort to 
specific practical initiatives. Because of these drawbacks, all interviewees stressed the 
need to ground a claim in a local area and make the links to local people and issues. Two 
strategies were suggested for doing this: a local prevention claim and a co-benefits claim.
A Local Prevention Claim. In this formulation, MPs make the case that acting on climate 
change is in the interests of their local area because taking action will prevent the worst 
effects of climate change. This tailors the claim more explicitly to a local setting. One MP 
described how discussions of climate change are prompted by extreme weather events 
such as floods:
There are peaks of anxiety about climate change when there is severe flooding … people do 
suddenly say, oh crumbs, you know this climate change thing is really terrible, inevitably the 
people affected are worried about how they’ve been affected, understandably. So people are 
like, ‘argh, climate change’, and then everything sort of runs round for a bit, and you can, then 
its kind of dies away.
In this example, the interviewee is seeing events like floods as a chance to make the 
claim that action on climate change is necessary and desirable, but she is also pointing out 
the fleeting nature of such opportunities. Another interviewee explained how he deliber-
ately stresses the risks of flooding, although he himself is more concerned about other 
impacts, because he saw it as a useful way of making a case:
I talk for example quite a bit about … domestic flood risk. I don’t see it as one of the biggest 
consequences of climate change, in reality, but ‘your house is going to flood if we keep doing 
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this and you will not be able to get insurance for it, so we need to do something about it’ … is a 
powerful message.
Making a claim based on local impacts, and the need to prevent the worst impacts, has 
the advantage that it links a global issue directly to the local area, and allows a politician 
to claim that it is in the interests of the area that he or she represents, to take action on 
climate. However, as with the cosmopolitan claim, it does not link directly to a case for 
local action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, though it bolsters the case for measures 
to adapt to climate change, such as flood prevention strategies.
A Co-benefits Claim. The most common strategy that interviewees reported was linking 
climate change to practical, achievable local actions, particularly economic measures, 
such as encouraging renewable energy generation, or improving transport infrastructure. 
This has the obvious advantage of relevance to the local area. The politician can claim 
that they are acting in the interests of the local area while also tackling a global issue. 
Thus, action on climate change has local co-benefits. Interviewees talked about examples 
of this:
I’ve just been to see a guy in my constituency, a car-related company, they’ve done it [saved 
energy], and it’s saving them money. So those are the messages, those are the ways of doing it, 
so it doesn’t seem a negative thing.
In [my area], the green economy, the offshore wind, presents an opportunity.
I know in my constituency about a community energy company … which is great and interesting 
and very innovative, and hopefully that will start to generate some interest.
I’m happy to use an economic argument if that means that more people will come on side … I 
change the language to be much, much less extreme.
As the last example shows, presenting climate action as a manageable, locally benefi-
cial initiative is a tactic used by politicians to build support. A co-benefits claim involves 
promoting a tangible local strategy, in order to represent the interests of the local area, as 
well as wider interests. The disadvantage of such a claim, though, is that it may reduce the 
opportunity to discuss the full implications of climate change, focusing on small steps at 
a local level.
A Surrogate Claim. The co-benefits claim, described above, promotes local benefits while 
acknowledging the global nature of climate change. It grounds climate action in a particu-
lar locality. By contrast, a surrogate claim simply promotes local benefits, without refer-
ence to climate change. In this case, although the politician himself or herself is thinking 
of a particular strategy in terms of its climate benefits, they deliberately do not mention 
this. Instead, they only talk about local benefits, such as reduced congestion, or cost sav-
ings. These MPs, a significant minority among interviewees, think that mentioning cli-
mate change or carbon reduction would be unpopular, and therefore counter-productive. 
They judge that an explicit representative claim on climate change, such as the claims 
described above, would not be accepted by its intended audience. Two interviewees 
explained how they articulated their support for local transport schemes which they pri-
vately thought would reduce carbon emissions, without mentioning this:
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I would rather not say a word about climate change and stop the [local road] being ten lanes, 
than make a really good case about climate change and have a ten lane bloody superhighway 
next to us.
If I had mentioned carbon emissions, I would have been … there would have been a rolling of 
eyes and saying, ‘oh here he goes again’.
Interviewees explained that they use this strategy because they see it as the only way 
to bring about the action required. When pushed to explain, one interviewee not only 
acknowledged the significance of climate change but also stressed the lack of support, 
within their party and with voters, hence the strategy of pursuing a surrogate claim:
Interviewee:  Climate change in my own party is toxic. There’s no need to talk about it.
Interviewer:  to look at it from a different perspective, you and I both know the science of 
climate change, we know that going to two degrees, three degree warming is a 
really serious thing which affects the whole way we live our lives.
Interviewee: yes
Interviewer: why can’t you talk about that?
Interviewee:  because unfortunately, as is always the way in most of these issues which are 
contentious … you won’t take people with you politically.
The last phrase here is telling: ‘you won’t take people with you politically’ emphasises 
that, in his judgement, there is no audience for a representative claim which is explicitly 
about climate change.
Conclusion
Analysis of these interviews shows that it is not straightforward for a politician to make a 
case for why, as an elected representative, he or she should support action on climate 
change. As a complex, mediated, global issue, the links with everyday lives of voters are 
not self-evident. As one interviewee memorably said, ‘you don’t say someone came to my 
surgery with climate change coming out of their ears’. They found it harder to make a 
claim on climate than other issues, such as supporting local services or providing job 
opportunities. However, politicians know that it is an issue requiring political attention, 
and so they find ways of building a representative claim, constructing a case for why they 
should be advocating climate action. Table 2 summarises the four contrasting representa-
tive claims on climate change, using Saward’s (2010) formulation.
Politicians do not necessarily choose one claim over another; they may use different 
claims in different circumstances. The cosmopolitan claim appeals to a global community 
and local people who see their lives within a global context – for example, supporters of 
development organisations (Desforges, 2004). The local prevention claim has more 
immediate resonance for local communities and businesses, particularly in areas at risk 
from extreme weather events such as flooding. A co-benefits claim on climate change is 
widely used, not just by politicians but by business organisations and other climate advo-
cates; it can be seen as part of the wider framing of environment as a process of ‘ecologi-
cal modernisation’ (Hajer, 2000). In the UK, the Stern (2007) Review was commissioned 
by the Labour administration to formalise the economic case for action on climate. The 
surrogate claim is more likely to appeal to right-of-centre voters who, as other research 
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(Whitmarsh and Corner, 2017) suggests, are most likely to be sceptical of the need for 
climate action.
Aware of these differences, politicians in this study used different types of claim for 
different audiences and at different times – such as the interviewee quoted above, who 
used a flood as an opportunity to discuss climate impacts in his constituency, or other 
interviewees who said that they would use a ‘co-benefits’ type claim when addressing a 
business audience. Previous work in political science also highlights this strategy. 
Richard Fenno’s (1977) classic account of ‘home style’ details how US Members of 
Congress tailor their presentation according to their audience; Michael Saward (2014) 
describes the ‘shape-shifting representative’. Whereas it is often assumed that a politi-
cian who changes their position or presentation according to the situation is unprinci-
pled, inconsistent or maverick, Fenno, Saward and the evidence from this study would 
suggest instead that such crafting of claims and positions is part of the everyday job of 
the representative.
In crafting representative claims, politicians find ways to put climate change onto the 
political agenda, offering it up in ways that are politically meaningful to the people they 
represent. However, in doing so, they risk downplaying the nature of the threat, negotiat-
ing it into something more acceptable to their audiences. Analysis of parliamentary 
speech also demonstrates a tendency to ‘tame’ climate change (Willis, 2017b). Yet, cli-
mate change, as a planetary phenomenon, cannot be negotiated away. As the US com-
mentator Bill McKibben (2015: 1) puts it, ‘Physics doesn’t negotiate. Physics just does’.
Table 2. Forms of MPs’ Representative Claim on Climate Change, Following Saward (2010).
Form of claim Maker Subject Object Audience
Cosmopolitan 
claim
‘we must tackle 
climate change in 
the interests of 
this local area and 
all humanity’










‘The nation and 
this local area 
must act to 
prevent climate 
impacts, such as 
floods, in our area’





with a particular 
focus on those at 







‘We need action 
to reduce carbon 
emissions, as it 
will benefit the 
local economy and 
society, as well as 
helping to combat 
climate change’
















‘Saving energy and 
promoting energy 
security brings 
benefits to our 
local area’












Politicians’ reluctance to confront the more far-reaching implications of climate 
change may not just be because they do not feel that they can construct a valid representa-
tive claim but also because their own life experience, and indeed the development of 
human societies and political systems over thousands of years, has been carried out 
against the backdrop of a stable climate (Clark, 2011). The far-reaching changes to earth 
systems threaten this stability (Steffen et al., 2011). In this context, the task for politicians 
is to develop representative claims which acknowledge the profound implications of cli-
mate change while crafting responses that resonate with those that they represent.
The Theory of the Representative Claim
As this analysis shows, conceptualising representation in terms of the making and accept-
ing of representative claims helps in understanding how politicians can reconcile their 
representative role with their position on particular issues. It provides an account of the 
creative ways in which politicians make the case for their agenda, even when, as in the 
case of climate change, it may not be an issue on which the local electorate is demanding 
action. It overcomes the vexed questions of whether politicians can or should represent 
nature or other species, people beyond their constituency and over the long-term rather 
than a single electoral cycle. The answer is deceptively simple: they can, and should, if 
they can make a representative claim which is accepted. Implicit in the theory, however, 
is the idea that some claims are harder than others to sustain; a claim like the cosmopoli-
tan claim identified here, based on the long-term interests of a globalised humanity, will 
find it more difficult to gain traction than a claim which represents immediate local inter-
ests. Thus, the theory provides a nuanced account of the way in which politicians concep-
tualise their role as a representative.
However, an approach might risk under-emphasising the structures and processes of 
representation. Electoral systems undoubtedly affect the way in which politicians work. 
Comparative studies of environmental policy across different legislative systems show 
the influence of different governance arrangements (e.g. Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013; 
Schaffer and Bernauer, 2014). As demonstrated by these interviews, the UK’s constitu-
ency-based system is an influential factor in politicians’ conceptions of representation. As 
a study by Lizzeri and Persico (2001) suggests, systems of proportional representation 
may encourage politicians to appeal to a wider group. It may be that changes to institu-
tional structures or electoral systems might encourage better consideration of complex, 
global issues; this discussion might be downplayed if too much emphasis is placed on 
representation as a claims-based construct.
Directions for Research
The research did not set out specifically to examine differences between different politi-
cal parties and beliefs, though this is undoubtedly of huge significance. For example, a 
cosmopolitan claim ties closely to liberal conceptions of internationalism and global soli-
darity, emphasised by Liberal Democrat interviewees in this study; as highlighted above, 
a surrogate claim is often used with right-of-centre voters. Further research with politi-
cians from different political traditions would help to build a clearer picture of the way in 
which political ideology shapes representative claims on climate change.
This research has focused on the politicians themselves. However, as Saward points 
out, politicians do not have a monopoly on representation or, indeed, on politics. Indeed, 
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Bruno Latour draws on the pragmatist tradition in US political thought to focus on atten-
tion on the ways in which issues become political. They ask how something becomes a 
‘matter of concern’ (Latour, 2004) for certain publics, how the issue is articulated and 
whether or how it enters the formal political arena. A flood, for example, may just be seen 
as a weather event, with no attendant politics. However, if local people believe that offi-
cial agencies could have prevented flood damage through better flood defences or warn-
ing systems, flooding may become a ‘matter of concern’, a political issue, as people 
articulate a problem and advocate solutions (Whatmore and Landström, 2011). This may, 
in turn, be taken up within the formal political sphere, if politicians support, deny or rede-
fine claims.
Following this, most interviewees pointed to issues which had become ‘political’, 
thanks to deliberate campaigns by local people, or pressure groups. An example of this is 
the campaign to protect bees, mounted by Friends of the Earth and other environmental 
groups. As one interviewee wryly remarked, ‘without in any way undermining the impor-
tance of bees, you know we get more letters on bees than on anything else’. Another poli-
tician criticised environmental groups for failing to build a public mandate on climate, 
saying ‘we’re never going to be able to carry this on a sustained basis if we don’t have the 
public support’, and contrasting with groups supporting overseas development, who, in 
his view, ensured that ‘there were still cheerleaders for that policy in the public’. There 
would be merit in research examining the ways in which politicians and other political 
actors work together, whether in an orchestrated way or informally, to develop and sustain 
representative claims.
As discussed above, while the analysis here has not focused on processes or institu-
tional considerations, their importance should not be neglected. It may be that more wide-
spread use of deliberative processes, for example, would help politicians to develop their 
mandate on climate change (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). Reforms which allow long-
term considerations to be brought into politics could also be considered (Jacobs, 2011; 
Urry, 2016). This research was limited to UK MPs, elected through a first-past-the-post 
constituency-based system. Comparisons could be made to other electoral systems, such 
as proportional representation, to consider the relationship between claims-making and 
the formal architecture of electoral systems. Last, backbench MPs, particularly in the UK 
system, have limited influence on government agendas (Norris, 1997); further research 
could investigate the representative claims made by governments or political parties.
Supporting Politicians to Speak and Act on Climate Change
This research points to ways in which politicians, individually and collectively, could be 
supported to develop a comprehensive political response to climate change. First, it is 
important for climate advocates, including scientists and campaign groups, to acknowl-
edge the complexities of the politician’s role. Politicians must understand the climate 
issue and its implications, and craft it into an issue, or issues, which they feel will garner 
support: they must develop representative claims. Scientific evidence in and of itself is 
not a motivator, as scholars of science and technology studies have long argued (Wynne, 
2010). Individual politicians feel constrained in acting on climate change, but some none-
theless find ways of building a claim, a way of legitimising their work in this area.
Second, climate advocates should understand that representation is not a matter for 
politicians alone. As discussed above, representation stretches far beyond formal politics. 
Advocates can develop and shape representative claims which politicians can join and 
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modify. Climate advocates could use the typology of representative claims on climate to 
consider how to support politicians and, indeed, how to develop their own representative 
claims.
For example, a ‘prevention claim’ could be developed as a time-limited strategy, 
around the time of extreme weather events such as floods or drought linked to climate 
change. A co-benefits claim can be used on a local or regional basis; indeed, there are 
many examples of local areas promoting the benefits of a ‘low-carbon economy’, which 
in turn helps local politicians to make a case for action. Greater Manchester, for example, 
has established a ‘Low-Carbon Hub’, which describes its aims as ‘reftrofitting our homes 
and workplaces, developing more low-carbon skills, building our renewable energy 
capacity and energy efficiency and helping the low carbon business sector flourish and 
grow’ (Greater Manchester Low Carbon Hub, 2017).
At the most fundamental level, those holding a moral position that representative 
democracy is desirable, while also understanding the scientific evidence that urgent 
action on climate is necessary, must find ways to reconcile representation and climate 
change. In the words of one politician in this study, ‘the idea that you can somehow ignore 
the electoral result when setting your expectations of what government might do is pro-
foundly undemocratic’.
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The scientific case for Earth System governance has been made, but how does this fit with a 
politician’s mandate as a democratically elected representative? What role do national 
politicians think they can and should play in the governance of earth systems? This paper 
tests these questions empirically, using data from a study of UK politicians. A mixed-method 
study of Members of the UK Parliament (MPs), including corpus analysis of political speeches, 
a focus group of civil society advocates, and interviews with 23 MPs, investigated how 
politicians understand and respond to climate change. Climate change provides a test for the 
Earth System Governance concept, because a global goal to limit climate change has been 
agreed through the 2015 Paris Agreement. Yet while the Agreement sets a clear goal, the 
means to achieve it remain firmly at the level of the nation-state, with each country assuming 
responsibility for its own national plan. Thus national administrations, run by elected politicians, 
have a crucial role to play. Evidence from this study shows that, while many politicians have 
an understanding of the challenges posed by climate change and wider changes to earth 
systems, few have yet been able to operationalise this understanding into meaningful 
responses at the national level. The study highlights two, linked, reasons for this. First, 
politicians’ ability to act – their agency – is limited by the practicalities and procedures of 
everyday politics, and by the norms and cultures of their working life. Second, UK politicians 
feel very little pressure from their electors to act on climate change, and have to work to justify 
why action on climate change carries democratic legitimacy. The paper concludes with 
recommendations for both research and practice. In terms of research, there is a need to 
supplement the analysis provided by Earth Systems governance researchers, with a more 
fine-grained, contextual understanding of the interplay between global goals and national 
political systems. In terms of practice, politicians, working with other stakeholders, need 
support in order to articulate the scale and significance of earth system challenges, and craft 





 1. Introduction  
 
I am sitting in a café in the House of Commons, right next to the River Thames, 
with a newly-elected politician. I ask him what he thinks about climate change. 
“It’s terrifying”, he replies. “Where we’re sat right now might well be under 
water, right next to the Thames. I wouldn’t fancy our chances.” In my mind’s 
eye, I picture a submerged Palace of Westminster, and I think that he may 
well be doing the same. “Why isn’t that discussed much by politicians?” I ask. 
It is as if this question breaks the spell, and he veers away from the 
underwater palace, moving the discussion onto electoral cycles, the economy, 
the health service. We are back on firm ground. 
 
There is a growing body of evidence (IPCC, 2014; Rockström et al., 2009) that 
human activity has influenced Earth’s planetary systems to such an extent that 
the planet is entering a new and different geological era, the Anthropocene 
(Biermann et al., 2012). One of the most significant impacts is the change to 
the planet’s climate system brought about by anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2014). Whereas earth’s climate had a long and 
turbulent history before the arrival of our species, the past 11700 years, the 
Holocene era, has been remarkably stable. During this period, complex 
human societies have developed, with the advent of agriculture, large 
settlements, and more recently, nation-states, democratic government, 
industrialisation and globalised economic systems. As the planet moves out of 
the stable climate of the Holocene, into an era characterised by greater 
instability, the implications for human society are both profound and uncertain 
(Rockström et.al., 2009).  
 
Better understanding of these changes has led to calls for governance of earth 
systems: purposeful, co-ordinated action by humans, aiming to limit changes 
to the climate and other earth systems, to allow human societies to continue 
and flourish. Prominent among these are the calls for ‘planetary stewardship’, 
which advocates a system of governance “built around scientifically developed 
boundaries for critical Earth System processes” (Rockström et.al., 2009:757), 
and the Earth System governance project, which calls for an expanded role for 
the United Nations organisations, to strengthen action at multilateral level, set 
global standards, and co-ordinate national action (Biermann et al., 2012). 
 
The research presented here investigates how one particular influential group, 
national politicians, understand and respond to this challenge. What role do 
national politicians think they can play in the governance of earth systems? I 
begin with a discussion and critique of the Earth System governance literature. 
Following a description of the methodological stance, I present empirical data, 
using corpus analysis, a focus group of civil society advocates, and interviews 
with 23 Members of the UK Parliament (MPs) to examine the question of how 
national politicians respond to climate change. Finally, I discuss ways in which 
the Earth System governance approach could develop a better account of the 
national political context; and offer recommendations for how national politics 




 2. Theoretical Framework: ‘Earth System governance’ and beyond  
 
Below, the theoretical framework of Earth System governance is set out, and 
critiqued using insights from an interdisciplinary literature drawn from 
sociology, political science and theory, and science and technology studies. I 
argue that Earth System governance research and advocacy would be 
strengthened if more attention was paid to questions of agency, and to the 
need to develop democratic legitimacy. These ideas are further explored 
through discussion of climate politics in the UK, a country often seen as a 
leader, though recent policy implementation has stalled.  
 
2.2 Earth System governance  
 
Earth System governance is defined by one of its architects, Frank Biermann, 
as “the societal steering of human activities with regard to the long-term 
stability of geobiophysical systems” (2014:59). Research in this area is diverse, 
incorporating both natural and social sciences, but has a shared focus on the 
ways in which humans influence, and are influenced by, earth systems. 
Governance is understood as the process by which humans try to manage 
their impacts on earth systems, in order to ensure continued benign conditions 
for human societies. Much work in this area has been carried out through the 
Earth System governance project, launched in 2009 under the auspices of the 
International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental 
Change, and now part of the Future Earth initiative (Future Earth, 2018). 
 
Biermann stresses that Earth System governance has both an analytical and 
normative dimension. It is an analytical project, studying “the emerging 
phenomenon of Earth System governance as it is expressed in hundreds of 
international regimes, international bureaucracies, national agencies, local 
and transnational activist groups, expert networks, etc” (2014:59). It is 
normative, in that it proposes ways in which governance processes could be 
reformed, to better manage earth systems. For example, over thirty scholars 
from the Earth Systems governance project co-authored a paper in the lead-
up to the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 
putting forward nine areas in which, they argued, major governance reforms 
were needed. The paper concluded that  
 
Swift transformative structural change in global governance is needed. 
We need a ‘constitutional moment’ in the history of world politics, akin 
to the major transformative shift in governance after 1945 that led to the 
establishment of the United Nations… Earth system transformation 
calls for similar, if not even more fundamental, transformations in the 
way societies govern their affairs. (Biermann et al., 2012:57) 
 
Similarly, the 2012 Planet Under Pressure conference, a gathering of over 
3000 stakeholders including representatives from academia, business, media 




 Fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and 
international institutions is required to overcome barriers to progress 
and to move to effective Earth-system governance. (Brito and Stafford-
Smith, 2012) 
 
Whilst research on Earth System governance has focussed on multilateral 
institutions, there is also analysis of state and non-state actors, including 
national and local government, NGOs, business stakeholders and citizens; 
and an assertion that governance is multi-layered and polycentric (Bernstein 
and Hoffmann, 2018; Kuyper et al., 2018). 
 
2.3 Limitations of the Earth System governance approach  
 
Summarising his call for improved Earth System governance, Biermann, while 
acknowledging the role of non-state actors and national governance, states 
that  
Effective international cooperation must be a basis for Earth System 
governance in the Anthropocene. A concerted effort is needed to bring 
these institutions in line with the exigencies of the changed political 
context of Earth System transformation. (2014:60) 
 
The reasoning behind this statement is clear. Earth systems must be 
managed through international co-operation. However, Biermann’s statement 
also reveals two key limitations in the Earth System governance approach. 
The first of these is an insufficient account of agency. Who has responsibility, 
and power, to act? Biermann writes the phrase “a concerted effort is needed” 
in the passive voice, without indicating who is making the effort, on whose 
behalf. Similarly, the Planet Under Pressure declaration states that 
“fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international 
institutions is required” (Brito and Stafford-Smith, 2012:8),  without stating who 
requires it, and who will bring it about.  
 
Neither is the democratic legitimacy of such proposals discussed. There is an 
implicit assumption that democratically elected politicians will be involved in 
bringing about better governance, but there is no account of how those 
politicians might derive their mandate, or gain electoral support for a reform 
project of such magnitude. These two limitations, agency and democratic 
legitimacy, are discussed in turn below. The analysis is then applied to the 
case of climate governance specifically. 
 
Agency: In its normative mode, Earth System governance research lays out a 
series of desired reforms to governance arrangements, at multilateral, national 
and local level (see, for example, Biermann et al., 2012). However, the 
process by which such reforms will be brought about is not made explicit. 
‘Governments’ are often assumed to be the change-makers: “We urge 
governments to draw on the lessons of past treaty-making exercises” 
(Biermann et al., 2012:52); but there is also a more general call for change, 
encompassing existing multilateral institutions, governments at all levels, and 
other actors such as civil society organisations. Often, the passive voice is 
used, such as in the example cited earlier: “a concerted effort is needed”. 
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 Throughout, however, there is an assumption that it is possible for these 
actors to translate scientific evidence into appropriate, agreed responses. 
Maarten Hajer coins the phrase ‘cockpitism’ to describe the illusion that 
governance of earth systems can be managed in this way, by committed 
actors – pilots, in this analogy – assessing all the evidence at their disposal, 
and having the freedom to respond accordingly in order to steer the planet, as 
aeroplane, into a safe landing (Hajer et al., 2015).  
 
Yet, in stark contrast to the cockpit analogy, the question of who the actors are, 
and what agency they have, is complex and contested. As has long been 
argued by scholars of science and technology studies, it is not simply a case 
of ‘translating’ evidence into action. Reactions to scientific evidence are 
complex and situated, influenced by social and institutional norms and 
cultures (Demeritt, 2001; McNeil, 2013; Wynne, 2010).  To the extent that it is 
‘government’ being asked to act, the ability of national legislators to respond to 
such demands depends on the political conditions within which decisions are 
made. This, in turn, depends on whether politicians feel that they have a 
mandate, from their electorate and others.  
 
Democratic legitimacy: The Earth System governance approach is not 
explicit about how their calls for reform relate to democratic processes at the 
local, national or international level. Earth System governance is presented as 
a precondition of human society, something that must be done, given the 
weight of scientific evidence. The question of how reforms can be brought 
about, democratically or otherwise, is not specified.  
 
Andrew Dobson describes this approach, stating what ‘must’ be done without 
specifying how, as attempting to play “a card that will trump political debate 
and discussion” (2010:765). Yet to the extent that action relies on legislation 
or policy change, politicians need to steer reforms through formal political 
processes. Put bluntly, what if calls for Earth System governance do not 
garner democratic support? Recent UK evidence suggests that public concern 
about climate change has low salience compared to other issues (Pidgeon, 
2012). How should a politician respond if scientists and Earth System 
governance advocates call for urgent action, but publics, including those 
whose votes they depend upon, do not prioritise the issue? In this situation, 
politicians are left with the tricky job of crafting a case for action, on an issue 
that is not front-of-mind for voters (Willis, 2018). 
 
These limitations to the Earth System governance approach do not undermine 
the fundamentals. This paper does not argue against recommendations for 
strengthened, multilateral governance. Rather, the analysis suggests that 
more emphasis must be placed on the processes by which such governance 
could be brought about, and how reforms can be steered through national 
political systems, in ways that engage electorates and develop a mandate for 
further action. In other words, researchers must address the ‘politics gap’ 
identified by Ian Bailey and Piers Revill (2015). Below, these issues are 
discussed with reference to a specific example: the case of climate 
governance, and its implementation in the United Kingdom.  
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 2.4 Earth System governance: The case of climate change in the UK  
 
The Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 can be seen as a step toward 
implementing Earth System governance. Following previous failed attempts, a 
record 195 countries reached agreement, declaring that ‘climate change 
represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and 
the planet… deep reductions in global emissions will be required’ (UNFCC, 
2015:1).  A goal was set to limit global average temperature rise to between 
1.5°C and 2°C.  
 
However, the Agreement also highlighted the limitations of global governance. 
Whilst a global goal was agreed, there were no legally-binding commitments 
or targets agreed for individual states. Each state instead assumed 
responsibility for developing its own plan, or ‘nationally determined 
contribution’ (NDC). The Paris framework offers each state the opportunity to 
shape their own response, to fit national circumstances and democratic 
possibilities. Yet so far, the sum total of all actions pledged through NDCs 
does not match the global ambition, with estimates suggesting that under 
current promises, the 2°C boundary will be breached (Fawcett et al., 2015). 
 
The UK is in a relatively strong position to respond to the Paris Agreement. It 
has statutory targets on carbon reduction, enshrined in the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, passed with cross-party political support. The Act sets five-yearly 
carbon budgets, leading to an 80% reduction in emissions from 1997 levels by 
2050. However, the means by which this goal will be reached are not clear. 
Targets need to be met through policies and action to reduce emissions in 
energy, transport, buildings and land use, for example. The Committee on 
Climate Change recently criticised government for a so-called ‘policy gap’ 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2017) saying that further policies are required 
if the targets are to be met. However, neither of the two main political parties 
in the UK is paying much attention to the issue, it remains a low priority to the 
electorate, and there are some signs that the cross-party consensus may be 
eroding (Carter and Clements, 2015; Farstad et al., 2018).  
 
In short, despite a comprehensive international agreement, and a strong 
legislative framework for domestic action, there is limited political activity on 
climate change in the UK, and underachievement against targets set.  
 
This shows that more emphasis needs to be placed on examining and 
understanding the place of climate change and, more generally, Earth System 
governance, within the complexities of national politics. The study described 
below uses data from a study of UK politicians, to investigate this question.  
 
3. Method  
 
3.1 Methodological orientation  
 
This study aims to supplement macro, structural descriptions of governance, 
with a more fine-grained, contextual account of the ways in which national 
politicians experience the issue of climate change, as one of a number of 
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 Earth System challenges. To do this, the study takes a mixed-method 
approach, inspired by what Sanford Schram (2013) calls “phronetic social 
science”.  
 
The term ‘phronesis’ refers to an Aristotelian categorisation of knowledge, 
described as “the practical wisdom that emerged from having an intimate 
familiarity of what would work in particular settings and circumstances” 
(Schram 2013:369). As such, it can be distinguished from episteme, or 
universal knowledge; and technē, or practical application of knowledge. 
Following this approach, this study aims to uncover politicians’ phronetic 
knowledge. It scrutinises their understandings of the possibilities and 
constraints of their role, or what Schram et al refer to as “‘unconsciously 
competent’ expertise” (2013:371). 
 
Phronetic social science can be seen as an approach rather than a theory, 
and its application is characterised by mixed-method, problem-driven research 
processes. In this case, the problem being addressed is how politicians 
understand and respond to climate change, and, following from this, how to 
develop better climate governance within the context of national political 
cultures and processes.  
 
3.2 Research process  
 
The research began with an examination of political speech on climate change 
in the UK House of Commons, using corpus analysis. I then conducted a 
focus group discussion with representatives from NGOs who work closely with 
politicians. Last, I conducted 23 narrative interviews with current and former 
MPs. Each of these stages is outlined below.  
 
3.2.1. Corpus analysis of political speech 
The first stage used the quantitative technique of corpus analysis, to 
investigate the language that politicians use to talk about climate change in 
public speech, in the House of Commons. Corpus analysis is a method 
developed within linguistics. Large volumes of text, known as corpora, are 
analysed to identify patterns in language use (Sinclair, 2005; Wynne, 2005). A 
corpus, consisting of 97000 words of speech in Parliament, was created, from 
debates about the 2008 Climate Change Act. The corpus, named the Climate 
Change Bill (CCB) corpus, was compared with a ‘reference corpus’, a 
representative sample of language. It was also compared with a corpus of 
parliamentary speech collected from discussions on the Budget in the same 
year, called the Budget Corpus. A detailed description of this method, and the 
findings, of this research can be found in a previous paper (Willis, 2017b). 
 
3.2.2. Focus group with NGO representatives  
Representatives from NGOs, consisting of six individuals who work directly 
with MPs on climate change, were invited to a focus group, hosted by the 
think-tank Green Alliance, in February 2016. Representatives from Christian 
Aid, Green Alliance, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the World 
Wildlife Fund UK and Greenpeace took part. Comments made were non-
attributable. I asked them about their experiences of working with politicians 
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 on climate change, and their views on what motivates politicians. The 
discussion was recorded, transcribed and coded using nVivo software. 
 
3.2.3 Qualitative interviews with MPs 
I then interviewed 23 current and former MPs, between February 2016 and 
April 2018. Participants were selected to provide a balance of age, gender, 
political party, seniority and length of time served as an MP, as well as 
previous experience working on climate issues (see table). Known ‘climate 
sceptic’ MPs (defined as those who publicly state that they do not accept the 
scientific consensus, as represented by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC)) were not approached. This is because the research 
investigates how MPs try to understand and act on climate change, rather 
than examining the reasons for rejecting the issue altogether. Although this is 
an important question, a different research strategy would be needed for this 
group. Though climate sceptics are influential, they are small in number, with 
only five MPs out of 659 voting against the Climate Change Act in 2008. 
 
Interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity, following a written 
ethics protocol, and were recorded, transcribed and coded. Riessman’s (2008) 
narrative method was used, focussing on eliciting narrative, with the interview 
conducted as a free-flowing conversation. As Todd Landman notes, “narrative 
analysis can illuminate the ways in which individuals experience, confront and 
exercise power” (2012:28), and so is particularly suited to phronetic social 
science. 
 
The interviews were designed to investigate politicians’ accounts of how they 
navigate their working life, and within this, whether or how they consider the 
issue of climate change. I asked interviewees how they responded to the 
scientific consensus on climate change, as established by the IPCC (2014). I 
then asked them to reflect on the ways in which the issue of climate change 
was understood, shaped and acted on in political life. 
 
Table 1: Interviewees’ background and experience  
gender 14 male, 9 female (gender balance of current Parliament is 
71% male) 
party affiliation 8 Conservative, 9 Labour, 4 Liberal Democrat, 2 other 
time served as MP Between 1 and 23 years’ work as an MP; mean = 8.6 
years 
current status 12 sitting MPs; 11 former MPs, who left office between 
2010 and 2017 
seniority 9 interviewees had served in government; 4 had served on 
the opposition frontbench. 10 were backbenchers, most 
with experience on Select Committees. 
record on climate 
change issues 
7 with a strong record of activity on climate change issues 
(assessed through speeches in Westminster and 
elsewhere); 11 with some activity; 5 with little or no activity 
participants were not asked for additional demographic data, e.g. age or ethnicity 
 
4. Results  
 
113
 The combined methods used in this study reveal a consistent picture of the 
way in which politicians respond to climate change. Whilst there were some 
differences between political parties (see Carter, 2013 for a discussion of the 
positions of the main UK parties), these differences were not marked; instead, 
a consistent pattern emerged, reinforced by the findings of the corpus analysis 
and focus group data.  
 
The pattern can be summarised as follows. Most politicians accept the 
science of climate change, and do not question the scientific consensus 
established by the IPCC. (Note that as detailed above, the small number of 
known ‘climate sceptic’ MPs were not interviewed for this study). However, 
whilst politicians accept the science, they downplay the consequences. Most 
also show a reluctance to discuss the far-reaching implications of climate 
change for human society, or more radical proposals for mitigation. Questions 
of agency and democratic legitimacy, discussed above, condition their 
understanding, and their conception of plausible responses to climate change.  
 
Below, evidence for politicians’ understanding of the science of climate 
change is first reviewed. Then the themes of agency and democratic 
legitimacy are explored, using evidence from corpus analysis, interviews and 
focus group data. 
 
4.1 Accepting the science, downplaying the consequences 
 
Politicians generally accept and acknowledge the scientific consensus, as 
represented by the IPCC. However, this acceptance is coupled with a notable 
reluctance to open up discussion on the material significance of climate 
change.  
 
Evidence for this response pattern derives both from corpus analysis of 
parliamentary speech, and from interview data. Corpus analysis reveals that 
politicians constantly refer to scientific evidence in discussing climate change. 
Speakers opened their statements with reference to the science, and the 
words science, scientific and scientist(s) occur very regularly. They work to 
establish the scientific case, with a high frequency of words in the semantic 
grouping ‘cause and effect / connection’ (words such as produce / impact / 
responsible / cause / effect). Thus there is a broad acceptance of the scientific 
case for action. These findings are discussed in more detail in a separate 
paper (Willis, 2017b).  
 
Interview data reveals a similar picture. In each interview, politicians were 
prompted to consider the significance of climate change. As the interviewer, I 
noted the scientific consensus, as reflected by the IPCC, and stressed the 
implications of this, by saying, for example,  
We’ve had a stable climate for twelve thousand years; we risk not 
having a stable climate any more. In those twelve thousand years, 
that’s when we’ve done everything from agriculture onwards. Human 
society as we know it has been formed in those twelve thousand years. 
The shift we’re talking about is really profound. Do you think that 
politicians, or society more widely, have taken that on board? 
114
  
This question was asked in each of the 23 interviews, with the approach 
varying slightly depending on the background of the interviewee. The 
response to this was acceptance and acknowledgement. Most interviewees 
nodded and murmured agreement. Eight expressed strong fear or concern, 
saying, for example, “it’s terrifying”, or “it’s the greatest challenge facing the 
planet”.  
 
The combined findings from the corpus analysis and interviews suggest that 
politicians have a broad understanding of the scientific consensus on climate 
change, and see it as a problem that needs attention, with a significant 
minority acknowledging the profound nature of the problem.  
 
However, despite this acceptance of the evidence, data from both the corpus 
analysis and the interviews reveals a striking reluctance to open up discussion 
on the significance of climate change. Corpus analysis showed that, while 
politicians referred to scientific evidence, they did so selectively, with very little 
discussion about abrupt or irreversible impacts, although these are discussed 
in IPCC reports. In the debates analysed, there are only three uses of words 
or phrases associated with abrupt or irreversible impacts (tipping point / 
threshold (event) / abrupt / irreversible) compared with 128 uses of science / 
scientific / scientist(s).   
 
A similar picture emerges from interview data. Despite acknowledgement of 
the problem, no interviewee offered further comments or questions about the 
science of climate change, or its impacts. All interviewees found ways to move 
the discussion on to other topics. One former MP said that, during his time in 
Parliament, he had never heard the issue ‘strongly articulated’: 
 
Even those of us who I strongly advocated action, I don’t think we, I’m 
trying to think back to a time when it was ever really strongly articulated 
like that… it’s almost like they don’t want to think about that. I’d say 
that’s even true of people who think we need to grip it, it’s like it’s such 
a frightening thought that it’s easier to just assume and believe, be 
optimistic. 
 
Instead of continuing discussion of the significance of climate change for 
human society, interviewees steered the discussion on to other linked areas, 
such as parliamentary procedure, public opinion, or technical policy solutions. 
My field notes reveal what I perceived as a “social awkwardness” that 
emerged if I continued to press this line of questioning: 
 
I find it difficult to ask these questions… I feel confrontational, as if I am 
breaking the rules of what can be talked about [extract from fieldnotes]. 
 
MPs’ responses to climate change therefore combine an acceptance of the 
issue, coupled with a reluctance to open up discussion on its implications. The 
sociologist Kari Norgaard labels this ‘socially organised denial’, which she 
defines as “not in most cases a rejection of information per se, but the failure 
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 to integrate this knowledge into everyday life or to transform it into social 
action” (2011:11). 
 
Part of the reason for this may lie in the difficulties of developing a full 
understanding of the implications of climate change. One veteran MP 
explained this by distinguishing between ‘agreement’ and ‘understanding’, as 
this exchange shows: 
 
Interviewer: The science is pretty settled, most politicians agree with 
that scientific consensus. 
 
Interviewee: Sorry, I need to qualify that. Agree without understanding. 
It’s become the politically correct thing to do… but do they understand 
what it means? 
 
In the NGO focus group, consisting of individuals who work directly with 
politicians, participants argued that understanding, as distinct from agreement, 
developed only when politicians were appointed into a relevant role, as a 
junior minister or spokesperson for energy or climate change, for example: 
 
Most politicians will have a sort of sense, when they’re appointed into a 
role, broadly what the issues are, but I think the reason that the 
commitment grows is that they get the data, they get the evidence, they 
see what’s going on, and go, bloody hell, this is going to be disastrous. 
 
Another NGO representative described how politicians undergo a process of 
realisation when they acknowledge that climate change is not another issue to 
add to the list, but something that affects the foundations of our society: 
 
I suspect that for most politicians, just routinely experiencing the media, 
then they would hear environment and climate change in no particularly 
separate box from health, education and transport, the business world, 
Europe: it’s just one of a range of issues that are political and of the day, 
and something needs to be done. And actually when they go into it, and 
have to start getting their head round it, they realise that this is this big 
massive transformative thing that could happen. 
 
Taken together, data from corpus analysis, interviews with MPs and focus 
group evidence therefore shows that politicians may refrain from discussing 
the profound, long-term implications of climate change for human society, in 
part because of this gap between ‘awareness’ and ‘understanding’. In the 
words of the focus group participant above, they do not conceptualise climate 




As outlined above, while politicians accept the science of climate change, they 
tend to downplay its implications. They are reluctant to discuss more radical 
solutions, such as the proposals put forward by Earth System governance 
advocates. This can be explained only in part by a lack of understanding of 
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 the evidence. Data from this study shows that responses are conditioned by 
politicians’ understanding of agency: their own agency, and the wider ability of 
institutions and states to respond in full. From the vantage point of the national 
politician – even the most committed, fearless politician – the agency of 
individual politicians, and governments, is limited. To put it in the earthy 
language of one veteran ex-minister interviewed, “motivation isn’t just a set of 
beliefs, it’s about an ability to implement… it’s all very worthy, but what the 
fuck can you do?” 
 
Limitations to agency are both practical – what is achievable within the 
framework of current laws and procedures – and also cultural: how politicians 
understand social and cultural norms. These are discussed in turn below. 
 
Most interviewees highlighted practical and procedural difficulties in 
responding to climate change. In particular, they drew attention to the lack of 
‘fit’ between large-scale, earth-system challenges, and the daily practice of 
politics. Bluntly, politicians are realistic about the extent of their power. This is 
partly a function of the UK system, in which the Government has almost 
exclusive power to initiate legislation, leaving backbench and opposition MPs 
relatively powerless, with roles largely as influencers or protesters, as more 
than half the interview sample pointed out. However the limitations of the 
government’s power are also front-of-mind for politicians. As one said,  
 
The punters, the populace think that the politicians, the prime minister 
for example, is all-powerful. Actually, they absolutely are not. I’m not 
saying they have no power, but they can’t just do it. 
 
Politicians also identified less tangible but nonetheless very significant 
constraints on agency. Interviews revealed the ways in which MPs’ responses 
to climate change are conditioned by social and cultural norms, and 
institutional practices. Specifically, those who speak out on climate change are 
regarded by their colleagues as outsiders, not part of the political mainstream. 
I asked one MP, who was in Parliament when the 2008 Climate Change Act 
was passed, whether it was discussed much. She replied, “a little bit, not very 
much. It was seen as something by the obsessives”. A former MP, who had 
campaigned actively on climate change and environmental issues, said “I was 
known as being a freak”.  
 
Whilst all interviewees reported that there was a small minority of MPs who 
champion climate issues, they also pointed to a more widely-shared 
reluctance to engage, particularly from elements of the Conservative party, but 
also reported across party lines. One explained it as follows: 
 
There’s a kind of obdurate hostility which is culturally quite difficult. And 
just as there’s a kind of cross-party group and an understanding, who 
see the science, recognise intellectually, there’s a huge group that does 




 Another interviewee noted that climate change issues were rarely raised in 
debates about the economy. When asked what would happen if he talked 
about climate change in a debate on the Budget, he replied,  
 
They’d just think you were a bit ‘niche’, is the way I’d put it. I say ‘niche’ 
in quotes like a bit of a lunatic fringe.  
 
NGO representatives described the same phenomenon. They reported that 
climate change was not seen as an issue that an ambitious MP would 
champion. One described how it might look to a government minister wanting 
to develop their personal power and influence: 
 
If you’re [a cabinet minister] and you broadly think that climate change 
is happening and you should do something about it, you walk into 
cabinet and you start saying right guys what are we going to do about 
climate change, you’ll just get laughed out of the room, because they 
want to be talking about the economy, and building stuff, and bombing 
people. It’s just not a serious sort of cabinet issue for the big bruisers. 
[If] you’re trying to build your base in a party, you absolutely don’t do 
that by talking about airy fairy climate change. You do that by talking 
about jobs and the economy. 
 
As a result, whilst a minority of MPs were vocal and insistent in their support 
of climate change action, most reported that they felt the need to self-censor: 
to restrict the amount that they talk about climate change, or modify the 
language they use. (This is discussed in more detail in a separate paper, 
Willis, 2017a). For example, one reported that she felt she would get a better 
outcome from discussions if she didn’t appear to be “a climate change zealot”. 
When arguing for a sustainable transport scheme in her constituency, she 
chose to make her case on economic and social grounds, without mentioning 
carbon reduction: 
 
I think if I had mentioned carbon emissions, I would have been, there 
would have been a rolling of eyes and saying, oh here he goes again. 
 
These findings are consistent with previous research on politicians, which 
show that MPs’ outlooks and actions are influenced by institutional and 
cultural contexts. For example, studies on gender in the House of Commons 
(Lovenduski, 2012; Malley, 2012; McKay, 2011; Puwar, 2004) demonstrate 
that the norms and rituals of parliament condition and constrain action. New 
institutionalist thinkers refer to this as a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Chappell, 
2006:223). Institutions like Parliament should be seen, they argue, as 
‘collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions’ 
(Chappell, 2006:161; see also Douglas, 1986; Lewis and Steinmo, 2012). In 
short, the agency of individual politicians is constrained not just by law and 
procedure, but by social and cultural norms. 
 
These norms can also be seen amongst the wider political community, 
including representatives from NGOs and advisory groups. One MP, a veteran 
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 climate campaigner, criticised those outside parliament for crafting messages 
to appear credible and reasonable to politicians: 
 
…people coming in, basically telling MPs what they want to hear… 
they’re basing their advice to us on what they perceive to be politically 
acceptable, rather than what’s scientifically necessary. It made me so 
angry.  
 
This interviewee vividly described how experts, when talking to MPs, “don’t 
want to sound like an outlier… it’s something about this place, I think, once 
you get inside one of those Committee rooms.”  
 
NGO representatives also reported how they crafted messages that they 
believed would resonate and appeal to politicians. One focus group participant 
described the NGOs’ attempts to present climate action as an economically 
beneficial strategy, comparing their messages to that of corporate 
consultancies: 
 
I think the environment community, we’ve chased ourselves round to 
pretend that we’re McKinsey and EY, and it’s been really helpful in 
winning the overall argument, shifting how climate change is perceived. 
 
Political scientists refer to this process of crafting messages as ‘framing’, in 
which politicians and other political actors, consciously or not, shape an issue 
to fit with dominant ideologies, a sense of what is achievable, prevailing norms 
and assumptions and so on (Benford and Snow, 2000; Cobb and Coughlin, 
1998; Kingdon, 1995).  
 
Evidence from the corpus analysis supports the finding that an economic and 
technical framing is used to discuss climate change. Phrases such as 
economy, efficiency, reduction/reduce, trading, costs, measures predominate. 
The dominance of this language is striking when compared to other 
parliamentary speech. The analysis shows that politicians use the terms ‘costs’ 
and ‘benefits’ twice as often in speech about climate than speech about the 
budget  (Willis, 2017a).  
 
Thus the evidence presented here shows a tendency to focus on immediate, 
technical solutions, rather than considering the full implications of climate 
change for politics and society. Politicians and those who interact with them 
seek ways of addressing climate change which fit with the working practices of 
Parliament and the institutions of policymaking. Interviewees were eager to 
give examples of possible approaches, such as incentivising renewable 
energy, and promoting public transport.  
 
This reluctance to linger on the ‘big problem’ of climate change, and a move 
instead to ‘little solutions’, is a result of politicians’ understanding of their 
agency, or room for manoeuvre. They would prefer to propose practical 
solutions which fit with social, cultural and institutional norms. Yet it leads to 
questions about whether such solutions add up to a sufficient response to the 
problem. It certainly precludes discussion of the arguments put forward by 
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 more radical critics (eg Jackson, 2011; Klein, 2015) that climate change 
requires a fundamental rethink of economy and society. 
 
4.3 Democratic legitimacy 
 
Politicians’ responses to climate change are also conditioned by their 
understandings of their representative role. The relationship between an 
elected politician and those that they represent is complex, and the subject of 
much debate in political theory (for a summary see Dobson and Hamilton, 
2016; Mansbridge, 2003). Recent work by Michael Saward argues that 
representation should be seen not as a static fact, but as a dynamic exchange 
between representatives and those being represented, in which a politician (or 
anyone else seeking a representative role) can make a ‘representative claim’, 
which in turn is accepted or rejected by others: 
 
Political representation is not simply a fact of political life, or an 
achieved state of affairs, resulting from elections. Rather, at a deeper 
level, representation is a dynamic process of claim-making and the 
reception of claims. (Saward, 2010:8)  
 
Data from this study fits with Saward’s conception of representation as claim-
making. MPs reported consistently that they felt little or no pressure from most 
people they saw themselves as representing, to work on climate issues. Thus, 
if they saw the need to act on the issue, they worked to construct a claim, 
demonstrating how their stance on climate change could be justified in terms 
of their role as an elected politician. 
 
Evidence for the lack of pressure to act on climate change was strong. Typical 
comments included 
 
I’ve knocked hundreds, literally thousands of doors, and had tens of 
thousands of conversations with voters… and I just don’t have 
conversations about climate change. 
 
When you go around with your clipboard asking what are your top 
priorities, you always know it’s health, economy, education, crime, stuff 
like that, and environment always comes very [low] down. 
 
Though all interviewees reported that vocal support for climate action was low, 
they did describe a minority who, though small in number, were vocal about 
the need for climate action. One interviewee described this group as 
“articulate, affluent people who have perhaps a particular type of worldview”. 
Another described climate change as one of a number of concerns including 
development and peace issues, which he labelled “the concerns of that type of 
person, who were committed activists and great people, but were not 
representative, at all, at all.” 
 
These findings are consistent with a recent review of evidence by Pidgeon et 
al, which states that “climate change is invariably not the highest or most 
important priority for many people” (2012:s87). Thus, if politicians took their 
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 cue entirely from the people that they represent, they would not prioritise 
climate issues. As a result, some chose to stay quiet, as illustrated by one 
interviewee, who dentified himself as very concerned about climate change: 
 
Interviewer: What worked in terms of making climate change 
meaningful and something that connects with people, voters?  
 
Interviewee:  I very very very rarely ever rose to that challenge, 
because there just wasn't enough time or bandspace or resources to 
even think about that, much as I would have liked to do that. 
 
Others, however, persisted, despite the difficulties. Interviewees discussed the 
ways in which it was possible to address the issue, through developing an 
account of how a certain course of action would serve the interests of they 
claim to represent: in Saward’s terms, developing a ‘representative claim’. A 
separate paper (Willis, 2018) offers further details of this claims-making 
process.  
 
Four types of claim can be seen. First, some MPs make a cosmopolitan claim, 
saying that it is in the interests of the human species as a whole to act, and 
therefore it should be a concern for all politicians.  
 
I often started off with that sort of fairly internationalist viewpoint… a lot 
of the impacts of climate change are going to hit other places before 
they hit here. [My constituency] is not likely to be one of the first places 
to be hit particularly badly. So what? I just happen to be here. 
 
Second, some frame the issue as a local prevention claim, asserting that 
action is necessary to prevent impacts such as flooding in their local area.  
 
I talk for example quite a bit about… domestic flood risk. I don’t see it 
as one of the biggest consequences of climate change, in reality, but 
“your house is going to flood if we keep doing this and you will not be 
able to get insurance for it, so we need to do something about it”… is a 
powerful message. 
 
Third, many point to the economic or social benefits arising from taking action 
on climate change, such as jobs created in renewable energy industries. This 
can be called a co-benefits claim, as politicians are claiming that such action 
helps toward tackling climate change, as well as bringing other specific local 
benefits.  
 
In [my area], the green economy, the offshore wind, presents an 
opportunity. 
 
I’m happy to use an economic argument if that means that more people 




 Last, a significant minority of interviewees judged that they could not speak 
out on climate, because a direct claim would be opposed or ignored. Instead, 
they make what might be called a surrogate claim, in which climate change is 
not explicitly mentioned. Instead, other reasons are given for measures which 
the politician privately believes will help to tackle climate change. 
 
I would rather not say a word about climate change and stop the [local 
road] being ten lanes, than make a really good case about climate 
change and have a ten lane bloody superhighway next to us. 
 
As these examples show, it is not straightforward for politicians to make a 
case for why, as elected representatives, they should act on climate change. 
However, politicians know that action is necessary, and so develop strategies 
for building support. Below, I discuss how researchers and practitioners could 
better use politicians’ knowledge and experience, and support them in 
developing stronger responses to the challenge of Earth System governance. 
 
5. Conclusion: The role of national politicians in Earth System 
governance 
 
Below, suggestions are first made for ways in which Earth Systems 
governance analysis could better account for national political considerations. 
Then, implications for practice are drawn out. Suggestions are made for ways 
in which politicians could be better supported to integrate considerations of 
Earth System governance into national strategies, responding to the themes 
of agency and democratic legitimacy set out in this paper. 
 
5.1 The research challenge: Linking Earth Systems to political realities 
 
The example of UK politicians’ responses to climate change shows that Earth 
System governance analysis needs to pay more attention to the ways in which 
these global issues are experienced, shaped and implemented by decision-
makers at the national level.  
 
The evidence from this study shows that there is a considerable gulf between 
the extent and reach of governance mechanisms proposed by Earth System 
governance advocates on the one hand, and the more limited efforts of 
politicians to craft a manageable and meaningful agenda for climate action, on 
the other. Rather than lingering on the subject of complex global challenges, 
politicians acknowledge the evidence, but then turn to what they perceive as 
achievable actions. This may be a well-meaning attempt, even a tactical 
choice, to frame difficult issues in ways that are less threatening and more 
amenable to action: better to do something than nothing at all.  
 
The obvious drawback to this strategy is, of course, that the stability of earth 
systems is not a matter that can be negotiated away. If Earth System 
governance advocates want national decision-makers to make more 
significant efforts to address global challenges, they will need to work with 
them, drawing on their phronetic knowledge (Schram et al., 2013) to 
understand how political strategies can be developed. In particular, they need 
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 to acknowledge and address the question of agency; and the need to develop 
democratic legitimacy for action. 
 
As Noel Castree and others have argued (Barry, 2012; Castree, 2017), doing 
this will require better interdisciplinary working, involving collaboration with 
critical social sciences and humanities scholars. The study presented here is 
one such example. Yet the working methods, language and publication habits 
of different disciplinary groupings can make such collaboration challenging.  
 
5.2 Addressing agency 
 
The evidence of this study shows that there is a need, in both research and 
practice, to acknowledge and address questions of agency – the ‘room for 
manoeuvre’ that individual actors feel they have, within practical, procedural, 
social and cultural constraints. 
 
An obvious procedural barrier is the relatively short-term time horizon of 
parliamentary politics. Within the practices of political life, it is very hard to 
open up debate on climate change and other threatened earth systems. Some 
legislatures, including Hungary, Finland and Wales, have created institutions 
such as an ‘ombudsperson’ or ‘commissioner’ tasked with representing future 
generations, allowing better discussion of long-term, complex issues (Urry, 
2016). Another possibility would be a National Convention or Citizens’ 
Assembly, providing an opportunity for politicians to discuss these issues 
directly with publics and stakeholders. Ireland’s recent Citizens’ Assembly on 
Climate Change may provide a model for this (The Citizens’ Assembly, 2018). 
 
The UK’s Climate Change Act, based on five-yearly carbon budgets, can be 
seen as an attempt to bring the long-term and global into the practice of 
everyday politics. Yet as this study demonstrates, the Act has not yet brought 
about sustained engagement by politicians. Targets are seen as the 
responsibility of one single Government department, and championed by a 
small number of committed MPs. A more diffuse, distributed system of 
responsibility, shared across different ministries, and with a greater role for 
local government and cities, could lead to a stronger mandate for action.  
 
This study shows clearly that MPs also feel constrained by social and cultural 
norms. They do not speak out on climate change, for fear of being seen as 
outsiders. This and other evidence (eg Hulme, 2009) points to the importance 
of vocal support from influential figures, including political party leaders and 
elder statespeople; business leaders, civil society organisations and, of course, 
the scientific community. Such interventions could stress the scale and 
significance of the issue, and the need for action, and engage politicians in a 
debate about responses, building on the understandings of the politicians 
themselves. 
 
Last, there is a need for a more explicit articulation of power relations and 
vested interests which may constrain politicians (Geels, 2014; Oreskes and 
Conway, 2012; Phelan et al., 2012). The fossil-fuel divestment movement, 
now gaining considerable traction, is one example of this. Efforts to uncover 
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 and quantify public subsidies for carbon emissions, so-called fossil fuel 
subsidies, are another (Coady et al., 2017). 
 
5.3 Building democratic legitimacy 
 
As Winston Churchill famously said, “Democracy is the worst form of 
Government except for all those other forms” (HC Deb 11 November 1947 vol 
444 cc203-321). Unless one of those ‘other forms’ are pursued by currently-
democratic states, any proposal for Earth System governance must gain the 
support, passive or active, of its electorate. Thus it must be asked of every 
governance proposal, not just “Is it technically sound?” but also “Does it build 
democratic support?”  
 
As this study shows, if MPs merely responded to the representations they 
received from the electorate, they would not have much reason to act on 
climate change. Politicians play a mediating role between the scientific 
consensus embodied in the Paris Agreement, and current public views and 
demands, on the other. They do this by building a ‘representative claim’ 
(Saward, 2010) that action on climate is in the democratic interest. Other 
actors, including NGOs, business groupings and academic researchers, can 
join with politicians in this process of claims-making, for example, stressing 
social and economic co-benefits of climate action; or articulating links between 
extreme weather events and climate change.  
 
It may be, too, that a greater stress on deliberation between citizens and 
politicians, as well as other actors including scientists, could lead to new 
strategies which garner public support. As in the case of Ireland’s Citizens’ 
Assembly (The Citizens’ Assembly, 2018), deliberative processes could allow 
politicians and publics to debate the implications of climate change, and co-
create responses (Dryzek, 2002). There have been limited experiments on 
such models, such as the approach of participatory budgeting (Davidson & 
Elstub, 2014).  
 
Comparative research between different countries (notwithstanding the 
difficulties of generalising from specific political cultures) could also reveal 
which climate strategies built stronger democratic mandates for national and 
international action. For example, has the German Energiewende, or Energy 
Transition, with its focus on local action by citizens, social enterprises and 
municipalities, increased understanding of, and support for, significant climate 
action? 
 
Given the magnitude of Earth System challenges, researchers and advocates 
may well be tempted simply to raise the volume, placing further demands on 
national politicians to accept and implement their proposals, without 
acknowledging the limitations they face. The research presented here shows, 
instead, the value of working with national politicians to craft politically feasible 
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 1. Personal reflections on research and practice 
 
Below, I offer two sets of reflections on my research, both of which explore 
themes which could not form part of published papers. In the first section, I 
reflect on the research process itself, and the challenges that I addressed. In 
the final section, I use my research and experience as a practitioner as a 
springboard for a more wide-ranging discussion on the future of climate 
politics.  
1.1 Reflections on the research process 
 
I came to doctoral research after twenty years on the frontline of 
environmental policy and politics, having worked at the European Parliament, 
directed a think-tank, served as a member of a number of government 
advisory committees and undertaken consultancy work for public, private and 
voluntary sector clients.  Returning to academia has been both rewarding and 
challenging. I have thoroughly enjoyed doctoral research, as it gave me the 
chance to pursue my own research question, read widely, and develop 
answers over a far longer stretch of time than had been possible in my 
working life. Before the PhD, I had worked on few research projects lasting 
more than a year. I have greatly appreciated the luxury of time and freedom 
that doctoral research provides.  
 
Stepping into an academic setting has also allowed me to develop a degree of 
critical distance from my work setting. For example, I have found myself 
reflecting on reports and blogs produced by government, think-tanks or 
industry groupings, to question the framing or assumptions made in their work. 
This has made for some interesting conversations with Green Alliance, as the 
co-sponsors of the doctoral project, as they find me turning my academic 
gaze upon them. When I presented some research findings to them, and 
explained how difficult politicians found it to talk about the far-reaching 
implications of climate change, it was clear that they too shied away from that 
discussion, and wanted me to be careful how I talked to politicians about it. As 
one said to me, “You don’t want to get into all that doom and gloom stuff, 
Becky”. Like the MPs, Green Alliance staff had, implicitly or explicitly, tried to 
‘tame’ the climate, shaping it into an issue that they could discuss comfortably 
with their stakeholders. 
 
Doctoral research also presented some challenges. In this section, I discuss 
five core issues that I have had to address in the course of this project. First, 
there was a recurring question during the research, about the status of 
scientific evidence on climate change. Second, I thought constantly about my 
positioning in the research, as both an academic researcher and a practitioner 
in this field. Third, whilst I was clear from the start that this study would be 
interdisciplinary, this did pose more of a challenge than I had thought it might, 
when operating in an academic setting. Fourth, the transition to academic 
research meant having to develop my skills in method and data analysis; and 
last, I had to learn the peculiar practice of academic publishing. I review each 
of these below.  
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 Challenge 1: Handling the science 
Whilst my research does not focus on the science of climate change, I quickly 
found that any research on climate needs to position itself with reference to 
climate science, and the production of scientific knowledge on climate.  
 
There are two reasons for this. First, climate change is only fully 
understandable through scientific understanding and evidence. Climate 
systems at a planetary level can only be viewed through techniques of 
scientific observation, synthesis, modelling and forecasting, over long 
timescales and wide geographies; and the effects of anthropogenic emissions 
of greenhouse gases can only be understood with the help of these scientific 
techniques. Thus an understanding of climate change relies on the use of 
scientific knowledge claims (Jasanoff, 2010; Wynne, 2010). All discussions of 
climate change, and all climate action, rely on an account of the science. All of 
the research participants in this study, for example, are reliant on scientific 
evidence on climate change to inform their position. 
 
Second, there have been high profile controversies about climate science, 
notably the 2009 ‘climategate’ controversy (Reay, 2010) and the continued 
reluctance of some politicians, particularly in the US and Australia, to accept 
the scientific consensus on climate change. In the UK, there are a number of 
media commentators who oppose the scientific consensus, but very few 
politicians take an openly hostile stance, with just five MPs voting against the 
2008 Climate Change Act. Nevertheless, the presence of the climate sceptics 
is felt strongly, with MPs in this study telling me that they felt worried about 
expressing views in case they were targeted by the vocal minority of sceptics. 
 
Early on in my research, I therefore realised that I needed to clarify my 
position on the scientific evidence. I decided that I would use the account of 
the science provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). I made this clear in the introduction I gave to interviewees, and in 
each paper I wrote.  
 
The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation 
and the United Nations Environment Programme, in their words, "to assess on 
a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, 
technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the 
scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts 
and options for adaptation and mitigation" (IPCC 2017). The IPCC acts as a 
sort of clearing house for climate science: scientists submit published papers, 
which are considered by a series of thematic Working Groups, and 
amalgamated into IPCC reports offering a summary of the state of knowledge.  
 
The IPCC is not immune from criticism. Brian Wynne (2010) claims that it is 
overly conservative and cautious, and that the way in which the structures and 
committees of the IPCC work, particularly how they deal with scientific 
uncertainty, results in a refusal to consider potential abrupt or radical shifts in 
climate. Both Wynne and David Demeritt (2001) argue that the structure of the 
IPCC dictates a technocratic, economistic approach to climate mitigation. 
More widely, scholars of science and technology studies (STS), a field I drew 
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 on in my research, insist on subjecting scientific knowledge claims to critical 
scrutiny, and seeing them as socially situated (Demeritt, 2001; McNeil, 2013; 
Wynne, 2010). 
 
I support this urge to situate and critique the scientific process, and want to 
acknowledge it. Yet I felt that it was important for my work to focus not on the 
production of scientific knowledge itself, but on the specific role of politicians 
in the process. For this reason, I decided to reference the IPCC’s account of 
climate science, as a starting point for my work, enabling me to concentrate 
on my specific research question, rather than being drawn into debates about 
the scientific consensus. 
 
I also decided to exclude known climate sceptic MPs from my study,  
defined as those who publicly state that they do not accept the scientific 
consensus, as represented by the IPCC. This is because the research 
question focuses on how MPs try to understand and act on climate change, 
rather than examining the reasons for rejecting the issue altogether. Although 
this is an important question, a different research strategy would be needed 
for this group.  
 
This position on climate science was accepted by my interviewees, and by 
referees of journal papers. It was, though, often questioned by those involved 
in reviewing my research, including supervisors and members of PhD Panels. 
Stating the scientific consensus on climate change was seen by some as 
promoting my own point of view, which, it was argued, I should avoid doing as 
an academic researcher. This was often linked to comments about my 
background in advocacy, relating to the point discussed below, about my own 
positioning in the research.  
 
As the discussion above shows, there are very valid questions to be asked 
about the production of scientific knowledge on climate change. However, this 
is not the subject of my study. I felt that there is enough evidence, and a 
strong enough consensus, on climate science to provide a firm enough 
foundation for my research.  This is why I used the IPCC’s account of climate 
science as a reference point, both in interview discussions and in written 
papers, as the starting point for my enquiry. 
Challenge 2: My positioning in the research 
A related challenge that has persisted throughout my doctoral studies is the 
question of how I position myself as an academic. As discussed above, much 
research, in science and technology studies (STS) and sociology, for example, 
has demonstrated that academics are not neutral, objective or impartial 
observers (Haraway, 1988; Latour, 1987; Wynne, 2014). There is, of course, 
a long tradition of academic engagement in political and social movements, 
with many academics seeing their work as part of a wider project of social 
change (see Gergen, 2015 for a discussion). 
 
Nonetheless, in the course of my research and practice, I have found that the 
ideal of ‘objective academic enquiry’ still exerts a powerful hold over many 
people’s imaginaries, both within and outside academia. This characterisation 
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 contrasts the ‘academic’ with the ‘activist’. Whilst the academic strives for 
evidence and understanding, the activist strives for a goal framed in terms of 
social or environmental outcomes. Academics may see activists as 
‘customers’ or ‘users’ of the evidence that they have generated; activists 
might use academic work to build a case to promote their cause. However, 
the two roles are seen as distinct, with a cordon sanitaire erected between the 
two. If academics were to pursue causes, it is often argued, their objectivity 
would be compromised.  
 
As my research developed, I found myself criticised simultaneously for being 
‘too academic’ and ‘too much of an activist’. My colleagues on the frontline, at 
Green Alliance and elsewhere, were frustrated by the process of academic 
evidence-gathering, and by my focus on what they saw as difficult, long-term 
issues. They wanted quicker, more manageable outputs that could be used to 
improve advocacy with politicians in the short-term. I found myself defending 
the academic research process, explaining, for example, why a certain 
amount of distance, theoretical analysis and thorough review were useful 
steps to developing robust understandings. Meanwhile, I was often asked by 
academics, including my supervisors, participants in my research reviews, 
and journal reviewers, to clarify my stance, and I was sometimes asked to 
distance myself from climate activists or advocates. For example, one journal 
reviewer objected to my use of the term ‘the climate problem’, stating that “it 
may not be perceived as such by members of society”, and encouraging me 
to use the more neutral term ‘issue’.  
 
This criticism from both sides made me realise that I needed to clarify my own 
understanding of my academic role, in keeping with the theoretical stance I 
outline above. In simple terms, I knew that I rejected the academic/activist 
distinction, which I felt was neither an accurate representation of either role, 
nor a useful ideal-type. I knew that I had benefited from the insights of 
academic activists (or activist academics) throughout my education and 
career; indeed I remembered how, as an undergraduate social theorist, 
Marx’s famous edict had struck a chord: “Philosophers have only interpreted 
the world; the point, however, is to change it”. 
 
Kenneth Gergen’s (2015) work was useful to me in clarifying my position. 
Gergen argues that research in the social sciences should be ‘future-forming’. 
He distinguishes between, on the one hand, social sciences which take from 
the natural science tradition an aim of mirroring reality, and on the other hand, 
a ‘reflexive pragmatism’ (Gergen, 2015:287) which sees research as situated 
within the social world, with an explicit ethical stance and aim for intervention, 
rather than just description or analysis.  Thus Gergen insists that positionality 
is both unavoidable and useful. Judi Marshall, a leadership scholar and 
feminist researcher, offers a similar analysis but with a more personal slant. 
Her practice as an academic, she writes, has been ‘living life as inquiry’. She 
defines this as follows: 
 
Living life as inquiry means that I hold open the boundary between 
research and my life generally. Often, therefore, I am aware that a 
theme I am pursuing in research is also relevant to some other area of 
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 my life, and I will seek to work with, rather than suppress, that 
realisation. This can be highly enriching for both my personal and 
professional lives, and it can be demanding. (1999:160) 
 
Marshall offers me, as a researcher, a way of working, which both 
acknowledges a normative motivation – what Gergen calls ‘future-forming’ – 
but also developing the ability to reflect and to challenge. Starting academic 
research never felt like wearing a cloak of objective neutrality, but it did allow 
me a certain distancing, an ability to look afresh at my professional world, and 
my own professional practice. I feel that both my research and my practice 
have benefited from this stance.  
 
In short, I would argue that evidence and knowledge should be understood as 
socially situated, and positioned in relation to social, environmental and 
economic norms. Academic research should not deny this positionality, but 
should uncover and examine it. Robust research requires reflexivity on the 
part of the researcher, and transparency about the normative goals of the 
research. Review and interaction with colleagues within and outside academia 
is part of this process. With this combination of rigour, review and reflexivity, 
academic research can and should contribute to the achievement of social 
and environmental goals, with academics playing a part in advocacy as well 
as analysis. 
Challenge 3: Interdisciplinarity  
I have never associated myself with a particular academic discipline. My 
undergraduate degree, in social and political sciences, drew from 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, political science, economics 
and international relations. My Masters degree, in environmental policy, was 
equally heterogeneous. Though my expertise is in the social sciences, I use 
evidence from the natural sciences. Understanding climate change requires 
forays into earth system science, meteorology, oceanography, geology and 
more besides, as well as some grasp of modelling and forecasting. There was 
never any need to define myself in disciplinary terms in my professional life, 
except for a general description of ‘environmental policy’ as my area of 
expertise. 
 
In academia, though, disciplinarity remains an important concept. Many, but of 
course not all, academics maintain a ‘home’ discipline, a base from which to 
explore other perspectives and approaches. At conferences and events, I 
often hear phrases like “of course, as a geographer…..”, or “from the 
perspective of sociology….”. I can see the attraction of disciplinarity. When a 
group of scholars collaborate or communicate with one another, it is very 
useful to have a core of shared understanding, key concepts, leading thinkers 
and influential journals. Working within a discipline, a certain degree of shared 
knowledge and expertise can be assumed; critique, discussion and 
disagreement happens within that shared space. Without shared 
understandings, critical engagement is more difficult. I have often found this 
when engaging with natural scientists about the more social and political 
aspects of climate change. For example, few environmental scientists will 
have an academic insight into ‘basic’ sociological concepts such as power or 
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 identity. While they do of course have some understanding of these concepts, 
they do not use them as analytic devices in the way that a sociologist does. 
Asking environmental scientists to see climate change through the lens of 
power relations or personal identity requires a certain amount of sociological 
groundwork to be laid. 
 
Many real-world problems, however, flow over disciplinary boundaries, and 
cross-disciplinary collaboration is essential. Public health, for example, is as 
much sociological as it is medical. Climate change perhaps stretches cross-
disciplinary collaboration to its limits, requiring strong links between the 
natural and social sciences, and benefiting from a wide range of perspectives 
within each of these. Addressing climate change also requires different scales 
of analysis, from psychology of the individual through to international 
relations; and from microbiology to earth systems science. This is evidenced 
by the wide range of disciplines involved in the reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  
 
In my research, therefore, I wanted to keep resolutely interdisciplinary. There 
have been times, however, when I have encountered difficulties as a result of 
my lack of grounding in one discipline. For example, when I submitted Paper 
1 to the journal Environmental Politics, reviewers expressed surprise that I 
had not referred to certain ‘classic’ texts in relation to the concept of ‘framing’ 
which (like power or identity for sociologists) is a key concept in political 
science. When Paper 4 was submitted to Political Studies, I was called up for 
not distinguishing between ‘valence’ and ‘salience’; again these are basic 
concepts in political science which I was not familiar with. Once introduced to 
these concepts, I did indeed find them useful analytical devices. However, it 
can feel awkward and sometimes rather exposed if you are not familiar with 
concepts that others see as ‘basic’ ideas, learned at undergraduate level. 
Despite these difficulties, maintaining an interdisciplinary stance means that I 
have produced research which is understandable and useful to researchers 
and practitioners from a wide range of backgrounds.  
Challenge 4: Developing appropriate methods 
In my previous work, I often used research techniques such as interviews, 
surveys, public consultation or case study analysis. As a result, I had a good 
grasp of the practicalities of these techniques, but I had not reflected on how 
certain techniques linked to specific theoretical positions or methodological 
outlooks. At the start of my doctoral research, my lack of grounding in what I 
saw as ‘proper’ research methods felt like a weakness. Through training in 
research methods, and reading about social science methodology, I began to 
reflect on linkages between theory, method and technique, and understood 
better that all research techniques carry with them a set of theoretical or 
epistemological assumptions. This insight, probably very obvious to career 
academics, was useful in structuring my research.  
 
The concept of ‘phronetic social science’ (Schram et al., 2013) which I discuss 
in the methodology section provides a useful bridge between theory and 
method. It suggests that research should be problem-driven, and that mixed-
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 method approaches help to develop the sort of detailed, contextual, ‘phronetic’ 
understanding that I have aimed for in this work.  
 
In the process of analysing and writing up data, I was helped by a course on 
‘Creative Methods’ that I attended at the National Centre for Research 
Methods. By this stage, I had conducted an initial set of interviews with MPs, 
and was faced with a heap of intriguing but unstructured material. An insight 
from one of the contributors, Brian Heaphy, was very useful to me. He told me 
that “it is difficult to distinguish between analysis and writing when using 
qualitative data”. This made me realise that writing is, at least in qualitative 
research, itself a form of analysis. Presentation cannot be separated from 
substance. It gave me the confidence to develop my idea of ‘composite 
narratives’, in essence a form of story-telling, that I used to present interview 
data in Paper 2. I found a way of writing about my data which I felt did justice 
to my research participants, and to the subject more generally. 
 
The other useful insight from this course was a discussion on the concept of 
‘rigour’ as applied to qualitative research. Again, as Brian Heaphy stated, 
“Rigour is a question of making explicit how you came to your findings”. This 
made a lot of sense and again, helped me to justify and explain my own 
approach to research. In particular, it informed Paper 3, where I set out an 
explicit process for developing composite narratives. 
Challenge 5: Writing for an academic audience, or learning to love peer 
review 
Journal papers, though so central to the academic world, are rarely read 
beyond the university sector, in my field at least. In my previous career, whilst 
actively researching, writing and collaborating with academics, I very rarely 
read journal papers, and only once contributed to one. This is in part because 
most can only be accessed through subscription, but also because their style, 
tone and content makes them a difficult and sometimes frustrating read for 
practitioners. To a certain extent, I am critical of this; I think that there is a 
wealth of evidence and insight contained in journal papers across many 
disciplines that does not reach an audience of practitioners who could benefit 
greatly from the research. However, I do also value the discipline and rigour of 
academic publishing, and the process of peer review. This is why I chose to 
present my PhD as a series of published papers, rather than the traditional 
thesis format. I felt that I should learn the craft. 
 
I certainly did learn, and made mistakes along the way. As I outline in my 
review of the papers above, my first attempt was the hardest. I wrote an 
account of the issue I was addressing, in the same way that I would write a 
policy report for a think-tank. Whilst I referred to various theories and 
evidence, I did not ground my account in one or more specific theoretical 
approaches. Reviewers criticised this. One, for example, wrote “the author 
suggests three factors that could encapsulate how politicians act – it is not 
clear where these are derived from… this would deserve stronger justification”. 
Another noted a rather ad-hoc approach to theoretical insights, with different 
theoretical work being used to explain different empirical findings, in isolation 
from the wider background. These reviews were helpful in tightening my 
136
 analysis and making it less ad-hoc. In short, I was learning the explanatory 
value of theory, and the way in which theory and empirical evidence can be 
combined to strengthen analysis. 
 
In subsequent papers, I took a different approach. Whilst in Paper 2 I 
remained resolutely interdisciplinary, I narrowed down to three specific 
theoretical insights, one from sociology, one from political theory and one from 
science and technology studies. This way, I could discuss the interplay 
between different theoretical traditions, whilst allowing a degree of context, 
and therefore rigour. In Paper 4, I focussed in on one theoretical offering, the 
theory of the ‘representative claim’, and found it rewarding to analyse my data 
through a relatively narrow theoretical lens.  
 
This reflection could be summarised as follows: As my confidence in 
academic writing has developed, I have almost learned to love peer review. 
Though taking criticism is difficult, my reviewers have often helped me to 
clarify issues, and pointed me in the direction of useful analysis and bodies of 
writing which I often was not aware of. When I disagree with reviewers, their 
comments have helped me to firm up my own analysis, in order to justify my 
approach. Submitting papers to different journals with differing disciplinary foci 





 1.2 Reflections on the future of politics and climate change 
 
In this final section, I reflect on some themes that emerge from my work, both 
as an academic researcher and as a practitioner. I examine these in the light 
of the deeply unsettled political climate in the UK, Europe and the US, 
characterised by the upheavals of the EU referendum decision in the UK, and 
the election of President Trump. What is the relationship between current 
politics and the search for an appropriate response to climate change? How 
does this, in turn, relate to the more fundamental question of the place of 
human society on a changing planet? What ways can be envisaged of 
reconciling our own human politics with the biophysical constraints of life on 
this planet? My aim in this conclusion is to use my doctoral research as a 
springboard for a more speculative and wide-ranging discussion of these 
issues, one that is difficult to conduct within the confines of an academic 
paper; and to offer a personal perspective, rather than close academic 
argument.  
Climate action and the political upheavals of 2016-18 
When I began doctoral research, in 2014, there were few overt signs of the 
political upheaval that was to come, though the seeds may well have already 
been sown, not least in the 2008 financial crisis and the responses to it. My 
first round of interviews was set against the backdrop of the EU referendum 
campaign, in late 2015 and early 2016, and I could sense an increasing 
uncertainty amongst my interviewees as the vote approached. In the wake of 
the referendum result, there was little point in even attempting to approach 
politicians to talk about anything other than Brexit, as they struggled to come 
to terms with a deeply disorientating result. At the time of writing, negotiations 
with the EU stumble on, and the accompanying uncertainty and complexity 
creates a huge distraction from other political issues. It uses up most of the 
finite time available to politicians and parliament, leaving little time or energy 
for proactive policy in other areas.  
 
In the interviews I conducted following the referendum, in 2017 and 2018, I 
noticed a growing diffidence among my interviewees. The Leave vote, Jeremy 
Corbyn’s surprise ascent to leadership of the Labour Party, and the 
transatlantic ripples from Donald Trump’s election, had profoundly unsettled 
UK politicians, particularly those from centrist traditions on both the Left and 
the Right. The rejection of established expertise, which has emerged as a 
defining characteristic of all of these events, left politicians wondering where 
their authority lay. This made it much harder for them to articulate, with any 
confidence, what a comprehensive political response to climate change (or, 
indeed, any other complex issue) might look like.  
 
Climate strategies have, to date, relied heavily on expert-led processes. Such 
processes define the problem, using the consensus-building model of the 
IPCC, and scientific peer-review. Experts also define solutions. When I began 
working on climate change issues, in the late 1990s, climate advocates were 
small in number, and the debate was dominated by the more radical civil 
society organisations. Today, there is a well-developed climate 
‘establishment’, which in the UK consists of many thousands of individuals 
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 working in finance, industry and government as well as civil society. Climate 
‘experts’ are everywhere. One example is the renewable energy industry, now 
employing 126,000 people in the UK (Renewable Energy Association, 2017) 
and 10.3 million worldwide (IRENA, 2018). 
 
This is a step forward, in that these thousands of people are focussed on 
climate change (though their influence is still small compared to the enormity 
of the issue). Yet as this group of experts has grown, I have noticed an 
increased tendency to conduct discussions in the technical realm, without 
reflecting back on the need to develop a democratic mandate. There is a 
sentiment of doing this ‘to’ people, who, it is assumed, will either not notice, or 
will passively accept change. I discuss this tendency in Paper 5, where I 
argue that proponents of Earth System governance set out a top-down 
account of what they believe is scientifically necessary, without considering 
the conditions under which such actions might be democratically possible, let 
alone popular.  
 
After the Brexit referendum, I set out my thoughts on this in a blog for Green 
Alliance. I argued firstly that environment and climate advocates were liable to 
groupthink, sharing a language and worldviews with each other but not with 
the wider world; and secondly that there was an increasing tendency to what I 
called ‘climate action by stealth’, whereby experts sought to impose solutions 
without making a public case for action, in the hope that people would not 
notice, would not care, or would be passively grateful for action taken on their 
behalf. Politicians use this strategy too, as I described in Paper 4: the 
‘surrogate claim’, whereby politicians justify policies by any means other than 
carbon reduction. To my surprise, the reaction to my blog from fellow climate 
experts was a denial of the problem, and a reiteration of the need for expert-
led processes. 
 
All this leads me to believe that climate action is extremely vulnerable to the 
wider sweep of anti-expert sentiment, and the destabilisation of established 
centres of knowledge and power. Investigative journalist Kyla Mandel has 
mapped the links between Brexit-supporting lobby groups and the thinktanks 
who question the scientific consensus on climate change, and notes that 
these groups even share an office building in Westminster (Mandel, 2016). 
Early analyses of the motivations of Brexit and Trump voters highlight a lack 
of trust in government processes (Foster and Frieden, 2017; Friedman, 2016) 
which will inevitably impact on the expert-led model of climate action that we 
have come to rely on. Yet I do not see much serious debate about these 
issues among the climate experts I work with. In the final section below, I 
sketch out a tentative account of ‘climate action as if democracy mattered’, an 
attempt to reframe climate action to take account of these shifts. First, though, 
I reflect on the place of these political machinations, given that they are taking 
place on an increasingly unstable planet. 
Political earthquakes and planetary upheavals 
Significant political events like Brexit are often described using earth science 
metaphors: earthquakes and seismic shifts. Yet such metaphorical 
earthquakes distract attention from actual changes to earth systems. 
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 Throughout my career, and increasingly during my doctoral research, I have 
found myself grappling with a disconnect between the daily preoccupations of 
politics, and the hugely significant changes to earth systems that humans are 
bringing about (some humans more than others, given disparities of wealth 
and resources). Changes to earth systems are rarely discussed in the political 
world. In early interviews, I approached this issue tentatively. I did not want to 
scare off my interviewees with questions about catastrophic climate shifts or 
the uncertainties surrounding our future on this planet. As my interviews 
continued, however, I came to realise that my difficulties in raising these 
issues stemmed in part from social and cultural constraints: what the 
sociologist Kari Norgaard (2011) calls ‘social denial’. Individuals might 
privately have concerns, but do not feel that it is appropriate or useful to voice 
them. This sustains a collective silence. In later interviews, I was more 
insistent in my questioning. As I describe in Paper 5, I tried to take 
interviewees beyond what they felt comfortable discussing, yet still, I did not 
manage to bring about a serious debate with any politician on these questions.   
 
For me, this raises a question which resonates well beyond the political 
sphere. Human society as we know it has, for nearly twelve thousand years, 
benefited from the climatic stability of the Holocene era. Are we too 
accustomed to the conditions of the Holocene to be capable of thinking 
beyond it, into an uncertain planetary future? The historian Dipesh 
Chakrabarty describes his realisation, upon studying climate science, that his 
own careful, critical scholarship, over many years,  
 
…had not really prepared me for making sense of this planetary 
conjuncture within which humanity finds itself today” (2008:199).  
 
The novelist Amitav Ghosh, in his exploration of climate change and culture, 
speculates that future humans will look back on the current moment as a brief 
era when our planet seemed relatively inert. The Anthropocene, he says, 
poses challenges “to our commonsense understandings and beyond that to 
contemporary culture in general.” (2016:9) A proper examination of our 
changing relationship with the planet is both dizzying and terrifying. It involves 
the realisation, memorably described by Noel Castree, that 
 
…humans are party to a huge and unrepeatable biophysical 
experiment in which we are not mere observers but a key part of the 
experiment itself. This is not, of course, to suggest we are somehow in 
control nor even pilots able to successfully steer the metaphorical 
(space) ship. (2014:444) 
 
People who have spent time thinking about this, like many of us who work on 
climate change, are deeply affected. Many develop coping mechanisms, such 
as techniques of compartmentalisation, limiting the amount of time they spend 
considering climate change in order to preserve psychological wellbeing. A 
study by Nadine Andrews describes the different coping strategies that people 
working in the environment sector adopt in response to environmental threat. 
Some, for example, suppress “negative emotion about climate change out of 
fear that engagement will affect competency” at work (Andrews et al 2016:11). 
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 Similarly, Lesley Head and Theresa Harada describe their findings of 
interviews with climate scientists: 
 
“Climate scientists distance themselves from stress and anxiety by 
downplaying the painful or troubling emotions …[this] enables them to 
keep going, but in ways that systematically downplay worst-case 
scenarios and embody a kind of everyday denial favouring positive 
scenarios.” (2017:40) 
 
For myself, I notice that I have developed my own coping mechanisms. Since 
my professional life is bound up in climate change, I make a conscious effort 
not to engage outside of working life. I sometimes feel bad that I don’t 
contribute to initiatives in my community, but I have found that making climate 
change a professional rather than personal issue for me (this could be called 
‘weekend denial’) has allowed me to continue working on an issue that is 
often deeply troubling. 
 
Sometimes, though, the separation of personal and professional becomes 
more problematic. During the heatwave of summer 2018, as I was writing this 
paper, I noticed an outpouring of emotion from climate commentators. 
Shedding their professional veneer, one after another expressed uncertainty, 
fear and grief about climate change, illustrated with references to their own 
families and plans for the future (see Murray, 2018 for a summary).  
 
The core difficulty is that climate change radically alters our conception of 
human agency. On the one hand, humans have had more influence than ever 
before imagined: we have made significant changes to planetary systems. On 
the other hand, we may have unleashed irreversible and possibly abrupt 
changes to these systems, leaving us with greatly diminished agency. We 
now face planetary instability which humans have contributed to, but have 
little control over; to which we may or may not be able to respond effectively. 
As Nigel Clark writes, “the ‘human’, in this way, appears to be at once 
advancing and withdrawing, centring and decentring itself” (2010:39). Those, 
like me, who advocate climate action, would like to offer a straightforward 
prescription for change. But we know that we may not convince others, and 
that even if we achieve the political, economic and social change we want to 
see, earth systems may not respond as we hope. 
Economic and political uncertainties 
Earth system change also raises questions about the foundations of our 
political beliefs and economic systems. The radical ecologist William Ophuls 
characterises the past 450 years as an ‘Age of Exception’, beginning with the 
‘discovery’ of the New World and consequent abundant resources, for wealthy 
European nations at least. This abundance, Ophuls argues, created the 
conditions for social and economic liberalism, and indeed democracy itself. 
Liberal democracy is predicated on choice; abundance offers choice, whereas 
scarcity restricts it (Ophuls, 1992; see Dobson, 2013 for a discussion). A 
similar argument is put forward by Timothy Mitchell, in his conception of 
‘carbon democracy’, though he is writing about the more recent exploitation of 
oil in the twentieth century:  
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 The availability of abundant, low-cost energy allowed economists to 
abandon earlier concerns with the exhaustion of natural resources and 
represent material life instead as a system of monetary circulation – a 
circulation that could expand indefinitely without any problem of 
physical limits.  (2011:234) 
 
Mitchell writes that this economic abundance led to “a form of politics that was 
dematerialised and de-natured” (2011:235). Thus both Ophuls and Mitchell 
argue that our current political arrangements are shaped by the availability of 
natural resources and services such as fossil fuels and a stable climate. The 
obvious implication is that a move from abundance to scarcity, or from climate 
stability to instability, should be expected to result in significant shifts in 
political understanding, practices and institutions too. 
 
The issue is not just that human societies depend on a stable climate. They 
also depend on throughputs of material – food, industrial products, buildings, 
transport – which in turn are fuelled by fossil energy (Urry, 2013). Social 
phenomena are influenced by, and influence, material systems (Shove, 2012; 
Urry, 2011). In short, our society is shaped by two material influences, which 
are now in conflict with each other: the availability of fossil energy on the one 
hand; and a stable climate system on the other.  
 
In this short piece, I cannot hope to do justice to an immensely complex 
debate in political economy, namely the complex interrelationship between 
economic structures, political arrangements and earth system uncertainties. 
But it is interesting to note that the battle lines being drawn in climate politics 
beyond parliament are based on differing views on the relationship between 
capitalism and climate change. Radical thinkers and activists on the Left, 
spurred on by Naomi Klein’s (2015) assertion that ‘this changes everything’, 
argue that nothing less than an end to capitalist economic systems will solve 
climate change. In a similar vein, Tim Jackson (2011) argues that economic 
growth, the goal of current economic systems, is incompatible with climate 
stability.  
 
So far, these debates have largely remained outside the sphere of formal 
politics. Certainly, none of the MPs in my sample were advocating an end to 
capitalist economic systems. Yet, as Marxist scholars of the postpolitical 
argue, this could be because they are part of a system that sustains, and is 
sustained by, the current capitalist system (Machin, 2013; Mouffe, 2000; 
Swyngedouw, 2010). The emerging political movement aiming to prevent 
further exploitation of fossil fuels, uniting anti-pipeline protests in Canada, 
opposition to fracking in Lancashire and stakeholder activism in financial 
markets, may be the initial manifestation of significant change, in that it offers 
a fundamental challenge to the current economic world order. 
 
In short, when set against the backdrop of earth system change, Brexit is a 
storm in a teacup (another earth science metaphor, of course). 
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 Climate action as if democracy mattered 
Since 2016, then, politics in the UK, Europe and the US has, in its own terms, 
experienced huge upheavals: the storm within the teacup. Put these in the 
context of changes to earth systems, the wider storm, and the uncertainties 
multiply. Is it even possible for democratic politics to cope with such radical 
change? My honest answer to this question is an emphatic ‘I don’t know’. But 
I am not sure whether it is even useful to ask this question. I do not think that 
it is possible to answer ‘yes’ with any confidence, yet saying a straight ‘no’ can 
only lead to fatalism.  
 
Instead, when I present this research, I often ask the audience two different 
questions before I begin. The first is, “Do you want to live in a democracy?” 
Not surprisingly, the answer is an overwhelming yes. Then I ask, “Do you 
believe that political action is necessary to tackle climate change?” Again, 
nearly everyone says yes. These questions may seem obvious, but they lay 
bare the fundamental challenge. We want democracy, and we need politicians 
that can both be elected, and implement strategies to tackle climate change.  
 
There are alternative conclusions. The veteran earth scientist James Lovelock 
famously said that “even the best democracies agree that when a major war 
approaches, democracy must be put on hold for the time being. I have a 
feeling that climate change may be an issue as severe as a war. It may be 
necessary to put democracy on hold for a while” (quoted in Hickman, 2010). 
As I discuss in Paper 5, this argument, that climate change is too important 
and difficult to solve through democratic means, is what Andrew Dobson 
describes as attempting to play “a card that will trump political debate and 
discussion” (2010: 765). But it raises more questions than it answers. Under 
what conditions, and under whose authority, would democracy be ‘put on 
hold’? For how long, and with what checks on power? Despite the limitations 
to current democratic systems, which my research confirms, I find myself 
agreeing with Winston Churchill: “democracy is the worst form of Government 
except for all those other forms” (Hansard 11 November 1947 col 203-321). 
 
What, then, might democratic strategies look like? My doctoral research has 
not provided me with a straightforward set of easily implementable solutions, 
but it has provided a certain degree of clarity on the way forward. I have 
discussed these briefly in each of the published papers, and draw them 
together below, in four principles.  
 
Principle 1: Acknowledging the issue. The first, and most fundamental, 
task is to acknowledge the significance of the issue: to face up to the fragility 
of human society, and its dependence on increasingly volatile earth systems. 
As my research has shown, this is a very difficult thing to do. Like the rest of 
us, politicians find ways to avoid confronting the issue. Social denial, to use 
Norgaard’s phrase, is everywhere. But I am convinced that such confrontation 
is necessary. The Iraq War veteran Ray Scranton wrote a haunting essay in 
the New York Times, Learning how to die in the Anthropocene. Scranton 
describes how he got through his tour of duty in Iraq not by denying the 
dangers, but by confronting and examining them, and considering his own 
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 mortality. This, Scranton argues, is how we should be thinking of climate 
change: 
 
The choice is a clear one. We can continue acting as if tomorrow will 
be just like yesterday, growing less and less prepared for each new 
disaster as it comes, and more and more desperately invested in a life 
we can’t sustain. Or we can learn to see each day as the death of what 
came before, freeing ourselves to deal with whatever problems the 
present offers without attachment or fear. (2013:1)  
 
In practical terms, this might point to what seems like a mundane conclusion: 
politicians, and indeed all those who understand the significance of climate 
change, should talk openly and often about it. Following this, the ‘climate by 
stealth’ approach, described above, is self-defeating. The more it is discussed 
and vocalised, the more chance there is of building a mandate for action. 
 
If this approach is taken to its logical conclusion, speaking up about climate 
change is far from mundane. It involves being explicit about many issues that 
are currently not discussed. In particular, it would involve a greater focus on 
the ways in which our society is currently dependent on high-carbon systems 
and practices (Urry, 2013). As John Barry notes, there has been far greater 
attention paid to defining future goals of ‘sustainability’ than to scrutinising our 
current state of what he terms ‘actually existing sustainability’ (2012). A more 
radical acknowledgement of climate change would therefore begin with an 
unflinching account of our current condition. 
 
There would be no debate about aviation, for example, without reference to its 
climate impacts. Compare that to the recent discussions about a third runway 
at Heathrow, when climate change was barely mentioned (Cuff, 2018). There 
would be explicit discussion about the place of fossil fuel companies in 
financial markets, and an acknowledgement that meeting carbon targets 
would result in reorientation of these markets. The argument currently 
advanced outside parliament, by environmental protesters, to ‘keep it in the 
ground’, would become a mainstream political debate. (As an aside, a ban on 
fossil fuel extraction and trading would be an elegantly simple policy solution, 
compared to the complex array of climate policies currently in play.) 
 
If such debate were forthcoming, there would be greater awareness of the 
distributional implications of climate change, both in terms of impacts and 
mitigation (Mendelsohn et al., 2006). In short, there would be full discussion of 
the social and economic implications of climate change impacts and actions. 
 
This debate is as much a challenge for the academy as it is for those in 
political life. Climate change is sidelined in many political science journals, 
and insights from political science are not used to strengthen the findings of 
social research on climate change (Hayward, 2013). More generally, many 
scholars of history and social science have downplayed questions of 
environment or earth systems, instead putting affairs between humans centre-
stage in their accounts, a tendency which Sarah Whatmore terms ‘endemic 
humanism’ (Whatmore, 2013:40).  
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From my vantage point in a sociology department, I found ‘endemic 
humanism’ everywhere. A notable exception was John Urry, a sociologist 
whose career was made in exploring the links between the social and the 
material, such as his exploration of the social implications of offshoring (2014). 
Whilst scholars of science and technology studies (STS) are very much 
concerned with this relationship between the social and the material, their 
object of study is often biological rather than geological. Most of the social 
scientists surrounding me seemed to see earth systems, if they noticed them 
at all, as an inert, insignificant backdrop to their study. Nigel Clark and Yasmin 
Gunaratnam, in noting this reluctance of many social scientists to engage with 
the earth sciences, ask, “what happens to our own disciplinary assumptions 
and investments when social inquiry engages fully with a mobile, forceful and 
dynamic earth?” (2016:3) 
 
Consequently, as Noel Castree (2017; Castree et al., 2014) documents, 
debates about the impact of earth system changes and human societies have 
been dominated by the natural sciences. Where social science is included, it 
tends to be economics, which, given the focus on quantification, can be 
integrated into science-based models and scenarios. Analyses of 
contributions to the IPCC reveal the dominance of economics (Corbera et al., 
2016). As I argue in Paper 5, following Castree, there is much more that 
social science could contribute to research on climate change and earth 
systems. This would require collaboration across disciplines, and different 
publication strategies. My own small contribution was to submit my final paper 
to a ‘mainstream’, natural science-led, though avowedly interdisciplinary, 
journal, Global Environmental Change. I have yet to find out whether this will 
be successful.  
 
Principle 2: Building a representative claim. I argue in Papers 4 and 5 that 
any response to climate change needs to work with the grain of democracy. 
This may sound self-evident, but, as I discuss above, climate policy is 
becoming an increasingly technocratic domain, something done ‘to’ people. I 
have found Michael Saward’s (2010) concept of the ‘representative claim’, the 
basis of Paper 4, to be a useful way of thinking about this. Democratic 
representation is not a case of passively accepting an account of public 
opinion, as defined by quantitative polling, for example, at one extreme. 
Neither is it productive to forge ahead without considering whether or not 
there is a public mandate for action. Building a ‘representative claim’ for 
climate change involves active development of a mandate. As Saward makes 
clear, it is not just politicians who can develop such claims; all those with a 
stake in the climate debate can do so.  
 
As the debates around Brexit have unfolded, I have noticed very similar 
prescriptions for change from those searching for a less divisive and more 
productive post-Brexit politics. For example, two accounts of the ‘new’ working 
class, by Lisa McKenzie and Claire Ainsley, stress that policy-making elites 
need to cast aside assumptions about public opinion, and find new routes to 
democratic engagement and inclusive policy processes (Ainsley, 2018; 
Mckenzie, 2015). Ainsley writes that  
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 …politicians and policy-makers should take a giant leap of faith and 
start their policy thinking with where the public is at, building their 
policies up and out of their opinions (2018:ch7). 
 
What these prescriptions have in common with my research and analysis is 
the stress on the need for a constant interplay between public views and 
values, on the one hand; and evidence about changes needed, on the other.  
 
Principle 3: Greater use of deliberation. One practical way in which this 
dialogue could be carried out is through greater use of deliberative processes, 
in which citizens and experts meet on equal terms to debate and agree 
solutions (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). This is not a substitute for electoral 
politics, but is a practical means by which elected politicians can explore the 
public mandate for action. The call for deliberation has been heard in the 
wake of the Brexit vote too (see for example Ainsley, 2018), with influential 
organisations including the Royal Society of Arts promoting greater use of 
deliberative processes. Recently, two Select Committees in the UK 
Parliament commissioned a Citizens’ Assembly to debate social care issues – 
another long-term, knotty issue.  
 
Such processes have been used increasingly in the Republic of Ireland. The 
findings of a Citizens’ Assembly led to the recent referendum in favour of the 
change to abortion laws. Ireland has also held a Citizens’ Assembly on 
climate change. A representative group of citizens spent two weekends 
hearing from, and debating with, climate scientists and experts on issues 
including transport, agriculture and energy; and deliberated as a group on 
how Ireland as a nation should respond to climate change. Given the time and 
space to learn, think and discuss, citizens offered up a surprisingly radical and 
confident set of answers to a tricky question. 80% of the group, for example, 
said they would be willing to pay higher taxes on carbon intensive activities 
(The Citizens’ Assembly, 2018). Yet it is almost an article of faith amongst 
politicians that people will not support calls for increased taxation.  
 
It could be that such discussions are actually more productive when political 
and economic conditions are more fragile. Put simply, if the current model is 
broken, there is more of an appetite to find radical fixes. For example, 
researchers criticising the concept of economic growth have always found a 
more willing audience at times of economic turmoil (Jackson, 2017). 
 
An important principle for greater deliberation is that its relationship to the 
formal political process should be clear. In other words, the outcomes of 
deliberative processes need to be considered and incorporated into the 
decision-making process; listening is as important as speaking (Dobson, 
2012). A recent study of senior politicians across three countries (the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand) by Carolyn Hendriks and Jennifer Lees-
Marshment (2018) revealed that politicians currently rely on ‘hidden’ forms of 
engagement with publics, through informal, spontaneous encounters, and that 




 …informal interactions between political leaders and citizens be 
‘designed in’ in and around structured participatory processes… those 
making political decisions are more likely to engage in, and be 
responsive to, participatory processes (and their recommendations) if 
they are given opportunities to connect informally with citizens. 
(Hendriks and Lees-Marshment, 2018:15) 
Seen in this way, deliberation is not a substitute for representative democracy, 
but a way of strengthening it, through ensuring that decisions are better 
informed. 
 
Principle 4: Policies that engage. In 2017, I presented my research at a 
Royal Society ‘Science Plus’ meeting, a gathering of climate experts from 
business, civil society and academia. I was struck that, amongst the sixty or 
more people attending, there were only two of us whose talks included 
discussion of whether and how the climate policies they were proposing would 
garner democratic support. The assumption that many seemed to be working 
to was that it was the role of experts to design technically optimal policies, 
which would then be handed to the politicians to ‘sell in’ to voters.  
 
This seemed to me to be the wrong way round. I argued that it was both 
legitimate and necessary to ask of every climate policy, ‘does this build public 
support?’ It was generally accepted, at that meeting, that technical feasibility 
and efficiency were sensible criteria by which to judge policy proposals such 
as carbon taxes, investment support mechanisms and legislated standards for 
vehicles or other products. My suggested addition to this list certainly raised a 
few eyebrows, yet it is a conclusion that emerges very clearly from my 
research. Policies should be meaningful, in two senses: they should provide a 
meaningful, material contribution to carbon reduction; and they should be 
meaningful to people and communities.  
 
Examples of such policies might include local-level energy solutions, such as 
community ownership of energy assets, and local management of energy 
supply and demand through smart grids and ICT-enabled infrastructure. As 
discussed above, limiting fossil fuel extraction, through disclosure, divestment 
measures or bans on further exploration, would be further examples. 
Institutional changes could include increased use of deliberative mechanisms 
to set climate strategy, such as Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly discussed above, 
or the institutions in place in Wales, Hungary and Sweden which offer 
representation of future citizens in current debates (Urry, 2016). A particular 
focus on young people could be effective. Research indicates that, whilst 
young people are less engaged in formal politics, they look for other means to 
engage politically and demonstrate citizenship (Hayward et al., 2015; Henn 
and Foard, 2012) and in ten countries, including Canada, the US, India, 
Pakistan and the Netherlands, young people have brought lawsuits against 
their governments, urging further climate action (Our Children’s Trust, 2018). 
 
Hand in hand with greater political engagement comes the need for a more 
sophisticated understanding of climate change as a social issue, not just a 
technical problem to be solved. On my daily trawl through Twitter, I am in 
turns amused and enraged by comments on new technologies that could 
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 “save the planet”. A recent piece in The Atlantic, for example, promised that 
“Climate change can be stopped by turning air into gasoline” (Meyer, 2018). 
There seem to be increasing numbers of very wealthy entrepreneurs putting 
forward climate ‘solutions’, such as Richard Branson’s Earth Challenge, and 
Elon Musk’s ultimate solution to problems on planet Earth: colonizing Mars. 
As Musk has said, “You back up your hard drive… maybe we should back up 
life, too?” (quoted in Heath, 2015). 
 
What strikes me about these proposals is that they offer ever-more ambitious 
technological ‘solutions’ as an alternative to, or perhaps a distraction from, 
changes to social and economic systems. The idea of any significant change 
to the social order, distribution of wealth or powers of governments appears 
so preposterous that migration to Mars begins to seem more plausible than 
social reform and environmental governance on our own planet.  
 
I do not deny that technological innovation is a crucial ingredient in climate 
action. But it becomes part of the problem if promises of new technology 
delay or distract from mitigation efforts (Markusson et al., 2017) and from the 
possibilities offered by social or political change. My aim here is not to enter a 
detailed discussion about the role of technology in climate mitigation, but to 
suggest that climate advocates would benefit greatly from making common 
cause with social reformers.  
 
I have picked out these four principles as they are the ones which emerge 
most directly from my doctoral research, and from the current political 
situation in the UK. What I offer is far from a complete prescription. As I begin 
to discuss here, a full response to climate change requires a close 
examination not just of democratic processes, but of the structures of the 
global economy, power and wealth. My focus on politicians, as one particular 
group of people (albeit a relatively influential group) should be seen as a 
complement to, not a substitute for, more structurally focussed analyses. They 
are not separate things, after all: as my research shows clearly, politicians 
constantly deliberate about their own room for manoeuvre within what they 
see as the established order of things. 
 
Yet, to return to my starting point for this project, much discussion of the 
politics and governance of climate change has remained in the abstract realm 
of systems and structures. I have tried to show how such structures play out 
in the lives of one important group of people: Members of Parliament. In doing 
so, I hope I have shown that a proper response to climate change is personal 
as well as structural. It must address deeply social questions about how 
individuals see themselves and their role within society, and, indeed, on this 
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Research Project Information Sheet  
 
Project title: Parliamentary responses to climate change 
 
This research project is a collaboration between Lancaster University and Green 
Alliance, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The 
work is being undertaken by Rebecca Willis, with Nigel Clark and Vicky Singleton at 
Lancaster University, and Tamsin Cooper at Green Alliance. 
 
Purpose of the project: In 2009, Green Alliance established its Climate Leadership 
Programme. Over the last six years, it has worked with more than 70 MPs to look at 
how they can incorporate consideration of climate change into their work as 
politicians. The research project seeks to evaluate this work, and ask how best to 
work with MPs and other decision-makers in the future. 
 
The research process includes: 
• Analysis of parliamentary debates on climate change; 
• Interviews with stakeholders in government, business and environmental 
groups; 
• Interviews with current and former Members of Parliament. 
 
Findings will be produced for academic audiences (conferences, journal articles) and 
practitioner audiences, through Green Alliance. Findings will also be used to inform 
Green Alliance’s strategy. 
	
About the interview: The interview will be conducted by the researcher, Rebecca 
Willis, at a time and place convenient to you. The duration of the interview will be 
agreed with the interviewee and will depend upon the time available; as a guide, it 
will take 30-40 minutes. Interviewees will be asked for their views on the research 
question, and their own experience on the issue. Interviewees have full anonymity 
(see below for further details). 
 
With agreement from the interviewee, the interview will be audio recorded, to allow 
transcription. Anonymised quotes and information from the interviews will be used to 
inform the project’s findings, as above. Interviewees are free to refuse to answer any 
of the questions; to withdraw from the interview at any point before or during the 
interview; or to request the researcher to delete records of the interview. Upon 
request, any information held about an interviewee can be deleted; the data can also 
be withdrawn from the project for a period of up to two weeks after the interview.  
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Amonymity and confidentiality: Audio recording files, transcribed text files, and the 
audio recording device will be stored securely. Audio files will be deleted from the 
recording device immediately after the interview. They will be encrypted and 
transferred to a password-protected laptop. Interviews will be transcribed by the main 
researcher, Rebecca Willis. The interview transcript will be provided on request. If 
you wish, you may provide additional information, clarification or interpretations within 
2 months from the time of the interview. 
 
All contributions to the data will be anonymised. Anonymising means deleting or 
disguising all information that can render a person identifiable to an outsider. Your 
name and contact details will be held separately from any interview recording and 
notes and it will be impossible to associate the two.  
 
Researcher: Rebecca Willis, r.willis@lancaster.ac.uk / 07764 586 221 
 
Supervisors:  
• Professor Nigel Clark, n.clark2@lancaster.ac.uk  
• Dr Vicky Singleton, d.singleton@lancaster.ac.uk 
• Tamsin Cooper, Green Alliance tcooper@green-alliance.org.uk  
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by members of the University 




      
      
Research Project Consent Form 
 
Project title: Parliamentary responses to climate change 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for 
the project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time during the interview, and withdraw the data 
from the project for a period of up to two weeks after the interview, 
without giving a reason and without detriment. 
 
I agree to the use of anonymised information given by me, 
including quotes, in future published reports, articles or 
presentations for the purposes of the study. 
 
I agree to take part in the study. 
 

















Interviews to be conducted by the researcher Rebecca Willis. 
 
The interviews will be semi-structured and will follow a narrative approach 
(Merrill and West, 2009; Riessman, 2005) to set MPs’ views on climate 
change within their professional and personal life story and career trajectory.  
 
Given the time pressures on MPs, I will offer as much flexibility as possible 





The interview will be flexible, with the aim being to develop a conversation 
between interviewer and interviewee, broadly following the structure below. 
 
Introduction by interviewer: 
Thanks for participation. Confirm procedure for consent – including anonymity.  
My research looks at how MPs understand and respond to climate change. 
But I want to start by talking to you a bit about how you see your role and 
work, then we’ll go on to see how climate change fits into that. 
 
Part 1: motivations for work 
• Can you tell me about how and why you became a politician? 
• Who do you see yourself as representing? 
o Probe: constituency/local area/voters/country/party 
• What are your aims as a politician? What would you most like to 
achieve, in professional terms?  
 
Part 2: ways of working 
• Can you tell me about a politician you have noticed, and how they 
achieve change? 
• Can you tell me about an issue that you’ve worked on? How did you 
decide to work on it? [where possible, use background information on 
what issues that MP has worked on – as a prompt] 
• Have you ever wanted to work on a particular issue but felt it wasn’t 
possible because you didn’t have support, or your party thought 
differently? 
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 • What happens (or would happen) when you speak out on an issue that 
might not have the support of colleagues in your party or in Parliament 
more generally? 
 
Part 3: relating this to climate change 
• As you know I’m particularly interested in how this applies to climate 
change.  
[for those who have worked on the issue]  
• Why did you decide to focus on this issue? 
 
[for those who haven’t worked on the issue] 
• Why have you not addressed this issue? 
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 Interview schedule (Round Two) 
           
Background 
 
Interviews to be conducted by the researcher Rebecca Willis. 
 
The interviews will be semi-structured and will follow a narrative approach 
(Merrill and West, 2009; Riessman, 2005) to set MPs’ views on climate 
change within their professional and personal life story and career trajectory.  
 
Given the time pressures on MPs, I will offer as much flexibility as possible 





The interview will be flexible, with the aim being to develop a conversation 
between interviewer and interviewee, broadly following the structure below. 
 
Introduction by interviewer: 
Thanks for participation. Confirm procedure for consent – including anonymity.  
My research looks at how MPs understand and respond to climate change. 
This is the second round of interviews. First round: concentrated on how MPs 
navigate their working life, & their representative role. 
I will tell you a bit about the findings from the first interviews – then we can 
focus discussion on the next steps.  
Explanation - first round showed: 
• MPs aware (to differing degrees) of the science. Concerned about 
climate change. But not something being required of them by their 
constituents.  
• Dilemma: need to act, versus representative role of MP. 
• Turn to simple / practical / local solutions. But then risks ‘taming’ 
climate change – making it small, manageable, incremental. 
• What are the ways through this dilemma? How can we face up to the 




• Does this analysis surprise you?  
• How did you approach issue? 
• Prompt: Nature of climate change (long-term, global, far-reaching 
implications; use IPCC evidence as base) Encourage reflection on this 
point. 
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 • What does this mean for politics? 
o Including: Representation; traditions / assumptions of politics 























Blogs published on Green Alliance’s website, Inside Track 
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